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
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WORLD PROBLEM DISCUSSION SERIES

# AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST

CHARLES HARVEY FAHS



ASSOCIATION PRESS

NEW YORK: 347 MADISON AVENUE

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## PREFACE

Many who are alert to the present world situation feel that the Far East constitutes at this time one of the areas of extraordinary strain and that the whole group of issues which make up the complexus often designated as the Far Eastern problem requires a widespread, dispassionate, and understanding discussion in America.

It is not easy, amid the engrossing interests and duties that are close at hand, for us to see clearly the various issues involved in such a problem, and especially to see those issues in their interlocking aspects. Whatever thinking we might be able to do about the problem, moreover, is discouraged by propaganda which tends to confuse us. Consequently, many assume that such questions must be left entirely to the experts, in the belief that there is no chance for the formation of an intelligent and effective public opinion with respect to the larger world problems. America's attitude on international affairs, however, should be the concern of every citizen, and it must be possible to present these subjects in ways which will lead to illuminating and profitable discussion and ultimately to trustworthy social judgments.

As will be discovered on examination, this book is not a treatise on the Far Eastern problem. It consists simply of questions to open up those issues involved which are likely to be of most interest to the American public, the questions in each chapter being followed by reference quotations setting forth the essential facts and the principal viewpoints held with reference to the major questions raised. To read through the questions and reference material would provide some basis for the personal opinion of an individual. If such thinking can be still further clarified by discussion and comparison of personal viewpoints in a group or forum with other individuals who are also trying to find their way, more progress can be made.

Two chapters might well have been added to the book: one on the Japanese problem in Hawaii, and the other on the interrelation of American interests in the Far East and those of other predominantly Anglo-Saxon national groups, such as Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, self-governing commonwealths of the British Empire whose territories border on or are in the Pacific.

Every day's newspaper brings to notice new or shifting aspects of the Far Eastern situation, and it is probable that a few questions and quotations will be out of date before the volume is long in print. It is believed, however, that for the most part both questions and

reference selections bear on the more permanent features of the problem.

An effort has been made to avoid implying answers expected to questions asked. The major question as to whether the Christian ideals and dynamic will in the end provide a way out of the most baffling difficulties in the situation has been raised repeatedly, now in one, now in another form, in these pages. Confessedly special emphasis has been laid on this issue. If the answer of Christian idealism, with its implied summons to life purpose and life service, be not found acceptable, then some more promising solution must be suggested. In this respect the book reflects an issue which has been inescapably drawn for us by recent world tendencies and events.

The forming and ordering of the questions have been done with the skilled cooperation of Mr. Harrison S. Elliott, whose wide experience in guiding discussion groups and whose resultant sense of need for the production of effective tools for the use of such classes led in the first instance to the preparation of the book.

There may fairly be claimed for the work the advantages accruing from months of careful research, for the most part amid the resources of the Missionary Research Library of New York City, and from such insight as has been gained from a lifelong interest in the Far East. Two journeys, each all too short, to Japan, Korea, and China, one made shortly before the beginning of the World War and one just before its close, have also been of high value.

CHARLES HARVEY FAHS.

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**CHAPTER I**  
**IS JAPAN BECOMING A MENACE TO THE**  
**PEACE OF THE WORLD?**

**I. What does the world think of Japan? Why?**

1. In various parts of the world the traveler not infrequently hears: "I don't trust the Japanese"; or, "I hate the Japanese." Why are the Japanese so disliked and distrusted? How far is this dislike due to prejudice; how far is it well founded?
2. Which of the following would you consider the chief causes of this feeling: Japanese racial peculiarities; jealousy over Japan's rapid rise in power; faulty ethical practices in business or in other ways on the part of the Japanese; an overweening Japanese sense of international destiny?
3. To what extent are you led to believe that international opinion of Japan is being formulated on the basis of her procedure in China, Korea, and Siberia?
4. What evidence is there that the people in America have experienced this same uneasy attitude of mind towards the Japanese? How did they come by it? To what extent do you feel that opinion in other parts of the United States reflects that in California?

**II. What danger is there, if any, that Japan will become a menace to the United States and to the welfare of the Far East?**

1. What evidence is there that the military and imperialistic party has been shaping the policy of Japan? How far has Japan's policy thus far tended to Prussianize the Far East?
2. To what extent has democracy obtained a foothold in Japan? What likelihood is there that the group in Japan working against militarism and autocracy and for a more liberal policy will win?
3. What are the imperial ambitions of Japan? In what ways, if any, are these likely to clash with those of other powers and to threaten the peace of the world?
4. Where and on what issues would Japan and the United States be most likely to clash? What is the likelihood of such a clash?



## 2 AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST

5. In what ways would the triumph of military and imperialistic policy jeopardize the largest and noblest future for Japan?
6. In what ways would a militaristic policy in Japan pave the way for another world war?

### III. How have America and the other nations hindered and how helped the liberalization of Japan?

1. What occasion, if any, has Japan had to fear the United States?
2. In her modernization what nations have had the most influence? In what ways has each influenced Japan?
3. How can the liberal movement in Japan be helped by other countries? Take into consideration the effect of sentiment in America, the impact of travelers and traders from the west, the influence of educational and other missionary work.

### REFERENCE MATERIAL

#### Estimates of the Japanese People

The Japanese, like yourselves, are human beings—subject to all the wants and frailties of our common humanity—loving and courting love—aspiring and falling—sinning and being sinned against—but knit together by a few underlying principles of far-reaching worth, among which are loyalty, the capacity for self-sacrifice, and the enthronement of knightly honor as the supreme rule of life. . . . The Japanese people of this day and generation have inherited from their sires these ethical standards, and in their relations to the outside world, they are doing what is humanly possible to realize them. . . .

Japan has not escaped the fire of doubt and denunciation with which the world resounds. Her motives are questioned, her policies criticized, and her purest aspirations scouted as criminal and sordid. She has been branded as the Yellow Peril, the Robber of China, the despoiler of Korea, the standing menace to the peace and well-being of her neighbors. And yet I . . . solemnly declare—in no spirit of either bravado or apology—that Japan is conscious of rectitude in her attitude towards the nations and peoples of all the world. She has been scrupulously faithful in the observance of all international engagements, whether in the form of treaty, covenant, or understanding. She has borne insult and humiliation in order to make good her plighted word.—Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, *Japan Review*, November, 1919, pp. 9, 10.

Is it not a fact that not only in Chosen [Korea], but in China, in America, in Australia, everywhere, this selfish imperialism of Japan has as its shadow the so-called anti-Japanese sentiment? Before we hate

the shadow it is necessary to look at ourselves. The ideals and principles under which Japan has gone forward are expressed in the familiar phrases, "Shed the national glory abroad"; "greatly extend our territory"; "rule the world"; and other such expressions. The result is that our neighbors have become anti-Japanese and today on all sides barriers, invited by ourselves, are being raised against us.—Takashi Suzuki, *Missionary Review of the World*, September, 1919, p. 661.

The Japanese is not worse than other men. We may dismiss at once the charges of trickiness and untrustworthiness which we have unconsciously trumped up against him in defense of our race-exclusiveness. Such charges have the usual, and no more than the usual, justification. The salient facts are that the Japanese are in the ascending phase of race assertion, that they are led with singular sagacity, that they have certainly no more and possibly somewhat less scruple about race-encroachment than other civilized races of our day, and finally that there is between us no cushion of kinship or common culture to lessen the shock of race collision.—Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," p. 213.

While not blind to the faults of the Japanese, I deplore . . . indiscriminate condemnation of them. If they are not the lovely fairies that Lafcadio Hearn pictures them, neither are they the "varnished savages" that Price Collier called them. From the huge mass of available data it is not difficult to make a selection that will apparently support almost any preconceived idea. But conclusions obtained in that way are one-sided. They leave some facts out of account, and state others in ways which make them appear more unfavorable than they really are. If one is to err at all, it is better to do so on the side of charity, to magnify good qualities rather than to minimize them. It is unreasonable to expect an Asiatic people to exemplify within sixty years standards of Christian character and conduct which Europe and America but imperfectly exemplify after fifteen hundred years. The Japanese have many fine qualities. They also have some grave defects. So have we. It is easy to pick out flaws in any people under heaven, including our own. After all, the Japanese are human beings like ourselves, and in thinking of them we may well remember the words of the poet Bailey: "Men might be better if we better deemed of them."—Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," pp. 242, 243.

The old belief that the Japanese are a race of diminutive supermen dies hard, but dying it is. The Japanese are an extremely brave and brainy nation. . . . They have in a very short space of time adopted the habits and customs of the Occident, and tacked them on to their own. They are . . . just humans with human faults and human virtues. They have a high code of military ethics, and a supreme but painfully modern

sense of patriotism. Their moral sense is low, they are not industrious, their intelligence is imitative but not initiative, whilst their ambition is blended with an unfortunate aggressiveness and a deplorable sensitiveness.—Andrew M. Pooley, "Japan at the Cross Roads," p. 20.

The net judgment with which we returned to America, after three visits during seven months, is a judgment of increased respect for Japan and for what she has achieved, and a deepened confidence in the worthy and better elements of Japanese life and character. There are circles both in the East and in the West in which it is almost as much as a man's life is worth to express such a judgment as this, so deep is the feeling of racial distrust of the Japanese and of suspicion of their political and commercial ambitions. . . .

No one can complain of fair and discriminating judgments, but what frightens one in much of the prejudice against the Japanese is its unfairness and its lack of discrimination. Courses of action pursued by America or Great Britain or Germany are viewed and judged in an entirely different light from similar courses of action pursued by Japan. Japan's conduct is often considered a matter of mere political expediency or a cover of sinister purposes, while wrong done by Western nations is too often condoned or lamented with soft judgments. Wrong and right are not affected by degrees of longitude. Evil or unworthy actions on the part of the Japanese ought to be judged on precisely the same basis as that on which a Western race or nation would be judged, unless the latter be held to a stricter accountability because of their fuller light.—Robert E. Speer, *Missionary Review of the World*, July, 1916, p. 517.

### American Opinion of Japan

I have touched the mind of the country in cities and villages in the east and middle west. I do not think it too much to say that there is a general suspicion of the motives and program of Japan. The Japanese course at the Peace Conference, whatever it may have accomplished diplomatically, has undoubtedly cost that country the confidence of the American public. . . .

One simple idea seems to have taken possession of America's mass consciousness. It believes that Japan is the Germany of the East. One does not have to suggest this idea. Everywhere one is asked if it does not explain most of the things that are now happening in the Orient. And it will take more than fair words and high banqueting to wipe it out.

It is likely, of course, to take some time for this feeling to reach the point where it demands action. The United States is thoroughly sick of foreign trouble. The seventy thousand dead who lie in France form a wholesome check to precipitate action in any quarter of the world. But with the passage of time, especially if proofs of Japan's imperialism accumulate, belief that China and Korea are being exploited for the

benefit of an archaic militarism will lead to belief that such a policy cannot be permitted in a sphere where the interests of the United States are as great as they are in the Pacific.—“P. H.,” *China Christian Advocate*, September, 1919, p. 7.

When you ask . . . why the affection for the Chinese and the hatred for the Japanese—there is a good deal of selfishness and human weakness mixed up in the answer. The Chinaman is not ambitious in a worldly way. The Japanese is. The Chinaman does not want to own land in America. He does not leave his employers suddenly and without warning to take a more lucrative job or go into business for himself. According to the California appraisal of character and traits, the Japanese is the direct opposite of all these things which make the Chinese welcome. . . . Nothing here written on the subject is in any way an attempt at expression of personal opinion or prejudice for or against the Japanese or Chinaman. It is merely the report of what seems to be practically unanimous opinion throughout the state. It is the opinion of such men as Benjamin Ide Wheeler and Senator Phelan, of shipping men, bankers, merchants, gardeners, and farmers. Frequently the opinion is expressed with an apologetic admission that fear of the Japanese is based chiefly on the feeling that the Japanese are much more clever than the Americans.—Charles A. Selden, *New York Times*, January 25, 1920.

### Militarism in Japan

Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War did not insure the peace of the Far East; now ten years later Japan has attacked and defeated the Germans in order to insure that peace. But no sooner has she defeated the Germans than she finds it necessary to fall upon the Chinese, likewise to “insure peace.” The process is cumulative. The peace of the Far East will, it would appear, only be assured when there is no one left to disturb Japan's peace of mind; that is, when all of Japan's rivals for commercial and political influence have been eliminated. And then, when the peace of the Far East has been established to Japan's satisfaction—what about the peace of the world?—Stanley K. Hornbeck, “Contemporary Politics in the Far East,” p. 300.

It is specially to be deplored that such a reactionary spirit, largely influenced by the political theories of German writers, had played on the mind, when the constitution was being framed by government leaders. It was in those days of the 80's that the cry of “Preserve the best of Japan” or “Japan for the Japanese” was loudly proclaimed. Magazines and books were published for the spread of the propaganda. This considerably hampered the Anglo-Saxon influence of earlier days as well as the religious work of missionaries, which was moving on by leaps and bounds.

The universities had been most influenced by German ideas of

*Kultur.* The army, which was at first modeled after the French army, had been gradually Germanized. German methods, with their exact precision and comprehensive organization, strongly appealed to the young minds of Japan, as they had to not a small number of Americans before the war. Japanese students flocked to the German universities, and later accepted the important positions in the Government and in the institutions of higher learning. But the compelling cause for the collapse of the Anglo-Saxon democratizing influence was Japan's discovery of her own danger, both political and economic. The governments of Europe she saw organized on a basis of force, rather than of right. She saw them engaged in world-wide rivalry for the possession of those countries which were weak, backward, and unable to defend themselves from European aggressors. The native peoples of the Americas, of Africa, of south and north Asia and of all the Pacific Ocean had already been swallowed up by the aggressive white races of Europe. In the Far East China and Japan alone remained unappropriated.

This discovery brought a horrible chill to every thoughtful Japanese. Not her intrinsic civilization, nor her attainments in appreciating the moral, intellectual, and political achievements of the most advanced nations of the West, would of themselves alone protect her from the engulfing swirl of European militaristic domination. Only by her own military might could she hope to confront their military might and maintain her independent life. Even most of those who through the 70's and 80's had been liberal leaders, since 1890 had at least acquiesced in the rise of the new militarism of Japan. They said that "preparedness" was essential to safety in such a world as Europe had created.—President Tasuku Harada, Doshisha University, *Japan Review*, February, 1920, p. 105.

A certain Japanese writer stated not long ago with startling frankness . . . that "a united, awakened, organized, efficient China is a menace to the very existence of Japan." That statement, while in a sense the very essence of reality, is, by the light of dawning world peace, the pathetic negation of truth. Consider the reverse side of the statement—a China disintegrated, demoralized, and wholly subservient to Japanese domination—would that mean a great destiny for Japan? In the first place, it suggests a parting of the ways with world democracy. It means a program autocratic, materialistic, and militaristic to the last degree. Its logical goal would be the complete subjection and reorganization of China's countless laborers and resources under Japanese overlordship as a vast industrial foundation for Japanese military power. Imagine its limits, if you can.—Jackson Fleming, *Asia*, August, 1918, pp. 636, 637.

To the Japanese themselves, I venture to repeat words that I wrote over eleven years ago. They are even more true now than when they were written:

"The future of Japan, the future of the East, and, to some extent, the future of the world, lies in the answer to the question whether the militarists or the party of peaceful expansion gain the upper hand in the immediate future (in Japan). If the one, then we shall have harsher rule in Korea, steadily increasing aggression in Manchuria, growing interference with China, and, in the end, a titanic conflict, the end of which none can see. Under the other, Japan will enter into an inheritance, wider, more glorious, and more assured than any Asiatic power has attained for many centuries. . . . Japan has it in her to be, not the Mistress of the East, reigning, sword in hand, over subject races—for that she can never permanently be—but the bringer of peace to, and the teacher of, the East. Will she choose the nobler end?"—Frederick A. McKenzie, "Korea's Fight for Freedom," pp. 319, 320.

### The Vision of Japanese Statesmen

*Consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination* is the vision of the Japanese statesmen; and toward the attainment of this national goal there is unity of purpose among Japanese leaders. With this in view, Inner Mongolia and Fukien province are being overwhelmed, and, last but not least, Japan has obtained from the Powers at the Peace Conference the official recognition of her paramount interests in Shantung. At the present rate of Japanese aggression, China cannot last very long. Shall she be left to her own fate, or will the Powers of the West take an active interest in the Far Eastern affairs and save her national entity? The United States is not interested in any particular European or Asiatic problem, individual in character. But the United States is interested in a problem that has far-reaching effects on the world's peace and the welfare of mankind. What are her obligations, by treaty, by policy, by moral rights, to her sister republic in the East?—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 11-13.

Shantung is only an incident in Japan's imperial policy for dominating Eastern Asia. Behind Shantung is Japan's determination to control the economic resources of China, in order to raise herself to a first-class power and to maintain that position. Everyone now knows that this program is a policy of force to the utmost. We know it. Europe knows it. China knows it. Japan knows it.

Japan is carrying this program to the limit of Prussianism. Upon a country with whom she was not at war—merely a weakened people in vassalage to her, Korea—Japan has committed extreme cruelties, sabering and beating the people, burning whole villages, abolishing civil rights. Japan has terrorized a nation, and until recent weeks was in the act of terrorizing a great province in China. She has poisoned whole populations through illegitimate smuggling of morphine and opium. . . .

But admitting that Japan has gone to extremes, drawing the heaviest

indictment against her, it remains that in principle she has merely followed the example of Europe—imperialism in its essence—the policy of taking everything you can lay hands on, whether or not it belongs to you. We in America, in ignorance of the game of international affairs, thought the Great War had ended that. We are now undeceiving ourselves.

Sharply then, and immediately, our democracy has collided with Japan's imperialism. There is no blinking that fact. There are two opposed systems. They have met in the persons of Americans and Japanese in Manchuria, buying beans or selling oil or soldiering against the Bolsheviks. They have met again over the conference tables of statesmen.—Louis D. Froelick, *Asia*, September, 1919, p. 875.

### Clouds on the International Horizon

One such cloud that constantly hangs on the horizon of Japan-American friendship is the anti-Japanese agitation in California. It is but a tiny spot on the great body politic of America, but the latter should remember that it is quite big to Japan which has an area less than the state of California. Another cloud threatens to darken the horizon of America's relations with Japan in China. Americans will understand our feeling on this subject if they can but put themselves in our place and imagine what America would think and how her people would feel if Japan began to interfere in American relations in Mexico or some country of South America! Russia, too, promises to provide another problem in which Japan's relations with America may be put to the test; but after all, this also is nothing but the China problem in another guise.—Baron Yoshio Sakatani, *Japan Review*, February, 1920, p. 107.

### American Imperialistic Tendencies

In the course of a hundred years or so the United States had jumped the Mississippi River, crossed the Rockies, occupied the Pacific slope, and since Japan's war with China had spanned the Pacific, occupying Hawaii and the Philippines, and was seeking investments in Chinese mines and railways. What might she not do next? What wonder that many Japanese, misunderstanding the spirit of the American people, should be irritated by their open-door policy and regard it as a hypocritical cloak for selfish designs? What wonder that they should think of America as a menace and, even if they could be persuaded that for the present she had no selfish motives, should believe that commercial expansion and the investment of capital in China might lead her later to challenge Japan's special interests in that land? Many of them might feel, too, that the open door, splendid in theory, could not be left safely to the protection of Occidental powers. All of Japan's experience had been to the contrary.—Kenneth S. Latourette, "The Development of Japan," p. 206.

Modesty, moderation, and content with existing boundaries, in the sense in which Americans have sometimes enjoined them upon other nations, have not thus far revealed themselves as American traits. It would be unwarranted to attribute to Americans in this period of national expansion a definite policy of deliberate and unlimited expansion. They have had no such policy—indeed, no consistent and persistent policy whatever—and they have consistently and sincerely condemned such a policy on the part of others. But they have had, like other peoples, what the outside world quite naturally construes as such a policy, a permanent instinct of self-assertion which acts automatically in all situations. They don't want the earth—far from it. But whenever circumstances have directed their attention toward some concrete portion of it, it has looked good to them, and they have cast about successfully for reasons why they should possess it. They have wanted it, and if possible have taken it, from impulse, and then have justified the taking by arguments developed later. Best of all, they have justified it by their own large power to organize, develop, and bless. The need of room, so often and plausibly cited by other peoples in justification of their aggressions, is a need that they have never known. The needs and the convenience of neighbor nations they have never regarded. American imperialism has been of the most unmistakable and undisguised variety.—Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 68, 69.

### **America's Contribution in Opening Japan to the World**

As Japan witnesses her enormous and unprecedented expansion of trade today and her rapid and colossal increase of specie, she cannot but reflect on the fact that such progress would have been impossible had not America forced open our doors and brought us into contact with the world at large.

One cannot help saying that there is no true Japanese who is not deeply grateful to America for what that country has done in the way of bringing Japan once more into commerce with the outside world. It is only right that we should acknowledge our obligations to the United States in this regard.—Baron Yoshiro Sakatani, *Japan Review*, February, 1920, pp. 106, 107.

### **Helping Japanese Liberals**

The outcome of the war has dealt the militaristic and bureaucratic party in Japan the greatest blow it has ever had. It is not too much to say that only one thing could have shaken its hold to a greater extent, and that is the actual defeat in war of the party itself. . . .

The moral of all this for our own country is almost too obvious to need mentioning. The cause of liberalism in Japan has taken a mighty forward leap—so mighty as to be almost unbelievable. The causes which



produced it can sustain it. If they do sustain it, there will be little backward reaction. If they do not continue in force to sustain it, they will betray it. To speak more plainly, the release of liberal forces that had been slowly forming beneath the lid was due to the belief that democracy really stood for the supremacy of fairness, humanity, and good feeling, and that consequently in a democratic world a nation like Japan, ambitious but weak in many respects in which her competitors are strong, could afford to enter upon the paths of liberalism. The real test has not yet come. But if the nominally democratic world should go back on the professions so profusely uttered during war days, the shock will be enormous, and bureaucracy and militarism might come back. One cannot believe that such a thing is to happen. But every manifestation of national greed, every cynical attack upon the basic ideas of the League of Nations, every repudiation of international idealism, every thoughtless word of race prejudice, every exhibition of dislike and unjustified suspicion directed at Japan, is a gratuitous offering in support of the now waning cause of autocratic bureaucracy in Japan. Liberalism here has plenty of difficulties still to overcome. Only the liberals in Japan itself, who have now taken heart and courage, can work out the problem. But liberals elsewhere can at least fight against those untoward developments in their own countries, which will restore to the Japanese reactionaries the weapons which the outcome of the war has loosed from their hands.—John Dewey, *Dial*, May 17, 1919, pp. 502, 503.

### The Rising Tide in Japan

The breaking down of the former political structure, as well as the ancient social structure, under the stress of modern industrialism is turning Japan into paths that may lead to regions of radical experiment. The question now disturbing the country is not how to avoid change, but how to maintain the old authority until a suitable modern authority can take its place. . . .

Intelligent Japanese, close to high official circles, say frankly that fear of revolution—or something akin to revolution—chills the heart and stays the hands of the authorities. This fear may be exaggerated. It certainly seems so to one who has moved about among the working people and attended their confidential meetings. The ignorant coolie laborers of Japan are still stolid—not people to start anything, or to stop where reason dictates if once started by others. Intelligent and educated workmen, who are by no means a mere handful, are primarily seeking relief from the intolerable burden of exorbitantly rising prices; but in the course of this effort they are involuntarily acquiring more radical ideas and are learning to promote their interests in new directions. The labor movement is marching in Japan.

But above these people is the "brain proletariat," restless, alert, dis-

satisfied, repressed. It has sympathizers and sentries in every government bureau, factory office, bank, and counting-house in the Empire. Its sentiments creep into the organs of public opinion in innumerable covert as well as overt ways. It has the ear of the silent thousands who are doing the manual labor of Japan—whose very discipline may become one day a weapon against established institutions. The thought of this brain proletariat has many aspects—from Buddhist passivism to Bolshevik activism—but through them all runs the red thread of a new discontent, of criticism of everything that has been and is. It resents even its former prides and affections. An educated Japanese of liberal sympathies illustrated this by declaring, with his usually conventional English rendered picturesque by irritation, "These tourists who bubble at the mouth about cherry-blossoms must have empty heads, or they would see more serious things in Japan to talk about."—Victor S. Clark, *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1920, pp. 394, 397.

### **The Contribution of Christianity to Japanese National Life— Two Notable Japanese Testimonies.**

Christianity has more than anything else diffused among our people the notion of international brotherhood. . . . Nobody could deny the tender influences of Christianity which is giving the final touch to their catholicity of mind.

It would be amiss if I failed to mention the enormous benefit Christianity is contributing to Japan in the line of women's education and philanthropic works, which would never have attained their present magnitude and development but for the guiding hand of foreign missionaries.

I believe that in Japan freedom of conscience obtains more than in any other country; but religions will become the integral part of a nation only when they are thoroughly acclimatized. I hope and believe that in the fullness of time a real Japanese Christianity will evolve, and be a beacon light in the path of the Japanese people in the progress of civilization.—Hon. T. Tanaka, *Missionary Review of the World*, November, 1916, p. 825.

Although Christianity has enrolled less than 200,000 believers, yet the indirect influence of Christianity has poured into every realm of Japanese life. It has been borne to us on all the currents of European civilization; most of all, the English language and literature, so surcharged with Christian ideas, have exerted a wide and deep influence over Japanese thought.

Concerning the future it is my own conviction that no practical solution of many pressing problems is in sight *apart from Christianity*.—Count Okuma, Quoted in the *Missionary Review of the World*, November, 1916, p. 825.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **HOW FAR HAS JAPAN BECOME THE DOMINATING FORCE IN THE FAR EAST?**

- I. What effect did Japan's part in the Great War have upon her acquiring a dominant position in the Far East?**
  1. What part did Japan take in the Great War?
  2. How did this part strengthen her position in the Far East?
  3. What effect did the awarding of the former German rights and concessions in Shantung have upon her influence in China?
  4. How far and in what ways did the Peace Conference recognize Japan's claim to a prior position in determining the policies of the Far East?
- II. How much of a foothold has Japan on the mainland of Asia?**
  1. Look at the map and see in what ways you think her control of Korea strengthens Japan's influence on the Asiatic mainland.
  2. If Canada owned, maintained, policed, and operated say the northern group of the American transcontinental railroads, owned and operated the mines in the general region traversed by these railroads, controlled practically all the commerce of the region with other regions, and was able to insist that in this belt of states all legal cases in which Canadians were involved should be tried in courts under Canadian jurisdiction and according to Canadian law, to what extent would you say American sovereignty in the states from Minnesota to Washington had passed from the United States? This is practically the situation in Manchuria. To what extent has Manchuria become in effect a Japanese dependency?
- III. How does Japan's position in the Far East compare with that of other powers?**
  1. Look at the map and see the location of the Japanese Islands with reference to the mainland of Asia. Locate the regions where she is in actual or in practical control on the mainland of Asia.

## JAPAN DOMINATING FORCE IN FAR EAST? 13

- a. Would you or would you not say that Japan's naval power and her present territorial foothold give her control of the Yellow and Japan Seas, with their approaches to China and Vladivostok?
  - b. In what ways does Japan's control on the mainland of Asia help to make her a dominating force in the Far East?
  2. How does Japan's influence in the Far East compare with the influence of Great Britain, the United States, and other Western powers in this same general area?
  3. Is Japan or is she not the dominating force in the Far East? Why do you think so?
- IV. To what extent does Japan's policy indicate a purpose to dominate the Far East?
1. To what extent were Japan's twenty-one demands upon China an indication of her determination to dominate China?
  2. To what extent is Japan in Siberia because of a real menace from the "Red" forces; to what extent is she taking advantage of the present disorder to establish herself in Siberia?
  3. What share of responsibility to aid the anti-Russian forces in Siberia has Japan taken? Were you a statesman in Japan at this time, would you consider the present summons to police duty in maintaining order in Siberia an opportunity or a burden? Why?

### REFERENCE MATERIAL

#### Japan in the World War

The question has been asked, "What has Japan done in this war?" I answer only by saying that Japan has done her best. . . . Her fleets in the Pacific and Indian oceans and in the Mediterranean traversed over 1,200,000 miles in the work of protecting transports and merchant vessels from the submarines, and we escorted 750,000 men rushing to the aid of France and Britain. Japan's geographical position, her resources, and the fact that the Pacific Ocean was freed of the menace which has threatened the freedom of other seas, enabled us to provide considerable quantities of war supplies and materials to Russia, to England, and to France, and, including loans to Russia, the money expenditure has been a very considerable item in the budget of Japan. But these are small matters in comparison with the magnificent sacrifices of our Western allies. The Government and the people of Japan have been the loyal allies of Great Britain and France and the friends of Russia and of the United States.—Baron Makino, Japanese Peace Commissioner,

in "Japan and China: An Official View," published in *London Daily Telegraph*, quoted in *Modern Review*, August, 1919, p. 174.

### **Japan the Indisputable Leader Nation of the Orient**

Japan emerged out of the war practically unharmed and relatively stronger. She is now the only nation in the East, Far or Near, that enjoys a complete independence. She is the indisputable leader nation of the Orient. The World War offered her the opportunity of "ten thousand years" and Japan will see to it that she will have her place in the sun. Japan will see to it that the Western nations shall not meddle in the affairs of the Far East without Japan's consent. Japan considers it her obligation to redeem the unnumbered millions of Asiatics from what might be the world's greatest tragedy—of being reduced to a perpetual servitude to the white races. Japan will see to it that the regenerated East may work out her human destiny in harmony instead of in antagonism to the civilization of the West. Meanwhile, Japan will see to it that her "sphere of influence" in China, be it ever so humble in comparison with what the European nations have already secured in that country, will yield sufficient economic advantage to provide her for future contingencies. And, finally, if China does not awake from the danger of everlasting confusion, constantly offering fresh opportunities to the Western nations for more aggression upon herself, bringing new frontiers and new problems to her neighbor, Japan will see to it that she will act again and again and take many more provinces just as she took Shantung. Let there be no mistake about this.—Setsuo Uenoda, "When East Meets East," *Asia*, December, 1919, p. 1217.

### **The Bitterest Outcome of the War to China**

In order to make the Pacific safe for the ships of the Allies, Japan wrested from Germany the harbor of Kiaochow Bay and the city of Tsingtao and the claims which Germany had extended into the province of Shantung. In accomplishing this Japan crossed Shantung from the north, invading China's neutral soil, and not content with taking over Germany's establishment she built brick barracks along the railroad, filling them with Japanese troops, and erected a great military establishment in Tsinanfu, the provincial capital, where she could control not the railroad east and west alone but also the trunk line north and south between Nanking and Tientsin, and dominate the entire government of the province. She overran the province with Japanese, as the Germans had never done with Germans, and introduced far and wide a diabolical trade in morphine. It was absolutely necessary that German power in Shantung should be overthrown, but the absorption and retention of so extensive and absolute control of this great province by Japan has been the bitterest outcome of the war to China and has caused great dissatis-

faction with the Peace Treaty to many friends both of Japan and China in the West. On China's side it is urged that the original acquisition of her rights in Shantung by Germany was by wrong and injustice; that Japan promised to return what she took from Germany to China; that on entering the war China denounced her agreements with Germany and resumed all extorted rights; that she needs and has a right to the return of a harbor, which is one of the few remaining harbors on her coast which European powers have not absorbed; that she is now striving to get her national house in order and needs all the help other nations can give her, instead of being pillaged of her resources; that she has already ample cause to distrust Japan, and that the Japanese claim to Shantung can do nothing but deepen this distrust and foster hatred between two peoples who must live in neighborly relations forever and who ought to be friends. On the side of Japan it is argued that Japan was asked to drive Germany out of Shantung by Great Britain; that Germany's rights had been granted to her by China and that it was Japan and not China which took them back from Germany; that Great Britain is seeking Tibet and has no intention of returning to China what she has taken directly from her in the past, and that since the war began France has helped herself to more of China's territory at Tientsin; that China is in danger of breaking up, and that it would be suicidal for Japan to run the risk of having some European power in Shantung; that Japan has promised to return to China all but a small part of Kiaochow Bay, and that she will hold this only on a long lease, so that in time China may have all back if China grows capable and trustworthy. If only Japan, which has learned so much from the West, would transcend the political tradition of the West and honestly seek to build China up, to strengthen the best elements of the nation, to be an absolutely unselfish friend—this would be to expect more of Japan than Western nations have been wont to do, but it would begin a new day in Asia, and from a friendly, grateful China Japan would gain more than she can ever wring from China outraged and embittered.—Robert E. Speer, "The Gospel and the New World," pp. 45-47.

### **Statement by the Chinese Peace Delegation**

One of the most remarkable documents to which the Peace Conference has given birth is the statement issued by the Chinese Peace Delegation. Dignified and restrained, but remorselessly logical, it is a scathing indictment of the Treaty of Versailles in its effect upon the Far East. I cannot close this chapter better than by quoting its salient points:

"China came to the Conference with strong faith in the lofty principles adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers as the basis of a just and permanent world peace. Great, therefore, will be the disappointment and disillusionment of the Chinese people over the proposed settlement. If there was reason for the Council to stand firm on the

question of Fiume, there would seem all the more reason to uphold China's claim relating to Shantung, which involves the future welfare of 36,000,000 souls and the highest interests of peace in the Far East. . . .

"The German rights in Shantung originated in an act of wanton aggression in 1897, characteristic of Prussian militarism. To transfer these rights to Japan is therefore to perpetuate an act of aggression which has been resented by the Chinese people ever since its perpetration.

"Moreover, owing to China's declaration of war against the Teutonic Powers, and the abrogation of all treaties and agreements between China and these Powers, the German rights automatically reverted to China. This declaration was officially notified to and taken cognizance of by the Allied and Associated Governments. . . . The Council has bestowed on Japan rights not of Germany but of China, not of the enemy but of an ally. Such virtual substitution of Japan for Germany in Shantung, serious enough in itself, becomes grave when the position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia is read in connection with it. Firmly entrenched on both sides of the Gulf of Peichili—the water outlet of Peking—with a hold on three trunk lines issuing from Peking and connecting it with the rest of China, the capital becomes but an enclave in the midst of Japanese influence. Besides, Shantung is China's Holy Land, packed with memories of Confucius and Mencius and hallowed as the cradle of Chinese civilization. . . .

"The Chinese Delegation understand that the decision of the Council has been prompted by the fact that Great Britain and France had undertaken in February and March, 1917, to support at the Peace Conference the claims of Japan to German rights in Shantung. To none of these secret agreements, however, was China a party, nor was she informed of their contents when she was invited to join the war against the Central Powers. The fortunes of China appear thus to have been made an object of negotiation and compensation after she had already definitely aligned herself with the Allied cause."—Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of Asia," pp. 522-524.

### Japan in Manchuria

Since the Russia-Japan War an anomalous condition has prevailed. Theoretically, Manchuria remains a part of China. Its officials are appointed by the Government of China, and are supposed to be amenable to it. Practically, the Viceroy and his subordinates are in a very embarrassing position. They are expected by the Peking Government to rule the country; but north of Changchun the Russians, until the chaos which followed the revolution of 1917 weakened their hold, were in possession of the railway and all the leading cities *en route*. South of Changchun the Japanese hold the railway, the fortified city of Port Arthur, and the commercial city of Dairen. Both Russians and Japanese do as they please in their respective territories, with little regard for the wishes of the Chinese officials. It is true that their jurisdiction is technically limited to a narrow strip on each side of the railway, but

as that railway is the one thoroughfare of the country, along which all streams of trade and travel flow, and in which practically all the activities of Manchuria center, the limitation is more nominal than real, and a Chinese magistrate who acted on any other assumption would quickly find himself in hot water. . . .

I heard many complaints that during and immediately after the Russia-Japan War hundreds of Japanese tradesmen had taken possession of shops in Manchurian cities, in some cases forcibly ejecting the Chinese proprietors, and that they have kept these shops ever since, refusing to pay rent except where some particular shopkeeper was able to compel payment. . . .

Japan, too, is under no less constraint than before to resist the advance of any European nation in Manchuria, and to maintain paramount influence in China. It is difficult to understand how any one who knows what they have done and are now doing can imagine that they contemplate anything else than permanent occupation. The Southern Manchurian Railway is one of the best railways in Asia. . . . The Japanese have expended great sums at Dairen. They have constructed immense docks for shipping, opened new streets and repaved old ones, erected handsome public and private buildings, and in general are making Dairen a model city of the Far East. . . .

As a matter of fact, why should the Japanese withdraw? They knew perfectly well that if they did the Russians would move down and occupy their old positions, and that the conditions which preceded the Russia-Japan War, and which caused it, would recur. It is fundamental to sound thinking on this subject to remember that Japan cannot be expected to acquiesce in having any European Power form a wedge between Japan and China and lie along the Korean frontier in such a way as to make Japanese occupation of Korea precarious.—Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," pp. 213, 214, 215, 219, 220, 221.

### **Will Japan Withdraw from Siberia?**

Japan, it is to be feared, has been preparing for the present crisis for many months. She has had 75,000 troops in Siberia for a year and a half. In every town along the Siberian Railway, and extending out into the vast rich country on either hand, she has established the foundations of her economic control. She is reported to have taken steps to acquire the industries of Siberia; has surveyed the mines and arranged the necessary concessions with the Cossack Semenov, whom she has constantly supported and intended finally to place in power. This is the tale which comes from thoroughly competent observers. If Japan were to withdraw her troops from Vladivostok tomorrow, everyone knows that the day after tomorrow the people of Vladivostok would set up their soviet again. It is the delusion of madness (or of a discredited



statesman) to think that Japan will withdraw.—Lincoln Colcord, "Japan in Siberia," *Nation*, January 10, 1920, p. 38.

### Keeping the Peace in Eastern Siberia

The Japanese expedition to Siberia has not been sent for the exclusive purpose of helping the Czecho-Slovaks: it was also with the object of keeping the peace in eastern Siberia. It is for this purpose that Japan has given aid to all anti-Bolshevik leaders—Kolchak, Horvath, Semenov, etc. Should the Empire vacate Siberia, what will become of Siberia? Britain and France still regard the Bolsheviks as an enemy, but their internal troubles and financial conditions make it difficult for them to send troops to Russia or even to help the anti-Bolsheviks with goods. This is why they have come to the decision that Russian affairs should be left for the Russians to decide. And this they can afford to do, because even though the influence of the Bolsheviks may spread, Britain and France will not be directly affected, as there are the intervening countries of Courland, Poland, Germany, Austria, etc.

Not so with this country. Korea, which is our territory, Manchuria and Mongolia which are our sphere of influence, and China, which is in a relation of mutual dependence with us, are all contiguous with Siberia and immediately exposed to the poisonous influence of the Bolsheviks. Besides, the disturbance in Siberia will at once imperil the first line of Japan's national defense, and is sure to be followed by a disturbance in Korea and Manchuria and Mongolia.—Quoted from the *Tokyo Yamato* in *Literary Digest*, January 31, 1920, p. 26.

### China's Interest in the Siberia Question

China is the focus of the Eastern question, and her interest in all phases of it is absolute. It is not too much to say that China's interest in the Siberian question is as vital to her future security and national position as the Alsace-Lorraine question is vital to France, or the existence of buffer states like Holland and Belgium in Europe has been vital to the security of England. As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, China virtually lost control of her vast provinces of Manchuria and Mongolia. As a result of Russia's collapse in the Great War, China had a chance to regain control of northern Manchuria and to recover Mongolia. Now came a proposed Japanese occupation of eastern Siberia to menace again the whole of China's northern territories and to cast a longer shadow over the Middle Kingdom. By all the catch-phrase tests which diplomacy has invented in the process of modern empire building, China's interest in the Siberian question is fundamental. By the test of "territorial propinquity," China has a major position, for China and Siberia are contiguous on a land frontier extending for several thousands of miles. By the test of "vested interests," China is again paramount

by reason of her reversionary ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which lies for about a thousand miles in Chinese territory. By the test of population contacts, China also is paramount, for hundreds of thousands of Chinese reside in Siberia and own much property there. By the test of the alleged menace of Bolshevism, China is more exposed to its penetration, for China at bottom is a great, loosely knit democracy and very susceptible to such penetration; whereas, for instance, Japan is a rigid autocracy remarkably impervious to such penetration. In the circumstances that existed, China could not feel otherwise than menaced if Japan was given a "free hand" in Siberia, for a Japanese occupation of that country east of Lake Baikal would envelop China's northern provinces in an elbow, with a large part of southern Manchuria already under a Japanese quasi-sovereignty. In short, the considerations that were potent in inducing China to join the Allied group at war against the Central Powers would vanish in good part, and a situation would be created that probably would work out adversely to China in practice.—Thomas F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 289, 290.

### **Japan Tarrying at the Cross Roads**

As a region for colonization on a large scale, Siberia would probably not be attractive to the Japanese, who do not settle even in southern Manchuria in large numbers, as the climate is unfavorable. But the direction of mining and manufacturing enterprises and of transportation would enable Japanese capital to exercise a very profitable control. To the outsider, however, it would appear that any attempt to exercise political domination in eastern Siberia will be accompanied with so many risks, and, on the other hand, the opportunities for friendly cooperation in a square and above-board manner in the development of Siberian natural resources will be so great that it should be an easy matter for the Japanese nation to make its choice. . . .

Should Japan adopt the militarist and imperialist alternative to the extent of using the present crisis for the purpose of gaining control of the eastern part of the Trans-Siberian, and of the North Manchurian (Chinese Eastern) Railway, this would not only reveal a policy dangerous to the peace of the world, but it would specifically be a direct attack on the policy of equal opportunity in which America is vitally interested. Experience has amply shown that the ownership by a foreign government of a railway in any country in practice destroys equality of commercial and industrial rights. Should Japan further embark on a policy involving a policy of exercising political control within other countries, through ownership of the means of transportation and other methods, such ambitions could lead her only to the end where German's military power ultimately found itself, confronted by the solid opposition of the civilized world. The American Government, both in its function of protecting

American rights and anticipating imminent dangers to national life, and as a friend of Japan and upholder of international peace and equity, could hardly look on in indifference were such tendencies to assert themselves. Should, however, Japan choose the other course, no one will begrudge her any natural advantage which she has—and there are many—for prominent participation in the development of Siberian resources.—Paul S. Reinsch, *Asia*, February-March, 1920, pp. 169-171.

### National Sentiment in China over the Shantung Decision

There can be little doubt that the Government had officially instructed its delegates to the Peace Conference in Versailles to sign the treaty, recognizing though it did the Japanese appropriation of German rights in Shantung. National sentiment was, however, tremendously aroused. If Japan had set out to instigate a new national spirit which should overwhelm the old local provincialisms, she could not have proceeded in a more effectual way to accomplish the purpose. The people took the matter out of the hands of the Government. By cablegrams to Paris, by telegrams to Peking, by mass meetings and agitations, finally by a strike of students and then of the mercantile guilds in the larger cities, they made it clear that national sentiment would regard as traitors all those who should take part in signing the treaty. It was an extraordinarily impressive exhibition of the existence and the power of national feeling in China. It was all the more impressive because it had to work without organized governmental agencies, and, indeed, against the resistance of deeply intrenched pro-Japanese officialdom. If there still remained anywhere those who doubted the strength and pervasiveness of Chinese patriotism, the demonstration was a final and convincing lesson. But it took a great crisis of foreign menace to focus the feeling; Japan in the last two years has done for China what otherwise might have taken a generation more. But when the immediate task of preventing the signing of the treaty that gave away Chinese rights was performed, the feeling lapsed. Perhaps it remains equally intense, but it has lost in sureness of direction.—John Dewey, "Chinese National Sentiment," *Asia*, December, 1919, p. 1241.

### Japan's Policy in Relation to China

In her dealings with China, the famous Twenty-One Demands may be said fairly to represent the method and the gist of Japan's policy. These were presented to China in what was intended to remain a secret manner. On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister presented to the President of China a list of demands arranged in five groups. Secrecy was enjoined upon the Chinese Government, but so momentous were the proposals that it was found impossible to maintain it. The demands leaked out, but the public was promptly assured by subsidized news

agencies that there had been no demands. Subsequently, in answer to official inquiries, the Japanese Government furnished to various governments, including the United States, a version of the demands which eventually proved to be different both from the original demands as presented to the President of China on January 18th and from the revised demands presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs April 26th. So strong were the denials of the Japanese Legations in London and Washington that American and English newspapers were unwilling to publish the first reports sent to them by their experienced correspondents in Peking. Later developments showed that there had been no exaggeration in these earliest reports. . . .

The scope of these demands was commensurate with the ambition of Japan. They were subdivided into four geographical groups: (1) Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, (2) the province of Shantung, (3) the Yangtze valley, and (4) the province of Fukien. The only parts of China which were not directly affected were the western and south-western provinces which adjoin British or French concessions. All of the northern provinces, those of the Yangtze valley, and the coast provinces, with the exception of Canton, came within their purview. The specific items of the demands provided for the exploitation of iron and coal mines, the construction and management of railways, joint agricultural enterprises, joint iron and steel works, the extension of the period of leased territories, and other affairs of similar far-reaching consequences. They even took cognizance of a "report" that had reached the Japanese Minister "to the effect that the Chinese Government had the intention of permitting foreign nations to establish on the coast of Fukien province dockyards, coaling stations for military use, and naval bases," and the Chinese Government was solemnly required to give the lie to the "report." The most cursory consideration of the geographical limits of the territory mentioned in these demands and of the wide range of interests involved can leave no one in doubt as to the character of the policy of Japan in her relations with China.—John C. Ferguson, "Pan-Nipponism," *Asia*, September, 1919, pp. 890-892.

### **Japan's Extraordinarily Favorable Geographical Situation**

A glance at the map shows how this long procession of islands from Saghalien to Formosa, lying like a series of wharves along the coast of eastern Asia, with its outposts and inlets at Korea, on the Liaotung Peninsula, at Kiaochow, and now at Fukien, gives Japan an enormous commercial as well as a strategical advantage in the competitive war of the near future, as compared with her rivals in Europe or in America. Never in history was so remarkably favorable a geographical situation in the hands of one nation, controlled by men capable of taking full advantage of it and looking to the future of Asia as in some sort the

heritage of the Japanese race.—H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," pp. 169, 170.

### **The Shaping of Events in the Far East**

What part should the United States take in the shaping of events in the Far East? Upon the correct analysis and proper solution of this problem hinges the future peace in the Pacific basin and the welfare of one fourth of the world's population. If the problem be correctly solved, and the situation wisely handled, the Pacific Ocean in the future will be a basin of cultural and commercial activities; the United States will hold her political prestige and commercial advantages in the East; the oldest civilization in the world will be preserved, and China will in time take her place among the powers of the world. If, on the other hand, the Asiatic question is left to a hit-or-miss policy with a lax and indifferent attitude, Asia will ultimately be consolidated under Japanese domination. Asia, with great natural resources and limitless man-power, dominated by an aggressive empire, European or Asiatic, is a menace to the world's peace, and a direct threat to the welfare of the United States.—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 94, 95.

### **Conflicting Aims and Interests of America and Japan**

Though never seeking a quarrel with Japan and though having no ambition for possessions in the Pacific any more extensive than those we now hold, a number of events of the present generation have in a striking and unmistakable way placed Japan and the United States as the champions of opposing and conflicting aims and interests. The conflict of interests of the two countries is not a possible development of the future; it is an immediate and at-present-existing fact, which no amount of peace-advocate logic can reason away. In the course of time one of the two countries must recede from its present position. We must give up some of our cherished traditions and renounce policies in which all Americans have taken a just pride, or Japan must give up imperial ambitions which are dear to all Japanese and have dominated state policy for years.—Carl Crow, "Japan and America," pp. 3, 4.

### **World Problems and World Outlook**

The United States is a world power, destined increasingly to participate in world commerce and world politics. The fate of peoples, the disposition of territories, and the determination of commercial policies in the Far East are bound to be of enormous consequence in world affairs. What occurs in the Pacific will have its effects upon the activities and policies of the major nations everywhere. The people of the United States already have large social and considerable commercial interests in the Pacific. They are entitled to increase, and in the natural course

of events undoubtedly will increase, their activities in these lines. We should endeavor in the present to safeguard the opportunities of the future. We should ask for nothing but what is just, giving due consideration to the rights and needs of all, demanding no special privileges for ourselves; but we should, on behalf of our own interests and of the cause of peace, frame our policies and practices with a view to the defense of the principles upon which we, along with the other powers, have agreed.

The international problems of the Far East are world problems. As such, they merit and demand the attention of every nation which has a world outlook and world interests.—Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 403.

### **The World-Wide Application of Wilsonian Principles**

Summarizing his principles in the form of questions, President Wilson. . . said, "Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose or interest? Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations, or shall the wrong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?" . . . The issue for the Orient as well as the Occident seems to be clear-cut. The President has said: "These issues must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest."

No human being can view the incalculable loss of human life and wealth . . . wrought by the Great War, and remain unmoved. "For what purpose is this waste?" Only in the achievement of some such principles as given above can any such loss be reconciled. These principles must be no less than world-wide in their application; they should extend not only to the free peoples of Europe and America, but also to the newborn democracies of the Mongol and the Slav. Especially do they concern the vast republic across the Pacific, whose future relations with the rest of the world are so full of potential possibilities for discord or for peace. The importance of these relations was summarized twenty years ago by John Hay in two sentences: "The storm-center of the world has gradually shifted to China. . . . Whoever understands that mighty Empire socially, politically, economically, religiously, has a key to world-politics for the next five centuries." Against the background of the great democratic upheavals in the East that are just beginning to take concrete shape and expression, and of the costly cataclysm in the West . . . these statements have a new meaning, both as a warning and a prophecy, concerning the new age which is to come.—W. Reginald Wheeler, "China and the World War," pp. 181, 182.

**CHAPTER III**

**SHOULD JAPAN BE ALLOWED INCREASINGLY  
TO DOMINATE THE FAR EAST?**

**I. What kind of a record has Japan in the Far East?**

1. In her policy of commercial and administrative penetration of the Asiatic mainland, how far has Japan followed the policy of Great Britain and other powers in the extension of "spheres of influence"; how far has she used other methods of acquiring control?
2. In what ways has Japan used her power to help Korea, Manchuria, and Shantung? In what ways has she used it to exploit these territories?
3. If Japan becomes increasingly dominant on the mainland of Asia, how far can we count on her using her powers for the good of the peoples concerned?

**II. Compare Japan's reasons for wanting territory with those of other powers.**

1. Why did Russia want Manchuria? Why does Japan want it? Why does China wish to keep it?
2. Compare Russia's and Japan's reasons for wishing Siberia. Take into consideration extension of commerce, establishing empire, finding ports, giving room for relief of congested population.

**III. How far is Japan's increasing control on the mainland to the interest of the Far East?**

1. For the development of the Far East which would you consider better—that Korea, Manchuria, and eastern Siberia should belong to China, to Russia, or to Japan, or that they should become independent states? Why?
2. If a worthy government of a democratic type were established in Russia, which government, Japan or Russia, would be more acceptable as the dominant power in the Far East?
3. How far is it of benefit to the Far East that Japan's control should increase in China proper?

**IV. Should Japan be allowed increasingly to dominate the Far East?**

1. Why did China refuse to accept the award of Shantung to Japan by the Peace Conference? What is her attitude toward the increase of Japanese control? What weight should be given to this?
2. On what grounds can Japan claim a right to a dominating position in the Far East? On what grounds could this claim to priority right be regarded as invalid?
3. How much and what sort of a menace to peace in the Far East is the further extension of Japanese control on the Asiatic mainland?

**V. What attitude should the United States take toward the increasing domination of Japan in the Far East?**

1. In what way has the United States used her diplomatic influence against the extension of "spheres of influence" in China and for the integrity of China?
2. What difference does it make to the United States what happens in the Far East?
3. Do you or do you not feel that the United States should seek to prevent the extension of Japanese control? Why?
4. How far do you feel the United States would be justified in going in helping to shape the outcome?
5. Just what can America do to help in guiding the Far East to a right destiny?

**REFERENCE MATERIAL**

**Japan's Record in the Far East**

There can be no question but that Japan is engaged in the attempt to control and where possible throttle the economic development of China. . . . She has acquired the last Chinese owned railway, seventy-four per cent of the mines and mineral deposits, and most of the forests and water power of the country. Of course we point the finger of scorn at the corrupt officials who have passed these things over to her for a song, but the fact that these officials have been corrupted by Japanese influences and are maintained in office in the face of Chinese public opinion by Japanese intrigue is also to be borne in mind.

Any study of the desperate internal political situation leads you straight back to the same sinister influences. Not a single one of the freebooting generals who are destroying the inner peace of China today



but depends on Japan for money and munitions. When Chang Tso-lin, one of the worst, commenced his march on Peking to overthrow the Government last year, he was armed with the rifles which the Germans surrendered to the Japanese Government at Tsingtao. It is significant that the conditions of anarchy and brigandage which are supposed to necessitate intervention by Japan in China have been most rife in the two provinces which Japan claims as her particular sphere. It is to Japan's interest to keep China's political affairs stirred up, and she is doing so.

Japan's effort to undermine the moral stamina of the Chinese, to make impossible "cohesive and sacrificial patriotism," by the widespread dissemination of morphia among the people is already known to the world. . . . I can send . . . a list of ninety Japanese shops which were discovered to be engaged in this devilish business in a single small city. The combination of the Japanese brothel, the Japanese "drug" store, and the Japanese hospital is the most widely known Japanese business combination in China.

It is this fact that, while China is struggling desperately to free herself from her past and erect a modern democracy amidst the immemorial autocracy of Asia, Japan is constantly pressing in to affect her affairs, and that everywhere her touch brings bane, not blessing, that arouses our indignation. It is no small thing that across the top of every statement sent out by the press bureau of the awakened students of China there is blazoned the words of a Japanese minister of foreign affairs, spoken in an official capacity: "Japan cannot view with equanimity the awakening of 400,000,000 people."—"P. H.," *China Christian Advocate*, November, 1919, p. 5.

### Japan's Policy on the Asiatic Mainland

Japan, the infant prodigy of the East, crowded for space for her ever-increasing population, and with an insatiable desire to become a first class power among the family of nations, has a vision of political and commercial expansion on the mainland of Asia. Consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination is the soul of Japanese foreign policy, and has been so ever since Japan became a modern nation. In the first blocking out of her program she proposed to annex Korea within forty-nine years, but this has been accomplished in twenty-six. Now the same process is being repeated in China. Already Japan dominates Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Fukien, Shantung, and Liaotung. The same policy—the policy of opportunism—that was used so effectively in undermining the Korean Government is in full operation in China now. . . . The open door principle is practically destroyed, for in the territories controlled by the Japanese the door is open only to Japanese trade.—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," p. 96.

**European versus Asiatic Ethics**

Can it be that Christian Europe "can do no wrong"? To our benighted souls it is a puzzle that European powers may perpetrate any crime in Asia with impunity, while an Asiatic nation must be execrated and condemned for taking the necessary steps to prepare itself against their further encroachment upon its backward neighbors.

To know something of the portentous possibilities of the British and Russian policies in China, one need only think of the vastness of the territories which they have staked out for themselves. Russia claims as her sphere of influence Outer Mongolia (1,000,000 square miles), Sinkiang (548,000 square miles), and more than three-fourths of Manchuria (273,000 square miles). These total an area of 1,821,000 square miles. On the other hand, Great Britain claims Tibet (533,000 square miles), Szechuan (218,000 square miles), Kwangtung (86,800 square miles), and the provinces along the lower reaches of the Yangtze River (about 362,000 square miles), making a total of 1,199,800 square miles for the British sphere of influence. In the south, France claims Yunnan (146,700 square miles) as her sphere of interest. Before the war Germany claimed Shantung (55,900 square miles), from whence she was scheming to expand in various directions.

The chief source of misconception on the part of Americans concerning Far Eastern affairs lies in their ignorance of Chinese geography. Open the map of China, mark out the spheres of influence established by European powers, and compare them with the Japanese sphere. Then you will begin to wonder why it is you make so much ado about Japan's activities in China. As against England's 1,199,000 square miles, and Russia's 1,821,000 square miles, Japan's sphere of influence, consisting of South Manchuria (90,000 square miles), Eastern Inner Mongolia (50,000 square miles), Fukien (46,000 square miles), and a section of Shantung (18,600 square miles), totals 204,600 square miles. Remember that it was not Japan which originated the idea of spheres of influence. It was because European powers were bent upon dividing China into so many spheres of influence that Japan was obliged to step in and take such measures as might be necessary to safeguard her position in the Far East against any emergency that might arise. . . .

It is interesting to note how spheres of influence have been established by the Powers. Japan paid for her small sphere in Manchuria \$1,000,000,000 and the blood of 100,000 of the flower of her population, for that was the cost of the war which was forced upon Japan by Russia. On the other hand, Russia, England, and France secured their vast spheres practically for nothing. The price paid by Germany for her sphere was the lives of two missionaries, whose questionable conduct resulted in their murder by Chinese.—Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. 128-130.

### A Korean Estimate of Japan

Japan . . . ambitious of her future and jealous of her rights, has chosen the expedient rather than the righteous path to reach her place in the sun. Her poets have sung the glory and grandeur of war; her philosophers have praised the valor and virtue of militarism. Her merchants have practiced "dumping" and misrepresentation of goods as a matter of course; her statesmen have adopted the Bismarckian "iron and blood" policy as the only road to national greatness. Japan is no longer the gallant knight she was deemed to be in the earlier years of her national ascendancy, setting out to rescue Asia from the European dragon; she is now the armed bully of the East. The Asiatics had looked upon her as their teacher and leader; now their hope and faith are shattered in finding her a merciless conqueror, reigning, sword in hand, over subject races.—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 171, 172.

### Japan in China during the World War

You know quite well from what you have seen for yourself in China on your various visits and from what your numerous well-informed friends in China have told you at various times, that Japan has taken every possible step during the four years of this war to ruin China, by creating and sustaining trouble; by financing the most objectionable elements in every community in which she has been interested; by the employment of *agents provocateurs*; by the encouragement of the use of morphine over large areas; by the use of Japanese immoral women in Chinese official households; by the protection given to bandits and other outlaws; by the wrecking of native banks, as in the recent Mukden case; by the corruption of officials through loans, bribes, and threats; and by the wholesale misrepresentation of Allied war aims and the most vigorous efforts to prevent China from coming into the war, and then later to discredit the country by preventing China from being of any use or service to the Allies. You also know that during these four years, which have been publicly heralded as Japan's years of opportunity, it has been the distinct object of the Japanese to gain a monopoly upon political influence in China, and at the same time to make openings for Japanese trade which would give the Japanese commercial folk as strong a commercial monopoly as possible. And in every instance in which the Government has created an opening through political maneuvering, seldom creditable, the Japanese business man, said by his defenders to be opposed to the truculent and unscrupulous policy of the Japanese Government, has been only too ready to take advantage of the opportunities offered to drive in the trade wedge, whether the trade was in legitimate imports and exports or in morphine or cocaine or women or Chinese cash or the rights and liabilities of the Chinese people.

Not only has Japan been working against the present interests and future good of the Chinese people, but her policy in China has been deliberately shaped to undermine the trade, influence, and prestige of the Occidental peoples, nominally her Allies, throughout the East. Every ideal which we have developed and announced as participants in the present European War is disowned or discounted in the Japanese press and by Japanese propagandists among the Chinese; and in actual diplomatic practice Japanese officials in China have practiced every subterfuge and committed every diplomatic crime with which we credit the Germans, and have invariably been supported by the home Government and encouraged by their commercial representatives in China.—From a private letter quoted by Thomas F. Millard in "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 246, 247.

### **A Defense of Japan's Trade Policy**

A British merchant of Changchun, Manchuria, sends the writer the following letter in relation to the attitude of the Japanese in Manchuria:

"With regard to that part of Manchuria which comes under Japanese influence, too great praise cannot be given. The conveniences and facilities to banking institutions, railway communications, postal and telegraph service are far and away superior to those afforded by the Russian and the Chinese institutions. The Yokohama Specie Bank, with its numerous branches, enables foreign traders to transact business on the same lines as they are accustomed to do in other civilized countries. Transactions with this bank are free from the exorbitant rates and the petty 'red-tapeism,' to which it is necessary to conform in working with either the Russians or the Chinese. It is a recognized fact that it takes any time over an hour to get a cheque cashed at a Russian bank; moreover, the absence of any knowledge of the English language renders transactions with them considerably irksome. Every employe in the Yokohama Specie Bank, on the other hand, has a good knowledge of the English language. Notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese Customs are supposed to manage the postal service in Manchuria, that service has become practically confined to the transmission of Chinese correspondence. The Japanese appear to handle the greater part, if not all, of the foreign mail in a satisfactory manner.

"In conclusion, Japan has fulfilled all her obligations, and continues to do so, in the development of Manchuria, and woe betide the day if the country comes under Russian influence or if it is handed back again to the control of the Chinese. Too great attention cannot be devoted to this country by the press in Great Britain, in order to direct the attention of British firms to the enormous prospects which await them here in various directions. It is to be hoped that they will soon awaken to these possibilities. If these efforts are delayed too long they will find that it is too late, as other countries will have secured the business."

It is well in criticizing a government to reflect long enough to con-

template the results which would follow in the event of its overthrow. The choice, should the Japanese relinquish or abandon Manchuria, would be either Russia or China, alternatives which may well make foreign traders willing to bear their present ills rather than to end them by flying to evils that, in this instance, they know all about.—Robert P. Porter, "Japan: the New World Power," pp. 756, 757.

### **Taking Advantage of Natural Laws of Trade**

In her commercial rivalry with America and other nations in China, Japan has benefited herself simply by taking advantage of natural laws of trade. Japan's geographical situation, her enormous investment in China, the presence of 200,000 Japanese there consuming Japanese goods, the abundant supply of cheap labor at her disposal, her familiarity with the use of the Manchuria pulse of which she is the greatest customer, a certain similarity between the Chinese language and her own—these are the conditions which have been instrumental in the advancement of Japanese trade in Manchuria.—Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. 137-139.

### **Japan versus Russia in Eastern Asia**

Japan, like England, is situated close to the mainland in a position of wonderful strength. But, even more than in the case of England, the disparity in size between the little island state and the mainland is enormous and is not offset by the divisions in the latter which have so long been England's protection. Japan faces on the continent only a single modern power, whose area is nearly sixty times her own. Her relation to Russia well illustrates the complexity of modern international relations. There is little race antipathy between them, and Russia suffers from dearth rather than from congestion of population. Yet the conflict of interests between them is as marked and as irreconcilable as any in the world. So long as the control of necessary gateways is a part of the policy of enterprising nations, Russia will be impelled by the strongest considerations of commercial convenience and national defense to force her way through to the eastern sea. At present she has no satisfactory outlet. There is, indeed, but one really available outlet alike serviceable to commerce and capable of defense—the Gulf of Peichili, with its great harbor at Dairen, its Gibraltar at Port Arthur, and its impregnable outposts in Korea and Shantung. Toward these Russia was pressing with all the force of her mighty energy when the nineteenth century closed.

Japan viewed this advance of Russia with the utmost solicitude. It is most important that we should understand the reasons for her anxiety. These are essentially two, political and cultural, though, as we have seen, they are but different aspects of a single interest.

If Russia should advance a solid front clear out to the Japan Sea and intrench herself in Korea and Port Arthur, while ample communications

were established with the populous districts of western Russia and the regions of eastern Siberia were filled with Russian settlers, there could be no question but that Russia would dominate the entire East. China for an indefinite period would be unable to oppose any effectual opposition, and against a power so vast as Russia Japan could not protect herself. It is, of course, possible that Russia would never have attacked Japan, but the mischief would nevertheless be done. Between two countries so situated there are sure to be numerous questions on which interests and opinions would differ, questions of their commerce with China and with each other, questions of naval and maritime privilege, questions of every conceivable sort, the decision of which would make a great deal of difference to both citizens and state. Against this greater Russia little Japan could never make her will prevail. If she accepted in every case Russia's view of the situation, she would be unmolested but would dwindle into insignificance. If she resisted she would be coerced and probably annexed and assimilated. Her fate would be that of docile Denmark or devastated Serbia. This was the political danger.

But something far worse menaced little Japan. The Japanese culture is one of the daintiest and most exquisite in the world. There is a porcelain-like delicacy and fragility to the wondrously beautiful civilization which the Japanese have inherited from old Japan and to which they are attached with passionate devotion. What would happen to this civilization if it were lined up in helpless subserviency to the huge raw-boned might of Russia? . . . Nothing discredits a culture like impotence. Indeed, the first marked effect of the opening of Japan and the revelation to her people of the power of the Western nations was an almost tragic disparagement of their own civilization, accompanied by a domestic vandalism and a tasteless foreign craze, the results of which a generation of restored sanity has not been able to obliterate. No, it needed no invasion or conquest to destroy Japan as her wise leaders knew and loved her. Only let Russia build out in fulness of strength on the nearby mainland and the mischief was wrought. Little Japan could never exist alongside of Greater Russia.

What was the way of escape? There was but one possible answer. There must be no Greater Russia, and there must be a Greater Japan. This is the program of Japan.—Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 227-230.

### **China versus Japan in Manchuria**

While strategically and politically Manchuria presents problems for each of the three countries whose territories converge on its borders, when considered as a field for colonization its importance commands more specifically the attention of China and Japan. . . . Manchuria is a natural outlet for the excess of China's population more truly than for

that of Japan; and, as far as rights to this open field are concerned, China has the better claim. The pressure of excess population seeking an emigration outlet will probably be greater from China than from Japan—for there are 400,000,000 Chinese as compared with 70,000,000 Japanese and Koreans, and the former are no less adept at "replenishing the earth" than are the latter.

Manchuria has an area of 363,700 square miles, a part of this area being immensely fertile, other portions being rich in timber and in mineral resources. Experts are agreed in the estimate that this region is capable of supporting a population of 100,000,000. The population today numbers perhaps 17,500,000 persons. Of these about 17,000,000 are Chinese subjects, some 13,000,000 of them being of Chinese and perhaps as many as 4,000,000 of Manchu race; 250,000 are Koreans; about 100,000 are Japanese; and about 50,000 are Russians. To enter Manchuria the Chinese have but to step through the breach in the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan or to sail across the ninety miles of water between the Shantung Peninsula and the Liaotung Peninsula. As many Chinese farm hands come and go between Chihli and Shantung provinces and Manchuria each year as there are Japanese in South Manchuria after ten years of occupation. What people, then, would it seem, have the best natural right to Manchuria; and what people, if events are left to their natural course, will settle this great potential outlet for excess population?

Though Japan takes South Manchuria, and whether she leaves it open to Chinese immigration or whether she closes it, her occupation will not settle the question of population pressure. Still less will it insure the peace of the Far East.—Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," pp. 271, 272.

### The Struggle for Manchuria

During the Chino-Japanese War in 1894-5 there was some fighting about Haicheng and Newchwang in southern Manchuria, and Japan after her victory received a grant of territory embracing the Liaotung peninsula and its hinterland. Through the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, however, this was ceded back to China in return for a handsome indemnity. Japan ousted, Russia took her place—first, in 1896, securing the concession for a railway through central Manchuria, then the lease of Port Arthur and the right to build a line from Harbin to Dalny [Dairen]. During the unsettled years that followed the Boxer uprising of 1900 Russia's influence was extended, and her failure to complete the evacuation of Chinese territory—Newchwang and neighboring towns—in October, 1903, brought on the crisis which culminated in the war with Japan.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the history of that struggle. Russia desired an ice-free port. More than that, she wished to retain under

her control the northern portion of Korea. In this Japan refused to acquiesce, for it was imperative that she break the strategic line between Port Arthur and Vladivostok.—Willard Straight, "China and the Far East," Clark University Lectures, p. 134.

### The Value of a Solvent Japan

Japan, with a rapidly increasing population, has nearly reached the limit in the home country. Internal pressure of population and the expanding energy of the people force her to seek an outlet. Racial opposition, dense population, or climatic conditions limit the field of such expansion, except in the contiguous territories of Korea and Manchuria. In these provinces, however, Japan has encountered the antagonism both of China and of various European powers intent upon territorial aggrandizement. In order to control the situation, Japan has been compelled to fight two wars and build up an expensive military equipment that is breaking her down financially. So long as other nations threaten Japan's natural expansion, she will be compelled to maintain this armed preparedness. In the writer's opinion it would profit the other powers' selfish interest to oppose this movement no longer, on the ground that a solvent Japan is of more value to them than a bankrupt Japan. Japan's future commercial prosperity depends upon the integrity of China and her interests in that quarter are consonant with those of America. We need not fear that Japan will ever permanently control China proper, even as the result of a successful war. There are too many Chinese, and it would be too expensive an undertaking. . . .

Japan is passing through her own hobble-de-hoy period. Her cockiness, her bumptiousness, her exaggerated sense of dignity, her concern to be recognized as an international power—all these phenomena we ourselves have displayed in our time and with far greater crudity. It was a passing phase with us and it will be with the newer nation if we do not take it too seriously. At any rate, nothing is so futile, so stupid, as international recriminations. We have much to gain by retaining Japan's personal friendship, we have everything to lose by losing it.

England's attempts to limit our expansion to the Pacific were based upon *a priori* considerations, not on her own desires for that territory. The United States expanded through its own exuberant energy rather than through necessity or pressure of population, and England's attempts at hindrance roused the fiercest resentment. Japan's present-day expansion is also partly a phenomenon of national vigor as well as of economic pressure, and the attempts of foreign nations to curb it excite the same resentment that we ourselves have experienced. Again, have we any call to put ourselves on the side of Japan's opponents?—James F. Abbott, "Japanese Expansion and American Policies," pp. 233, 234, 257, 258.



### Three Possibilities for America

Japan may be reborn to abandon her policy of force for peaceful and legitimate commercial progress in China and East Asia.

Or China may find her spine, straighten up, and oppose the marauder.

There is no immediate prospect of either, though each will undoubtedly slowly develop and partially solve the problem.

As for us, we have at last reached the place where we must plan our own course on the probabilities and not the hopes. We can do three things:

1. We can say, "All of this is none of our affair. Let them work it out themselves." And with this attitude we may stay out of the League [of Nations], and either honestly believe that our civilization can wield its greatest power by standing, unimpaired, alone, or simply do the slacker trick of avoiding a bad mess.

2. We can make a lot of cheap, noisy talk and goad Japan into readiness to declare war, while we mean to do nothing and are prepared to back down at any threat from the East. We then convict ourselves of insincerity and encourage aggression against our rights and principles.

3. We can enter the League of Nations determined to stand by our principle of democracy. The logical result is that we definitely make up our minds to be ready to fight for it.

The hope for our peace with our neighbor in the East is that we be so strongly and deeply convinced of our democracy that we are ready to fight for it.—Louis D. Froelick, "Democracy Collides with Imperialism over Shantung," *Asia*, September, 1919, p. 875.

### America's Help for China

The world is being too closely unified for two incompatible political ideals to exist together—imperialistic autocracy based upon militarism, and representative democracy founded on political liberty. President Wilson crystallized this idea into a political principle when he said in his message delivered at a joint session of the two houses of the Congress, April 2, 1917. . . . "The world must be made safe for democracy; its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. . . . We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the rights of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal domination of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

It is a clear enunciation of new Americanism. The United States fought for her own freedom in the Declaration of Independence. She

was willing to fight for the freedom of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere in declaring the Monroe Doctrine. In the European War she fought for the freedom and democracy of the whole world. China, if unselfishly aided and wisely guided, can revive her ancient genius and develop her vast potential resources, and will eventually take her place among the powers of the world as a strong, democratic nation. Will the United States of America, true to the new principles of her political conviction, perform her mission toward China in the consummation of this noble task?—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 109, 110.

### **The Larger Problems of Human and National Relationships**

In the interests of human freedom, the peoples of the world must face three groups of problems. The first concerns the relations between the politically developed states, upon whose cooperation the solution of international problems depends. It is to these states that we must look for the evolution of those ordered relations, which lie at the base of international life, not only affecting these states in their direct relations with one another, but necessary for the solution of the international problems falling into the other groups. The second series centers round the difficult questions arising out of the relations between races at widely differing stages of political and economic development. There are two main sides to these problems: there is first, the question of protection against exploitation, whether political or economic; and second, the question of developing among backward peoples those broad principles, moral, social, and political, upon which free societies must be built. Both merge into each other at many points; on the whole, the former are concerned with immediate, and the latter with ultimate, questions. Broadly speaking, we are here faced with "the white man's burden," which hitherto has often appeared to cloak purely selfish ends, but which is the analogy in the international field of the communal protection of the young and the weak in domestic politics. The third series of problems relates to the control by the states of the world of the great cosmopolitan interests, mainly economic in character, whose growth has been one of the most striking features of the last century. These three sets of problems overlap and cannot be kept distinct; but broadly they are political, sociological, and economic, though all of them are closely related to international ethics. Indeed, reduced to the simplest form of expression, the task is to "moralize" international relations. To confine the issue to the problem of how to keep a single strong-headed nation in its due place, or of how to settle international disputes without recourse to war, is to miss the real significance of these questions as phases of the larger problems of human and national relationships.—Arthur Greenwood, "An Introduction to the Study of International Relations," pp. 195, 196.

## CHAPTER IV

### HOW CAN AMERICA SAFEGUARD HER TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE ORIENT?\*

#### I. How important is the Chinese market to the United States?

1. China is said to be the greatest potential market in the world. What considerations lead you to doubt this claim? What considerations lead you to believe it?
2. America would look askance upon a Japanese attempt to achieve commercial priority in Mexico. Would Japan have a right to look equally askance on any attempt by the United States to achieve commercial ascendancy in China?
3. If Japan achieves the commercial supremacy of the Far East by permitting her manufacturers to produce goods cheaply through sweated labor of women and children, in what ways would it concern America?
4. Just in what ways, if any, aside from commercial loss would it be a disadvantage to the United States to lose her full share in the Chinese market?

#### II. What chance has America against Japanese competition in the Orient?

1. Admittedly under Japanese domination in Manchuria, much of the American trade with that part of China has disappeared. How has this commercial supplanting been brought about by Japan?
2. What peculiar advantages does Japan have to secure the trade of the Asiatic mainland?
3. What probability is there that Japan will secure an increasing monopoly of trade relations in the Orient?
4. What do you feel is the relative pressure upon Japan and the United States: (a) To secure an adequate market for the output of home industries? (b) To provide assured raw materials for these industries? What bearing does this have upon the

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\*The discussion group or world problem forum may prefer to give two weeks to this topic. If so, Sections I to III could be covered the first week; Sections IV to VI the second.

relative importance for the two countries of the development of commercial relations with China?

**III. What can America do to secure her fair share of Oriental trade in competition with Japan?**

1. If Japan's procedure continues to make it difficult to promote American trade with the Asiatic mainland, what steps in your judgment are justified to protect the American position?
2. What recourse other than to arms would the United States have for securing "satisfaction" for the "freezing out" of its trade in the Orient?
3. Japanese raw silk is sold to the United States. Japan buys much of her raw cotton from us and from it manufactures cotton goods which compete with the American product. If these cotton goods should supplant our trade in manufactured cottons in the Far East, would or would not the United States be justified in putting an embargo on silk imports and raw cotton exports to influence industrial conditions in Japan? How far would conditions in American cotton mills justify America in taking this attitude? How far could we count on American silk manufacturers and cotton growers joining in such a weapon to their own economic detriment?
4. Just what part do you feel America should rightfully take in the trade and commercial development of China?
5. If you wished to advance American trade in China, just what proposals would you make to the United States Government?

**IV. What bearing does our shipping program have upon the whole question of America's future position in the Far East?**

1. What advantages, if any, has Japan over America in the development of Pacific shipping? Of what importance is it, if any, that our commerce should be carried in American bottoms?
2. If American youth because of superior business opportunities ashore prefer not to go to sea, should restrictions against non-American sailors on ships of American registry be removed? Why? Why not?
3. Would you favor American personnel on our shipping, even though substantial subsidies were necessary to make possible wages that would induce American youth to go to sea for a living? Why? Why not?

**V. What kind of an effect has America's commercial impact upon the East?**

1. To what extent are America's commercial contacts with the Far East now on a Christian basis? Is the impact of our trade approach to the Far East prevailingly Christian in its influence? Consider this with respect to the materials of commerce, the personnel of American trade as you may know it, the methods of salesmanship as you may have heard of these, the diplomatic procedure of America in dealing with controversies that arise with other governments growing out of our trade contacts, and the fundamental motives that lie back of the extension of our trade in foreign lands.
2. In what ways should this commercial impact be Christianized?
3. What would be involved in the Christianizing of America's commercial impact upon the East?

**VI. What hope is there that the trade interests of the East and the West can be harmonized?**

1. Do you feel that the ultimate best interests of Japan and of the United States with respect to the developing trade of the Far East are inescapably in conflict?
2. Are there values to be secured which are securable by only one or the other, to the gain or loss in each case by one or the other?
3. To what extent is there an international community of interest in the commercial development of the Far East?
4. Are or are not the economic relations of nations to one another essentially interdependent, consequently requiring true cooperation and recognition of mutuality of interest for their highest development?
5. If you believe in this principle of interdependence of the nations in the realm of economics, how would you go to work to make this principle evident under international commercial conditions which seem now purely competitive?

**REFERENCE MATERIAL****Possibilities of the China Market**

Most of the eighteen provinces [of China] and the three provinces of Manchuria contain coal, and China may be regarded as one of the first coal countries of the world. Iron ores are abundant in the anthracite field of Shansi, in Chihli, in Shantung and other provinces, and iron

(found in conjunction with coal) is worked in Manchuria. On the Upper Yangtsze and in Shensi province petroleum is being worked. Tin is the most important mineral export. Antimony ore is exported from Hunan. Yunnan province is one of the richest copper districts in the world.

Cotton is grown widely even as far north as the southern part of Chihli, the chief area of production being the Yangtsze valley.

About twenty-seven per cent of the world's supply of raw silk is from China.

Treaties forbid the export of grain with the exception of the soya bean, the chief product of Manchuria, of which in 1917 205,853 tons were exported as beans, 821,941 tons as bean cake, and 104,213 as bean oil.—Statesman's Year Book, 1919.

A great wealth of undeveloped resources in minerals awaits the engineer, the scientist, the laborer, and the financier of the New China. Hundreds of millions of acres of fertile lands await the application of scientific methods of agriculture, to make them trebly productive. Millions of acres of barren hill lands await afforestation with its attendant blessings. Good sanitation, irrigation, rural credits, and modern transportation facilities are essentials to the farmers of the New China. Household industry is to be superseded by the factory, with all its problems of sanitation, organization of labor and capital, congested city populations, education, and morals which are attendant upon an industrial society. Along with this industrial development there will be great accumulations of wealth with their attendant opportunities and responsibilities. Big business with its manifold ramifications must accompany transition from the bamboo to the iron age. Railways, steamship lines, electric power, and all that machinery and modern invention have meant to Western society will enter into the life of the New China. These developments in all their varying phases call for organization. Individualism must give way to group activity, to organization in the larger unit. Over and above all there must develop a still greater organization, an efficient and progressive governmental administration. China must develop the capacity for organization, effective organization, and organization for a common constructive end.—Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché, *Chinese Recorder*, April, 1918, pp. 220, 221.

The possibilities of our Pacific trade are shown by the growth of Japanese commerce. In 1868 Japan's foreign trade was \$13,123,272, gold; in 1888 it had increased fivefold and was \$65,580,382; in 1898 it was \$221,627,954; in 1913 it was \$680,934,729—\$15 per inhabitant. The foreign trade of China probably will make a greater relative increase per inhabitant during the next twenty-five years. The trade of Japan increased almost fourteenfold from 1888 to 1913. If the trade of China increases at a similar rate during the next twenty-five years, it will reach

over \$8,000,000,000 by 1941, half of which will consist of imports. But if China is to import \$8,000,000,000 worth of goods a year within the next quarter of a century, the importance of the Chinese market to the United States for the maintenance of our export trade can scarcely be overestimated.—James W. Bashford, "China: An Interpretation," pp. 435, 436.

### Japan's Commercial Purposes, Progress and Methods

If the British and the Americans in China are opposed to Japan's commercial expansion in China, they are welcome to oppose it. But they should go at it in a business-like way, that is by means of commercial competition with the Japanese. They should not mind little toys like the Twenty-One Demands. These will not hurt, nor will they bring any very great influence to bear upon the commercial market of keen competition. If the Japanese business men can continue to produce goods at low cost which will sell well in China, the only way the British and the Americans can oust the Japanese goods is to reduce their cost of production and transportation. Boycotts or strikes started by agitators will not shake the Japanese trade with China from the foundation. If only Japan should find it impossible to continue production at low cost, owing to rise of wages, cost of living, etc., whereas the Western countries may remain stationary as far as the cost of production is concerned, then it will be time for the Westerners to compete with the Japanese goods in the Chinese market effectively.

One thing the Westerners in the Orient should remember . . . is that we will not stop growing until we shall have approximated the advanced races of the West in our possession of wealth, strength, and civilization, individually and as a nation.—Jihei Hashiguchi, *Far Eastern Review*, August, 1919, p. 572.

Recently a special agent of the United States Department of Commerce made a summary of the disabilities under which American merchants now operate in Manchuria and Shantung, as follows:

1. Delays at the Japanese banks. Shroffs [clerks] of American and other foreign firms are made to wait while Japanese are given prompt attention.
2. Holding of goods at the ports of entry and railway stations on various pretexts, while goods shipped by or consigned to Japanese merchants are moved and handled promptly.
3. Similar delays at Kobe, Japan, and at other points of transshipment, where cargo shipped by or consigned to American firms is held up, while cargo shipped by or consigned to Japanese firms is moved promptly.
4. Special favors accorded by the railways in China under Japanese control to Japanese shippers, including an obscure system of rebates.

5. Subjection of Chinese to a "graft" system, except those who work in with the Japanese.

6. Encroachments on Chinese business and property, except that of those who work in with the Japanese.

7. Evasion of local Chinese taxes by Japanese traders and merchants, while other foreign merchants and the Chinese have to pay them.

8. Manipulation of public utilities controlled by Japanese, like postal and telephone and telegraph communications, to give advantage to Japanese merchants.

9. Taking advantage of the war censorship and the circumstances which have caused mails from America destined to China and other places in the Orient to be turned over to the Japanese postal authorities in Japan to be forwarded, to delay the business mail of American firms trading in China and other Oriental countries, to learn the business secrets of those firms, and to use the information thus gained to obtain the business for Japanese firms; and similar use of telegraph and other communications controlled by Japan.

10. Refusing space in Japanese ships to American cargo in order to give advantage to competing Japanese firms, and giving lower rates or rebates to Japanese shippers than are given to competing American firms.

11. Counterfeiting of the trade-marks and other distinguishing features of well known American manufactured articles and the extensive sale in China of inferior Japanese imitations of those articles.—Thomas F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 274, 275.

Japan is poor. How poor it is only those who have visited the country can comprehend. . . . The whole population—men, women, and children—labors incessantly and for a mere pittance. Various forms of disease, especially tuberculosis, create an appalling death rate. This condition of the great mass of the Japanese has been made more serious as a result of the war, even though wages have been somewhat raised.

Japan has been eager to become a manufacturing nation and the international conditions evoked by the present European situation have opened a remarkable opportunity to the few to realize this ambition. All forms of manufacture have increased at an astonishing pace in the great cities. The factories have been largely the possession of a small company of fortunate investors or speculators and have been immensely profitable. These newly rich are conspicuously in evidence in the great centers of Japan and the morals of those who have thus suddenly acquired munificence is one of the most serious problems which the country faces.

On the other hand, the growth of these manufacturing industries has largely been accomplished by prostituting the labor of men, women, and children. The pay of all workmen is pitifully small, while that of women



and children is shockingly inadequate, although they are often compelled to work twelve to fourteen hours a day. Even the holidays are few, a rest day once in two weeks being commonly the maximum opportunity of change. The result is that the death rate among laborers is exceedingly high. A woman worker endures the strain only a few months, or years at most, and the result of the sad situation is that new sources of supply for female labor are constantly being sought, young women from the outlying parts of Japan and from Korea being brought in in large numbers to fill the gaps which these fatal conditions create.—Deputation to Japan appointed by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1918, "The Kingdom of God in Japan," pp. 61, 62.

### **Advantages of Japan's Geographical Propinquity**

There is one enormous advantage that Japan has over the rest of the world, in the China trade, and that is geographical propinquity. This advantage which Japan has sought to improve by diplomatic means, has been of assistance both in legitimate and in somewhat doubtful ways. . . . The legitimate advantages derivable from geographical propinquity . . . all resolve themselves into reduced costs, and therefore cheapness. Every item in transportation costs is less for the shorter distance, and when to this is added the fact of substantial subsidy, as has been the case with Japan, the advantages of geographical propinquity are considerably enhanced. There are two advantages over the Western trader that the Japanese enjoy in the highest degree. The first is the advantage of language. It is a comparatively simple matter for the representative of Japanese commerce in China to speak and read Chinese. On the value of this advantage there is no need to dilate. The second advantage is that conditions of life for a Japanese in China are much more closely similar to those to which he is accustomed than is the case with the Westerner, and the result is that he lives much more cheaply, which means that his distributing or collecting costs are correspondingly—and considerably—lower.—W. S. Ridge, *Far Eastern Review*, September, 1919, p. 613.

### **Developing American Trade in the Orient**

Other nations have concrete advantages in China. . . . We have the good will of the buying and the selling public. The next important thing is to keep it. We can do this by sending out to China the goods they want, packed as they want them, and delivered when they want them. We can do it by the following up of our many "commercial investigations" and extravagant talk about the possibilities of the country, with careful, but definite, financial investments and the establishment of industrial enterprises. It is important, too, that the men who are sent out there to handle our business interests should be selected with care. They

should be men of the highest type only, not the adventurers and the sightseers, but the far-seeing, purposeful men who make their business their first interest, and who will maintain the same caliber of work and the same standards as we expect of them at home. In a word, they should be men whom we shall be proud to have judged as representative Americans. Every man sent out who can not stand this test, even though he be in the most insignificant clerical position, will work against us.—Chester C. Lincoln, *National Marine*, September, 1919.

While the peace settlement has made the political international issue most acute for the moment, the financial and industrial question is the important one in the long run. Here lies the great chance of the United States. The introduction of a unified comprehensive currency system, improved modern harbors and terminal facilities, the reconstruction of the inland waterway system to improve transportation and avoid destructive floods—these are samples of the important tasks that must be undertaken. At the present time the United States is the only country that combines the requisite capital, engineering ability, and executive talent.

The important thing is that by undertaking big things on a large scale the United States will get around much of the competition that breeds irritation and suspicion. If the scale is big enough, there will be no competition. Japan is not prepared to take hold of these things on a large scale. A negative policy that can be interpreted as putting obstacles in the way of the legitimate development of Japan is fraught with dangers. To concentrate upon big enterprises in a constructive way will leave Japan plenty of opportunities, while it will once and for all avert the possibility of rendering China a virtual subject of Japan—a danger which the best friends of Japan must admit to be real as long as the militaristic-bureaucratic element continues to dominate her policies. The serious source of evil in the present situation is the likelihood that the United States will have sufficient interest in the Far East to talk a great deal, and to act in minor ways but upon the whole in ways which can be construed, with more or less justice, as having for their main object to thwart the ambitions of other countries, especially Japan.

It is not necessary to say that the next few years are crucial. In China as elsewhere reconstruction is imminent, but for the time being things are in solution. Distance has its disadvantages in all the lesser relations. But it can be made an advantage if the attention of America is fixed on large scale undertakings. . . .

Leaders must come whom Chinese leaders recognize as their equals and who are intellectually prepared to deal with Chinese leaders as equals. And the plans must be on such a scale that it is evident that, while ample security and reasonable profit are given to foreign investors, the outcome will be to make China the mistress of her own economic destinies. When this is accomplished, she will have no difficulty in looking out for herself

politically. Just because the controlling factor in the policies of other nations has been to cultivate the economic subjection of China, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to pursue the opposite course. Has it the imagination and the energy?—John Dewey, *New Republic*, December 3, 1919, pp. 16, 17.

The way to create wide interest in foreign affairs is to give a wider number of people an interest in them, and this can be accomplished by making foreign trade and investment in backward countries a less risky and more normal enterprise.

The effect of this enlarged interest would be to break down the uncanny pretentiousness of diplomacy. . . . This exclusiveness is an illusion which collapses when anyone goes behind the etiquette of diplomacy to the substance of it. People will not go behind it, however, unless they are made to feel that the subject matter of diplomacy is related to their daily lives. Without some direct and constant interest, public opinion ignores foreign affairs until a crisis is reached. . . .

But if trade with these regions were extended, hundreds of firms would be sending buyers and traveling salesmen to them, establishing branch offices, and in endless ways intensifying communication. Business men would have to learn languages, study history and political conditions, and some knowledge of foreign countries would become a commercial necessity. The schools would have to meet the demand, the newspapers would have to give space to foreign news, there would be a growing section of the public well enough informed to ask the State Department pertinent questions. Congressmen would have to show that they knew not only that there was urgent need for a new postoffice in Ashtabula, but what was the political situation in China or in Costa Rica.

In brief, to have public opinion there must be interest, and this can be created not by preaching but by making the subject of it part of the business of life. . . . Just as there is a political machine which governs because the voter is too ignorant and too lazy to govern himself, so there is a diplomatic machine which counts upon the apathy, the docility, and the explosive emotions of the people. In this darkness and silence the world is rigged, and all manner of cruelty and selfishness flourishes.—Walter Lippman, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 196-198.

### Importing the Products of Oriental Cheap Labor

The people of the United States, with wages at two to five dollars per day, cannot import goods from China, with wages at twenty cents a day, without exporting something to pay for it. It is a national enrichment for us to buy the produce of what some call pauper labor, because we get goods we need and use, pay for them in other goods that we have, and, therefore, the import of goods stimulates the export of goods. If one will take the trouble to think nationally, he will see that there is no

escape from that sentence.—J. Russell Smith, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1919, pp. 299, 300.

The Province of Shansi can give the world coal enough to supply the needs of the world for some thousands of years at one shilling and sixpence a ton. How is that produced? The porters who carry it have to carry a 400-lb. load for less than one penny a mile, and so the ordinary thing is that they work one week and lie up the next. Other workers work up to their middles in water and suffer so from swollen legs that the average time sheet shows that they work two days a week out of four. . . . There are almost 1,000,000 factory girls in Japan. The factory girl gets less than a single woman can live on—and you know the rest. Reports tell us that investigation revealed that of the girls who come up from country homes to city factories more than sixty per cent are never heard of again at home. We buy the stuff cheap, dyed with the blood of our sisters. Is it our job to put that right?—Rev. W. E. S. Holland, Address at Sheffield, England, November, 1919.

### Two Varieties of Monroe Doctrine

It seems as though there is absolutely nothing that Japanese can do in Mexico without treading upon the sensitive toes of the advocates of the Monroe Doctrine. . . . If a Japanese secures a fishing privilege along the Mexican Coast, he is held to be encroaching upon that doctrine. If a Japanese gets a mining concession there, the same doctrine stands ready to expel him. If a handful of Japanese farmers or laborers manage to get into Sonora or lower California, down comes the Monroe Doctrine to denounce them. If a Japanese business firm sells arms to the Mexican Government, that is regarded as a violation of the doctrine. What, indeed, would the Monroe Doctrine say if a Japanese concern, even unassisted by the Japanese Government, were to propose building a railway in Mexico? In short the Monroe Doctrine of today, as applied to the Japanese, is not a political doctrine as it was meant to be by President Monroe; it is an economic dogma conceived to bar out all Japanese enterprises, which are in nature purely economic, and which are the result of the natural growth of the ordinary pursuits of individuals, unattended by governmental influence.

And yet, on the other hand, America has more than once proposed to build railways and work mines in Manchuria. She has no hesitation in recognizing the right of her financial interests to advance funds to the Chinese Government, or build railways, or exploit mineral resources in China or Eastern Siberia. Japan, of course, has no desire to pick quarrels with America on such matters, but she may at least be permitted to point out the peculiarities of the Monroe Doctrine as applied to her citizens in the Western hemisphere.—Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan and World Peace," pp. 91, 92.

**Christianizing America's Commercial Contacts with the East**

Our impact upon the East must be Christianized because we are moving out upon the East in very many different ways, and those ways are sure steadily to increase. . . . And we cannot separate the different forms in which that movement of the West upon the East is taking place. They are all of them inextricably intertwined. And every one of them is bound to suffer or to benefit from the character of the rest. Christianity is sure to be damaged in its purer form of expression in the missionary enterprise by everything that is non-Christian in all the other forms of the movement of the West upon the non-Christian world. . . .

We have a right to demand that the attitude of this nation toward every non-Christian nation should be a Christian attitude. The idea of war between the American people and any Asiatic people is preposterous. There are no possible conflicts in sight that justify us in any other attitude toward the whole non-Christian world than an attitude of sympathy and brotherhood and peace. And we are bound to practice in our national relations with all of these nations the same spirit of restraint, of generous confidence in another's good will, of unselfish regard for another's interest, which we regard ourselves as under obligations to practice in our relationship one to another as Christian men. Our newspapers should realize this and behave with decency. So also should Japan's. That is the first thing.

In the second place, we can do it by making sure that the men who go out to represent this country in commerce and in trade really represent that which is best and truest in the land. The Government is not to go into the business of religious propagandizing. But this country is a Christian country. . . . We have a duty to seek to make sure that all that goes out from this nation to the rest of the world, whether politically or commercially, should justly represent the true character of our people. . . . There have been in the past great bodies of noble men who have gone out to represent the Western nations to the Eastern world . . . statesmen and merchants who carried their Christian character with them and who, wherever they were and in all that they did, stood unabashed and faithful as Christian men. We can Christianize the impact of the West upon the East by making sure that this kind of man goes out to represent us there.

In the third place, we must do it by Christianizing our trade. . . . We cannot expect to conduct our trade with the East upon non-Christian principles, and then have the East turn the other cheek to us and practice Christian principles in trade with us. We are bound to carry on our trade with other nations on a Christian basis—I mean with honesty, and with unselfishness, and a desire for mutual helpfulness and good.—Robert E. Speer, "The Gospel and the New World," pp. 142, 143, 148-150.

The morphia that was seized in the recent smuggling case in Shanghai was all manufactured in Philadelphia—a fact verified in open court by a lawyer of the International Anti-Opium Association. It would be a criminal offense to ship this direct to China. But there is no law against shipment to Japan. American traffic through the two channels of British goods in bond and our own products has reached vast proportions already. The official statistics show that for the first five months of the current year [1919] 25,000 ounces of morphia reached the port of Kobe from American ports. But the *Japan Chronicle*, published in Kobe, is responsible for the statement that the manifestos of ships arriving in Kobe during the same period show about 90,000 more ounces not appearing in the custom house returns. The conclusion is certain. This amount was transhipped in Kobe harbor to be smuggled into China. That this shows gross connivance on the part of Kobe port officials may be argued. But the primary responsibility is with the laws and administration of the United States. We have become a large partner in the contemptible business of drugging China at the time when China is making heroic efforts to emancipate herself from the narcotic evil.—John Dewey, *New Republic*, December 24, 1919.

### Economic Cooperation

It is through the development of economic cooperation that the world-family will solidify itself, and the world-order will develop. A league of peace which deals only with political questions is but a paper pact. The workers of the world have gone beyond the intellectuals in that they propose to give the organized supra-nation some task at once to accomplish, and it is only by action that organisms develop. Moreover, in this they are in actual tune with the facts and needs of today, for the business of economic production has now proceeded far beyond the political organization of mankind. Politically we are living in one century and economically we are living in another. The artificial boundaries of the states do not correspond to the facts of economic production and exchange, any more than they correspond to the ideal of fellowship and the capacity for its enjoyment. There are today no independent economic units. These absolute sovereignties, called states, which exist in political philosophy and practice, do not exist when it comes to the interdependent economic life of the world, which crosses all frontiers. Here is the actual beginning of that world-family life to which religion seeks to call the loyalty of the individual and of the nation.—Harry F. Ward, "The Opportunity for Religion," pp. 64, 65.

## CHAPTER V

### WHAT HOPE IS THERE THAT CHINA CAN BE SAVED AS A NATION?

#### I. How much can we expect of the Chinese?

1. The Chinese are called the Anglo-Saxons of the Orient, and are said by travelers and missionaries to be a particularly able race with exceptional qualities of leadership. What is your estimate of Chinese as students, laborers, business men, agriculturists, or diplomatists? How did you come by this estimate?
2. If the Chinese are the kind of people that many claim, why are 400,000,000 Chinese seemingly so impotent either to protect themselves against foreign aggression, or to work out their own destiny? What is the matter with China?
3. What potentialities for a national life of high significance does China already have? What are the great weaknesses of China?

#### II. What hope is there that China can work out her own destiny?

1. Does China's present lack of national cohesion and administrative efficiency lead you to a pessimistic attitude of mind with reference to her ultimate national destiny? Why or why not?
2. How far is China's present condition due to her age-long conservatism, how far to inherent national and racial weakness, how far to the interference of foreign countries in her internal affairs and the attempts at exploitation by foreign governments?
3. It is claimed that China has made great progress in the last twenty years. What are the outstanding changes that have taken place? What are the indications that this progress will continue?
4. Do you feel that if China were guaranteed that Japan and other nations would not interfere she could establish a strong national government and work out her own national destiny? Why or why not?
5. Given a truly worthy internal development in China, would

her international position have to be asserted by force of arms, or could this be achieved by peaceable means?

6. To what extent should President Wilson's principle of the self-determination of peoples hold for China, if she seems unable to achieve adequate self-determination?

### III. What is best for China and for the world?

1. Which do you think would be preferable for China: a larger chance to work out her own destiny, Japanese suzerainty, division between the powers, or some form of international commission or mandatory government?
2. Which of these would be preferable for the Far East in general, and for the peace and progress of the world?

### REFERENCE MATERIAL

#### China's Basal Lack

China, with her old ordered life shattered and the foundations of a new order still unlaid, has discovered no stable government, largely because she has not bred, on a large scale, a reliable, powerful, and disinterested leadership, and is in the grip of a smouldering civil war, so persistent as to seem to be almost endemic.

Yet, if we look at China alone . . . we discover the greatest population in the world, a people with striking powers of endurance and constituting an inexhaustible reservoir of labor, with her ablest sons capable of a powerful leadership that is still largely undeveloped; a country having mineral resources of incalculable value and variety, with practically every product needed for the support of the most advanced civilization, including, incidentally, enough coal of high quality to provide the whole world at its present rate of consumption for over a thousand years and, alongside the coal, vast and indeed incalculable stores of iron. This people which has already established its 7,000 miles of railway, its complete postal system, its ironworks whose products successfully compete with those of Pittsburg and Bethlehem, and its ramified wireless installation, is bound to take a large part in directing the destinies of the future. Yet, at present, China has not "found" herself. She tosses rudderless and defenseless in the tempest of the world's unrest. "Surely never richer freight went derelict on the waters of time."—Basil Mathews, "Essays on Vocation," p. 6.

#### China's Progress in Recent Years

The cleavage point between the new and the old in China's awakening was the disastrous war with Japan in 1894. Through that humilia-



tion, as by one flash of intelligence, China came to realize that she was hopelessly outclassed in efficiency. . . .

The first step was throwing wide open the doors to foreign diplomacy and commerce. China joined the world. The next step was the institution of Western science and education as the basis of her new life. This required a reconstruction of the educational system. The memorizing of the classics, a mechanical process with slight relation to character and none at all to practical efficiency, had been the backbone of her education for two thousand years. . . . All this was abolished at a stroke. . . . We find now a complete system of public schools, of primary, grammar, and high-school grades, with Western branches—geography, history, physics, and chemistry—taught alongside of proper Chinese subjects. Provincial universities for the districts and the University of Peking for the nation at large crown this admirable scheme. The last figures obtainable show nearly 40,000 public schools, with an enrolment above 1,000,000. . . .

Transportation and commerce early demanded the attention of the new order. In the lack of capital, concessions were granted to foreign corporations, and railroad extension began with a rush. . . . By such means the Government has been able to build up an excellent post-office system that reaches the leading cities and interior towns, and is proving of incalculable value as a binding element for the widely scattered districts and divergent populations. Factories are springing up at commercial centers, in which Western machinery is taking the place of hand labor. The public press has seen a remarkable development. . . . China contains the greatest coal deposits in the world. Iron and petroleum are abundant. It is, therefore, a highly favorable sign that stock companies are being formed akin to those in the West for the development of these and other natural resources. The Chinese are learning to trust one another. With such vast wealth under their feet they will not always remain in their present poverty and helplessness.

The development of governmental institutions, like the army and navy, law courts, police protection, public sanitation, a trained diplomatic service, have been coincident with the growth of the democratic idea and the establishing of the republic in 1911. Through all the vicissitudes of the new regime the great goal of a Westernized Orient has not been lost to sight.

The greatest test of all has been China's willingness to give up the ancient customs which hampered her development. From the beginning of history conquerors of alien civilizations have been brought up standing when attempting to change the customs of the land. China has taken this matter into her own hands. . . . The voluntary abolition of the queue, first in the army, then among students, then in commercial centers, and now increasingly throughout the land, is a sufficient answer to those who would question the depth of China's purpose to become an integral part

of the world. If anything else is needed, consider the prohibition of the opium traffic, which had been forced upon China by outside nations, but which she dealt with in a way peculiarly her own. With some 25,000,000 people addicted to the foreign drug, the passing and enforcing of a prohibitory measure was a task from which the most centralized and favored nation might well shrink. Yet China cast out the evil thing with scarcely a ripple of excitement. . . .

Taking it altogether, may it not be said that China has made almost as much progress in fifteen years as Japan made in half a century? When we consider that these changes have occurred among a people until a few years ago characterized as unresponsive, inert, and hopelessly conservative, regarding it a crime to attempt to improve upon the past, and holding the outside world in scorn, even the best historical parallels fail to impress.—Cornelius H. Patton, "World Facts and America's Responsibility," pp. 8-13.

The permanent improvements which have been made in hundreds of Chinese cities during the past seven years, the roads built, the thousands of small and large industrial plants erected, the improvements in sanitation, the schools, colleges, and hospitals endowed and opened, the hills reforested, the mines developed, the newspapers established, and the remarkable growth of knowledge of foreign affairs during a period of unceasing political turmoil punctuated by a series of natural calamities and blanketed by a war-trade depression, are conspicuous evidences of wholesome progress and of a genuine interest among the people in improvements and innovations. Although an administrative scandal in Peking is cabled to every Occidental capital while the erection of a new factory in Wuhu or of a new girls' school in Nanking is described locally in an inconspicuous paragraph, we all know, if we stop to consider, that the building of a school or a factory in the provinces is a much more significant omen of the tendencies of the Chinese people than a squabble within the mandarin ranks; but, with politics so blatantly conspicuous, it is exceedingly difficult to be just and fair to the people who have yet to make their influence felt upon the administrative systems which in no sense represent them.—*North China Herald*, July 13, 1918, p. 65.

### Struggling toward a Larger National Life

Foreigners who pretend to be friends of the Chinese incessantly harp on the disturbances in China, saying that the country is in a state of anarchy, that the Chinese people are not fit for self-government, and that they must be placed under international tutelage. Arguments like these have been widely circulated by interested parties, whose sole aim is to see a weak China—one which will allow them to perpetuate their control and interference in the affairs of that country. The Chinese are now in the midst of a great transformation. Everywhere the old order

is changing, giving place to new. The ancient ideas and hoary traditions and customs are being discarded and a new scheme of life that is foreign in origin is being gradually absorbed. Such a transition necessarily brings forth discord and dissension. For national transformation is fundamentally a struggle for advancement; it is a conflict between the new and the old ideals of a people, and the conflict will go on until a new system is evolved and incorporated into the life of the nation. Viewed in this way the various ills which have rendered China unsightly before the eyes of the foreigner are nothing but the natural outcome of the attempt to adjust a nation, that has for hundreds of years been isolated from the rest of the world, to the new environment created by the invasion of extraneous ideas and the introduction of Western culture.

Although common to the history of every nation during its period of creative change, the internal disorders in China and the different complications that constitute what is known as "the Chinese Question" have suffered severe criticism at the hands of many a foreign writer. There is really no cause for discouragement at China's struggle for a reformed and stable central government. Rome was not built in a day. Neither can a modern democracy be instituted in eight years in a country which has had centuries of absolutism. It is to be borne in mind that those Latin-American republics, which today are stable and prosperous, were for many decades in a state of confusion and distress, and we must not forget that it took the long years between 1776 and 1865 for the great American nation to establish itself firmly.—Chong Su See, "The Foreign Trade of China," pp. 376, 377.

The fitness of the Chinese for self-government and the possibility of China's becoming a united and constitutional state should not be questioned because eight years of confusion and lack of harmony have followed the proclamation of the republic. What government in Europe or America has not passed through initial stages of internal discord, marked by revolution, bitter parliamentary dissension, attempted secession of provinces, and civil war? The assumption of superiority by the white man in creating and maintaining the machinery of government is unfair. If we compel non-European races to erect governments patterned after our own in order to escape from our political and economic yoke, should we not give them a little time before hailing with delight their incapacity for self-government?—Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of Asia," pp. 451, 452.

The two conditions of all progress are steadfastness and mobility. Are not both these conditions met in the Chinese people. What people possess more steadfastness? Three centuries ago the Manchus overthrew the Chinese, but who really was overthrown? For those three centuries the Chinese kept the line of racial cleavage sharp and distinct, subtly drained away the energies of their conquerors, and now after two

hundred and fifty years of steadfastness of purpose have broken the hated yoke. Where on earth is there any other nation with such abiding qualities of stability and endurance? And only those who are ignorant of Chinese history can think of the Chinese as impassive or immobile. No nation has ever been shaken by mightier upheavals, or responded more readily to new ideals, or shown a more unflinching will for moral change. —Robert E. Speer, *International Review of Missions*, April, 1916, p. 208.

### Waking Up or Just Turning Over?

"The dormant giant is stirring; he will soon rise, shake himself, and call his tormentors to account." This is the sort of rhetoric which just now comes glibly from sanguine friends of the Celestial Republic. Among knowing ones in the Far East a quite different sentiment has been appreciatively savored: "China is not waking up: she's only turning over in her sleep." Somewhere between the seers and the cynics lies the truth; but who shall say at what distance from either extreme? . . .

It must be owned that there are disconcerting features in present-day Chinese life. "The Chinese lavishes so much loyalty on family, community, and province that he has none left for the nation," says a clever returned student at dinner. "The country is practically sold out now; no wonder the Peking politicians are getting what they can," declares another. "Oh, we always absorb any invaders in the course of two or three centuries," is the philosophic dictum of a serene spectator of his country's danger. In a company of intelligent, foreign-trained, young Chinese, some of them minor government officials, questions about the composition of the present legislative bodies, the qualifications of the electors, the number participating in the voting and the like, elicit amused replies or merely provoke gently ironic laughter.

Certain things in China may well cause apprehension: the division between north and south, which are terms of political faith rather than of geography; large armies unpaid for months, living on the countryside and terrorizing towns and cities; bandits now and then committing depredations within a few miles of centers like Peking and Canton; a government vacillating between the demands of militarists and fear of popular uprisings; revenues needed for constructive national tasks diverted to the uses of clamorous generals or dissipated in administration inefficient or worse; the development of natural resources hindered by the lack of public order and security; internal discord and weakness inviting aggression from without.

But when the worst has been said, there remain other aspects of China which are full of hope. One marvels that in spite of all the difficulties that have been mentioned the mighty current of Chinese life flows on steadily, calmly, irresistibly, for the most part in beds worn during the centuries but increasingly, too, in newly broken channels of innovation

and progress. China is typical of a distracted world. If attention be fixed solely upon the sorrow, disease, poverty, strife, bitterness, and suspicion of the present hour, it is well-nigh impossible to escape despair. But when one takes account of the persistent, normal, upbuilding influences at work in the world, he takes heart again. So with China. There is a dark side, but there is also a bright and encouraging side. . . .

The cynical may smile at the mention of the Republic; they may deride the senate and the lower house. The fact remains that the Manchus rule no longer. The forms of republican government may for the moment seem somewhat to mock the Chinese people, but these very forms and names mark a sharp and dramatic break with the old order. They serve as symbols of a new regime, suggesting modern ideas, and inviting to a fuller realization of them. The Chinese are not to be hurried too rapidly. They must be gradually inoculated with novel theories. They are becoming accustomed to the language of popular government; in time they may demand not only the rhetoric but the reality of republican institutions.

As a matter of fact, the present government in Peking is by no means an irresponsible autocracy. Of late it has had to reckon with an organized and powerful public opinion, and unmistakable feeling of nationality. Under the leadership of the "students"—that is, not only school boys and girls and college graduates, but alumni as well—and organizations of business men, a sense of national unity and of national danger has been astonishingly extended and deepened. A jealousy of encroachments from without, a suspicion that men in authority are disloyal to the country, a demand for international justice, a program of industrial autonomy have manifested themselves in striking ways. This national consciousness seems to have penetrated the remotest parts of the Republic. The "wiseacres" of the treaty ports admit that this is a novel phenomenon. There may be something in the awaking giant idea after all.—George E. Vincent, *American Review of Reviews*, November, 1919, pp. 515, 516, 518.

### China's Economic Problems

The world is deeply interested in the awakening of China. It is difficult for a people who are accustomed to an environment of modern industrialism to appreciate the significance to the world at large of the transition of a population, equivalent to one-fifth of that of the earth or nearly that of the whole of Europe, from a medieval civilization to one which will bring it into tune with what the West has given the world during the past century in scientific, industrial, and social developments. The changes which the Chinese people will experience during the next few decades are so stupendous in their significance to themselves and to the world at large that we can have no conception of their immensity.

China is about to recruit a vast army of men and women soon to pass from the household and field to the modern factory. Probably eighty per cent of its population is still agricultural, and a somewhat larger percentage of the industry is of the domestic, handicraft character, but the inrush of modern ideas, modern materials, and modern organization is coming so rapidly that China's society is soon to be overwhelmed by it.

With a country larger in area than the United States, marvelously wealthy in natural resources and possessing a population of industrious, democratic, peaceful, good-natured peoples, with the potentialities mentally and physically of any other race, with a rich culture which has filtered down through the entire mass, the resultant of the four or five thousands of years of their civilization, and on a continent which can claim fifty-one per cent of the earth's inhabitants, China has a wonderful future in the modern economic world. Its people are gifted with a mechanical instinct, are quick to learn, and, given the advantages of modern popular education and an effective modern governmental administration which they are capable of developing, there are no limitations to their possibilities. There is no caste among the people. Generally speaking, the only difference between one Chinese and another is difference in opportunity. One shudders as he looks out over the horizon of the new era in China and realizes the gravity of the problems which confront these people in their transition from their past secluded, simple, pastoral *laissez-faire* existence to the modern, highly organized industrial society, rendered many fold more complex by its relations with the outside world, more especially with those of its neighbors.

The fact that the nation and the communities have not as yet enacted factory legislation, made provisions for sanitation in connection with their civic and industrial life, or developed a body of corporate law, indicates the tardiness of the country in modern industrialism. Are the four hundred millions of China doomed to struggle through the same experiences in their adjustments and in the relationships between labor and capital as have marked the progress of Western society; or will their people profit by what the West has learned and build their social structure upon a sounder foundation because of this knowledge? . . .

Not only is China confronted with adjusting itself to modern industrialism . . . but it has an equally great problem in that of modern transportation. At present six-sevenths of China's population is concentrated in one-third its area—that of the south and east, which is rich in waterways, although there are hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile lands in the north and west dependent upon land transportation still to be opened to development. Huge areas in west China, though fairly well populated, are cut off from economic communication with the outside world because of lack of railways. There are also, in Central Asia and Siberia, empires rich in virgin resources still to be colonized and opened to modern development. Railways carry with them protection. De-

velopment will follow in their wake even without effort on the part of the Government. We have only to witness the signal success of Chinese settlers in the Philippines, Java, the Straits Settlements, and other sections where transportation facilities have made it possible for them to settle, to appreciate the ease with which Chinese populations flow into areas where colonization is made possible. In a sense, China's problems all center about that of transportation. Give the country the railways needed to bring all sections into connection with the sea and give it access to Central Asia, provided that we do so without involving the country in grave political complications with other powers, and that it can be done for the welfare of the Chinese people, which in the broader sense will be for the welfare of others as well—and we shall witness an economic transformation following therefrom which will astound the world in the immensity of its proportions. Industry, agriculture, and commerce may all be revolutionized with the solution of China's great transportation problem, and a new economic order prevail, but this new order will bring with it new problems, affecting all phases of the life of the people.—Julian Arnold, *Chinese Recorder*, August, 1919, p. 517.

There will be no hasty transformation of scene in China, which would be as disastrous to her as an over-investment of capital. China's hope lies not in a sudden revolutionary destruction of the old order, but in slow, steady growth, by educative processes, which shall enable the nation to adapt itself gradually to its changed environment. Only in a very small degree have the Chinese begun to realize the idea of nationality, of a central government, of a uniform legal system, and of taxation as distinguished from tribute and official perquisites. Left now to work out her own salvation on these and other lines, China's progress would be painfully slow and surely harmful to foreign interests: therefore the necessity of a mild and friendly form of international financial "control," at least in such matters as affect the foreigner directly.—T. W. Overlach, "Foreign Financial Control in China," p. 279.

### Ignorance and Dishonest Officialdom in China

China has given during the year [1919] a very striking demonstration of a quality which it had been generally supposed her people did not possess—the spirit of national patriotism. The protest which was evoked throughout the land by the action of the Peace Conference, in regard to the transfer of the rights previously possessed by Germany under the treaty of Kiaochow, exhibited a unanimity and a depth of feeling entirely new in the Chinese treatment of the relations of the Central Government with foreign powers. It would be too much to say that the old provincial point of view is a thing of the past; but it marks an enormous advance toward a pervasive national consciousness to have a question like this of Shantung plainly affect all classes of the population

and form the occasion of demonstrations by students and merchants, which fulfilled the purpose of driving certain obnoxious high functionaries from office. The students have shown themselves to be a power with which the Government must reckon, and if that power is to be exerted in the right way it may regenerate their country.

It must be admitted that in the attitude of the foreign-educated students toward the vital problems now facing China there is an absence of practical political sense. Their spokesmen are greatly addicted to the use of the catchwords of the Western defenders of popular freedom, quite ignoring the two great problems that have to be solved before China can be judged capable of self-government—the rescue from the darkness of ignorance of the underlying mass of the population, and the acquirement by all grades of the office-holding class of respect for the standards of public honesty accepted by other great nations. Young China seems to be fully awake to the necessity for public education, but in none of its manifestos can there be found any reference to the crying need of common honesty in high places. In an appeal for Western sympathy issued by one of the Chinese plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference, stress is laid on the ardent desire of the people of China to retain the republican form of government, but the fact is ignored that the chief danger to the established political order is to be found in the militarist Tuchunate,<sup>1</sup> whose arrogant dictation renders the nominal existence of free institutions a farce. When the Chinese intelligentsia have succeeded in freeing their country from this incubus, they will have a better chance to command attention for questions which they have lately been dragging into the forum of discussion, such as the abolition of spheres of foreign influence, the surrender of extraterritoriality, and the attainment of tariff autonomy.—John Foord, *Asia*, December, 1919, p. 1262.

### **The Place of Chinese Christian Women in the Development of China**

Let us say it with all due reverence and humility: Chinese Christian womanhood will be the most potent factor in the regeneration of China. . . . The hope of China lies in the spread and growth of Christianity in this country. Who can promote this growth better than the Christian women of China? Theirs will be not only "the hand that rocks the cradle," but the mind to direct young China on its way, and the soul which shall enable adult China to cling to its way along the narrow path of righteousness and truth. China cannot develop without sweeping away all that is wrong and false, and who can do this clearing better than the Christian women? Theirs will be the hand to raise a high standard, theirs to demand a cleaner record, and a sterner probity in all strata of society. Theirs will be the voice to negative the debasing practice of

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<sup>1</sup> Military governorship.



concubinage, theirs to claim freedom from the subtle bondage of ancestral worship and the demoralizing vices of gambling and opium smoking. Ultimately theirs will be the vote to decide whether China shall be democratic in name or in truth. There is nothing boastful in these statements. All who are familiar with Chinese history know that, compared with other heathen countries, her women are held in higher esteem and consideration. Christianity alone can crown her and give her an equal share in the home and nation, and it is the Christian women who must come forward and assist in the development of the country.

Already in thousands of Christian homes they are laying the foundation of a more Christ-like character in the lives of children, and these little ones will become the pillars of state. Unlike the students of old they are willing to work with their hands as well as with their minds, and the double toil will enable them so much the more, so that the results of their labor will be the production of a new race, not effeminate but strong and masterful and capable of accomplishing all that is required of them whether in the home or state. Their spiritual welfare will be fostered also by these same Christian mothers. Thus grace of mind will be enhanced by the moral beauty of the soul. A true race of patriots will arise who will scorn self-seeking and by the integrity of their lives prove that Christianity has the power to save men whether white or yellow. Japan then will not be able to coerce China, when the Christian element will be strong enough to crush traitors.—Ida Kahn, M.D., *Chinese Recorder*, October, 1919, pp. 659, 660.

### Christianity and the Leveling Up of Life

The whole point is that, if the four hundred millions of Chinese people are to be forced to fight for their own existence and to get hold for themselves of the "strong mailed fist," there will be a terrible war between the white peoples and the Chinese. But the Chinese do not believe in war; the Chinese believe in moral forces to build up a civilization of a high order. We believe in what Sir Douglas Haig said—the leveling up of the whole social life. The growth of China from a small state of three or four million square miles of territory has been created through moral forces. It was a process of leveling up the surrounding tribes and people. Our literature, our philosophy, and our idealism have gone with us and, as it were, converted the surrounding tribes.

Coming into contact now, however, with a Christian civilization, we find a higher order still of idealism based on a conception of mutual service. If the Western people now will endeavor to help China in her transition from the old order into the new order, through the process of leveling up instead of leveling down, then the world will have an assurance of peace and the League of Nations will become a reality. We younger men in China are doing our best to convince China

to go against militarism and to develop on democratic lines. We are firmly convinced that our cherished idealism, our belief that war is a curse, is correct; that the nations can adjust their differences through a right conception of the relation between nation and nation, and through the supremacy of international law over violence and physical force. In our effort to establish a true democracy in China we are convinced that an effective way of realizing our objective is to bring Christianity to the Chinese people.—Dr. C. T. Wang, Chinese Peace Commissioner, in an interview with the representative of the *Westminster Gazette* as quoted in the *London and China Express* of May 22, 1919, and in the *Chinese Recorder*, August, 1919, p. 512.

### The Only Hope

The only hope for the future of the world lies in the universal recognition and application of those ideas of international order, justice, and brotherhood which Christ proclaimed, and of which the foreign missionary enterprise is the organized expression. All other ties snapped in the war. Science, philosophy, education, commerce—each and all failed to hold the world together. Labor and socialism came nearer than any of them to maintaining a kind of unity; but they, too, were soon rent apart. The home churches were as widely sundered as other interests. Foreign missions alone preserved the international idea. . . . No political adjustments between governments can create enduring peace unless they rest upon a foundation of righteousness and good will; and these are precisely the foundations which the missionary enterprise is laying. Treaties are no stronger than the moral character of the peoples that make them, and missionary work makes moral character. . . . The special service that foreign missions can render in rightly influencing the pressing world problems in eastern Asia was well expressed by Viscount James Bryce, when he said that the jarring contact of many nations in the Far East today imperatively calls for the strengthening of foreign missionary work, which, he declared, must be the chief influence in smoothing that contact, in allaying irritation, and in creating those conditions of international good will which are essential to the preservation of world peace; and he added: "The one sure hope of a permanent foundation for world peace lies in the extension throughout the world of the principles of the Christian Gospel."—Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," pp. 485, 486.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **HOW MUCH HAS CHINA A RIGHT TO EXPECT OF AMERICA ?**

#### **I. Has America really been a friend to China?**

1. Some say America has proved untrue to China and deserted her in the Peace Conference in allowing Shantung to go to Japan. What do you think about it?
2. What things has America done in the past that showed her to be a friend of China ; what things has she done that would make China doubtful of this friendship?
3. Why has America shown herself friendly to China? How far has America followed her policy from altruistic motives, and how far because she considered it good national life insurance?
4. Why has China looked to the United States for continued friendship? Why does China today set such a high estimate on the friendship of the United States?

#### **II. Just how far is the integrity and development of China essential to the welfare of all the nations on the Pacific?**

1. If China should fail in her attempt to establish a republic, and should be taken over by Japan, or be divided between the powers, in what ways, if at all, would this have an unfavorable effect upon the United States?
2. What effect would the break-up of China have upon the danger of war over Far-Eastern matters? Would or would not the United States be likely to be involved in such a war?

#### **III. What, if anything, should America do to help save China as a nation?**

1. To what extent is America morally obligated to stand by China in this time of crisis? How far would she be justified in going to prevent Japanese or other foreign aggression and to help China work out her own destiny?
2. If China is given a chance to work out her own destiny, what do you feel that America could do to help her make good?
3. Appraise honestly the relative value in fending off foreign

aggression and in guaranteeing China's integrity of diplomatic help; loans to the Government and for private enterprises; providing for the education in America of potential Chinese leaders; and increase of missionary work.

4. How far should America go? Suppose it involved sacrifice and disadvantage to the United States, would you or would you not vote for our undertaking the responsibility?
5. If China proves unable to work out her own destiny without foreign intervention of some kind, just what processes of friendly helpfulness from America do you feel would do most to hasten the commercial, industrial, intellectual, and moral stabilizing of Chinese life, so that at the earliest hour possible the Chinese people might again assume full control of their own national affairs? Consider this question from the point of view of your own appraisal of the assets of American life and character which might be mobilized for these purposes and also take into consideration the attitude, so far as you can judge it, of the Chinese towards various methods of helpfulness which have already been tried or which might be proposed.

#### REFERENCE MATERIAL

##### The Failure of Justice to China at Versailles

That in some way China has come out of the recent war settlement with less of consideration as a disorganized nation, and less of justice as a fellow-member of the world fraternity, is generally conceded. As to the placing of the blame therefor, wide and conscientious differences of opinion exist. Some would go back to Germany, some would charge it all up to Japan, others find the cause in American diplomatic weakness, still others lay it to certain treaties, as to which there is again difference of opinion as to whether they should have been made, yet since they have come into existence many conscientiously feel that honor is involved in their being kept. Yet others would blame a certain section of the Chinese people for involving their country, through treaties and loans. We cannot claim to know all the ramifications of the situation. In part what has happened is due to general failure on the part of all concerned to live up fully to the ideals of the "Fourteen Points." There has been, however, a persistent note in recent books and articles coming from many quarters, that justice has not been done to China. Whether this mistake must be undone by an "act of grace" on the part of Japan, by concerted action by all the Powers, or by the League of Nations, is a problem we are unable even to attempt to solve. Yet inasmuch as commerce is now the greatest "political interest," and Christianity has so much political significance that the "powers that be" talk of curbing its activity, and we believe,

furthermore, that even politics could and ought to be Christian, we cannot keep quiet! We sympathize with the very natural resentment of the Chinese people at the way their territory is assigned to others. We believe that justice should be done, and that against this, as well as all other injustice, the Christian Church needs prophets to protest. There is a real danger that to patriotic Chinese the Christian nations will seem to acquiesce in this unjust action. A way must be found to undo this injustice. China seems to lack a friend disinterested enough to try first of all to secure for her justice.—Editorial, *Chinese Recorder*, October, 1919, pp. 650, 651.

In the discussion and solution of no problem before the Conference of Paris were the insincerity and bad faith of the great powers more apparent than in the disposition of the Shangtung question. The facts of history were distorted. The principles for which the Entente powers and the United States declared they had fought were ignored. The powers showed their inability to rise to the high level of international morality essential for the creation of a society of nations. Instead of trying to lay the foundations of a durable peace in the Far East, the statesmen of the Entente powers and the United States decided for the continuation of a policy that has provoked several wars and given rise to injustice and oppression. For the European powers and Japan, the solution proposed for the Shangtung question was the holding fast to traditions and practices of the past. For the United States, it was the abandonment by our Government of the idealism and disinterestedness that for more than half a century have characterized American diplomacy in the Far East.

The solution of the Shangtung question incorporated in the treaty dictated to Germany is the triumph of the policy of economic exploitation through political blackmail, against which John Hay and his predecessors in the American State Department struggled with skill and a large measure of success.—Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of Asia, 1900-1919," pp. 285, 286.

### American Friendship for China

The "open door" of the twentieth century is in all essential respects the same objective that was desired by our countrymen who first sailed around the Cape to compete in a world market without expectation of support from naval forces behind them.

In the hundred years since that intercourse began we have refused to yield to the temptation presented by military weakness unexpectedly exposed. We have steadily refrained from coercing a helpless people ourselves, though we have not denied to others their right to defend their commercial and political interests by stern measures, nor have we shown any quixotic reluctance to reap from these measures the benefits that accrued to all. We have accepted no cessions of territory, even

at the treaty ports. We have never menaced the territorial integrity of China and have been among the foremost in upholding her sovereign right to her own soil. However fatuous and unfair our treatment of Chinese in America, it cannot be denied that we have endeavored to treat the Chinese Empire as honorably as other countries and have consistently desired to include men of every race and color in the great family of nations, so soon as they could prove their birthright by the plain tests of morality and culture. And, finally, we have declined at all times to force upon an unwilling people our scientific and economic methods of industry or transportation, or to take possession of their affairs in the proud and selfish conviction that we could manage them better than they could themselves. In policy, if not always in performance, America in her relations with China has tried fairly to maintain the high ideals of a Christian nation.

The chief blemish in the conduct of American relations with China is, of course, our treatment of her subjects in the United States. I have no excuse or palliation to offer for conduct in which our national honor has been compromised for the sake of a group of unscrupulous politicians in the Pacific coast states, but it is at the same time true that to our previous fairness toward China has been due her patience under indignities received at our hands. Unhappily for our own credit, it is now evident that, as a people, we spoiled our case with China by mere blundering. Had political societies and state legislatures been sufficiently far-sighted to restrain their impatience in the presence of a supposed menace of invasion by Chinese workmen, it would at any moment have been possible to adjust the matter of Chinese immigration with the Government in Peking. As it was, we placed ourselves in the wrong, violating our treaty stipulations while insisting that China should fulfill hers. In spite, nevertheless, of just causes for resentment the Chinese authorities, mindful of past mercies, have acquitted themselves with decorum and conceded to us the further restrictions demanded of them. Their conduct is a notable instance of the political value of long-continued friendly relations when unexpected circumstances may suddenly threaten to overturn them.—Dr. F. W. Williams, "China and the Far East," Clark University Lectures, pp. 82, 70.

### **American Altruism in the Treatment of China**

I imagine the British Government stating its case [in regard to the Hay Doctrine of the "Open Door" in China], confidentially, something like this: "You Americans want to keep the door open in China, so that your commerce and your finance can enter on equal terms. You also want to maintain the integrity and autonomy of China. You have moral grounds for this—justice and humanity and the integrity of treaties, and all that—and we will give you credit for a reasonable amount of genuine

altruism; your national record entitles you to that. But deeper than that, you begin to see that there in time may be an Oriental peril for you. You have seen within a few years a small Oriental nation rise to be a formidable power by learning and applying Western military science; from that you reason that if this method and disposition are communicated to the whole of eastern Asia, and that region becomes consolidated under one arrogant and aggressive and predatory government, then you had better look out lest the weight of that impact will be thrown against your country, and your institutions, and your standards of life."—Thomas F. Millard, "Our Eastern Question," pp. 377, 378.

Just as by the Monroe Doctrine we seek to prevent European powers from conquering, colonizing, and dividing up America, so in China, our interest, apart from a share of the trade and investment chances, lies in contributing to the world's peace by removing that vast territory from the field of international political competition. What we should mean by "the open door" in China is the integrity of that country and its immunity from conquest, partition, and forced exploitation. The plea of an "open door" as a mere tariff policy comes with ill grace from us, who have closed the door both in Porto Rico and at home, but China's integrity is an issue of a different character. It is important to us not so much for immediate economic reasons as because it is likely to promote peace. It is a world, rather than a national, interest.

Because it is a world interest, it should be secured by the efforts of many nations and not by the United States alone.—Walter E. Weyl, "American World Policies," pp. 213-215.

### **The Friendship of China for America**

Of the friendship of China for America today there can be no question. The Chinese look to the United States as a relatively disinterested nation that has the desire and the power to secure for them freedom and fair play. There is something pathetic in this faith. Surely, they say, the country that declined to accept an indemnity, that never seized any Chinese territory, that has sent thousands of men and women to do unselfish deeds of mercy and benevolence, that has fought in a world war in behalf of self-government and of justice among nations, will not fail a people who are seeking to realize for themselves American ideals of representative government and of national independence and dignity.

The embarrassment which such an appeal involves is obvious. The situation in the Far East is complex, difficult, almost baffling. It contains perhaps the germs of another mighty conflict. To fix sole responsibility upon any one nation is unfair and futile. It is a world problem, the solution of which demands magnanimity and sacrifice by all the interests concerned. The Chinese look to the United States as the one power that can assume the leadership in a statesmanlike attempt to find a

solution which will substitute for independent aggressions and dangerous rivalries a cooperation in guaranteeing the integrity of the Republic, and in helping to develop its resources, physical and social, for its sake and for the welfare of the world. In all this is China awake or only dreaming?—George E. Vincent, *American Review of Reviews*, November, 1919, p. 518.

### **Complexities in Applying the Open-Door Principle**

Though at first sight political, and fought by diplomacy, the struggle for foreign control in China was not less one of international financial interests, contending for the exploitation of new opportunities for investment. Foreign capital was attracted by the great profits to be gained from the impending industrial revolution of China. In order to eliminate financial competition of other nations or to counteract political moves on the part of other governments if such were destined to be harmful to its own expansion, foreign finance often solicited, and freely received, diplomatic protection. With a protection and promotion of foreign enterprise several governments combined the furtherance of national ambitions of a more or less political character. All banks and syndicates in charge of the railways and loans became more and more generally recognized as indispensable means to the political and commercial ends of their respective governments. The struggle for foreign control in China has accordingly been marked by a most singular and distinguishing feature, namely, the closest possible cooperation between foreign finance and foreign policy. The period was one of "conquest by railroad and bank."

The tenacious determination on the part of several powers to control their respective spheres to the greatest possible exclusion of their competitors tended to prejudice not only China's integrity but also the full and free enjoyment of the treaty rights of others. Though protesting vehemently and professing adherence to the "open-door" doctrine, nations nevertheless viewed with jealousy the preserves seized by others. They were driven to bitter diplomatic strife over each new prospective "sphere." In short, the tremendous pressure of modern imperialism coupled with modern capitalistic enterprise was, in China as elsewhere on earth, a constant menace to peace. . . . For China will unquestionably become once more one of the principal centers of world politics, in which Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States are concerned.—T. W. Overlach, "Foreign Financial Control in China," pp. i-iii.

### **Foreign Control of Railroad Development in China**

The extent of foreign conquest in China with railway development as a weapon needs special attention. . . . About 14,000 miles of railway are to be constructed in China by foreign capital, and wherever the rail-



way extends there will follow the governments of foreign powers, creating spheres of influence. It certainly looks sinister and monstrous that this network of railways, instead of consolidating the industrial and commercial life of China, merely proceeds to or from the centers of the "spheres of influence" through the very heart of China, for the military and political consolidation of the nations concerned.—Setsuo Uenoda, *Asia*, December, 1919, p. 1215.

#### **Substance of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 2, 1917**

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurance of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 290, 291.

#### **"Territorial Propinquity" Pushed to Its Logical Conclusion**

The essential point that makes this declaration [the Lansing-Ishii Note] different from the notes exchanged between America and Japan in 1919 is that the former now recognizes the special interests of the latter in China, especially in regions to which the possessions of Japan are contiguous. It is obvious, however, that all states whose territories are adjoining have mutual interests, such as the control of the cross-frontier traffic and the enforcement of rules of sanitation. A mutual protection of these interests by the states concerned is a condition of their normal life and needs no recognition by a third power who is separated from

either of them by a vast ocean. Moreover, if Japan has special interests in China, China has equally special interests in Japan, and a recognition of these interests should be extended to one of these two states as much as to the other. The note under our consideration, however, takes no notice of this mutual right: it says nothing of the special interests of China in Japan, while it grants recognition to the special interests of Japan in China. The explanation of this unilateral arrangement is found in the fact that neither America nor Japan meant by "special interests created by territorial propinquity" those interests that I have just mentioned—interests arising from adjacent or conterminous boundaries—but those acquired by Japan, not because of the accidents of territorial contiguity, but because of her deliberate and aggressive policy of encroaching upon the territorial rights of China. Such are her interests in Manchuria, in Mongolia, in Shantung, and in Fukien. On the surface of it, the recognition of these interests by the United States is unfortunate because most of them are only granted by China under duress, and it is hoped that they will be taken away from the hands of Japan as soon as the Western powers have time to redress the injustice inflicted on China by her neighbor, who has taken advantage of their preoccupation in the war.

The term "special interests" is exceedingly vague, and it is not clear whether it is confined to those already obtained by Japan or can be extended to those that may be acquired by her in the future. Should it happen that Japan, in pursuance of her policy of expansion, exacts from China further territorial and economic acquisitions in regions contiguous to her leased territory or where her economic interests are already strong, would the Government of the United States be obliged to recognize her claims and support her demands? Such a recognition or support would not only reverse the friendly attitude which has characterized its diplomacy towards China, but would also be inconsistent with the noble ideals of right and justice so loudly pronounced by President Wilson. Moreover, there is almost no limit to the rights and interests Japan might claim under the phrase "territorial propinquity." The different islands that constitute the Japanese Empire stretch for a distance of twenty-eight degrees of latitude and are situated in a curved line parallel to the coast of China. Should she enforce her claims to the full extent, Japan might assert that the United States should recognize her special interests in all the coastal provinces of China—from Manchuria to Canton. In time, she would be able to control the greater part of China, as it has been her intention to do. Such a condition would be destructive of the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity for the commerce of all nations. The only thing that has hitherto reconciled that principle with the possession of spheres of influence by different powers is that, in all these spheres and in leased territories, the same tariff rates should be enforced as in any other part of China, and the most favorable

treatment should be accorded to the subjects of all states. The experience in South Manchuria has, however, shown that, irrespective of what the treaties and laws may provide, Japan will always grant greater facilities to her own merchants in the spheres under her control than to those of other nationalities. This should have been taken into account by the United States Government when it exchanged the new note with Japan.—Sih-Gung Cheng, "Modern China," pp. 295-297.

### **The Weakness of China Will Trouble the World**

Is anything gained for the world's permanent peace by the prospect of a conquered or disintegrated China? Only the blindness which does not see beyond the immediate present can feel anything but sorrow if China is on the road to chaos. For the trouble being prepared by the weakness of China will trouble the world. It will haunt its peace. And no clairvoyance is needed to prophesy that if China is unable to stand on its feet and assume control of its own affairs, innocent people the world over will pay taxes for armaments, and those who are boys today will perish on distant battlefields. This is no scaremongering. The Chinese are almost a quarter of the human race. Let them sink into helpless disorder, thwart them, oppress them, and they will become to the world what Turkey and the Balkan states have been to Europe—a running sore which infects everyone.

How irrelevant to such a problem is the doctrine preached by the ordinary pacifist—as if not fighting were a policy which touched even the fringes of this problem, so gigantic that it darkens the thought of anyone who looks into the future. For of all the stakes ever offered to diplomacy China is the richest and largest. If comparatively insignificant territories like Morocco and Bosnia can bring the world to the edge of war, what lusts of imperialism will a helpless China arouse?—Walter Lippmann, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 224-226.

### **American Obligation to China**

Between ourselves and China there exist mutual confidence and reciprocal good will. This is a practical as well as a moral asset. But, in addition to and beyond this, there is needed something more. We have pleaded for the respecting of China's integrity. We do not believe in the policy of partitioning or absorbing China. We profess to believe in China's powers of regeneration. We deprecate international aggressions. But what do we do when evidences of policies which run counter to these principles are laid before us?

Any upsetting of the political *status quo* in the Far East becomes a menace to our interests, along with those of other nations. China is pledged to the equal treatment of all nations, the nations are pledged not

to establish inequalities against each other in China's markets, and all nations have the right to equal opportunities. It was special concessions demanded and received from China by particular nations that led to the scramble for concessions which marked the years 1895-1898, which led in turn, indirectly, to the Boxer uprising. The Chinese people are now developing a national patriotism; they are beginning to know something of international affairs; they have become alarmed at the menace of subjugation which threatens them. This means that they will not be ready to endure patiently any considerable invasion as a result of concessions which have recently been required of them. To prevent the establishing of inequalities, to insure against the partition of China, to save China herself from internal disturbances, and to guard against some new form of anti-foreign agitation which may affect all foreign nations alike injuriously, should not every nation which is in a position to do so exert itself to restrain any other whose policies appear likely to induce some or all of these undesirable consequences?

The Chinese look to the United States to exercise a positive and helpful influence in the solution of their problems of reconstruction. The American Government in its official advocacy of the open-door policy assumed a position of responsibility—responsibility towards the interests of every power and every people concerned. This responsibility makes imperative something more than mere reiterated protestations of friendly interest. It calls for most careful consideration, and substantial, constructive political and economic effort.

Finally, and quite independently of immediate expectations or obligations, it must be recognized that the United States is a world power, destined increasingly to participate in world commerce and world politics. The fate of peoples, the disposition of territories, and the determination of commercial policies in the Far East are bound to be of enormous consequence in world affairs. What occurs in the Pacific will have its effects upon the activities and policies of the major nations everywhere. The people of the United States already have large social and considerable commercial interests in the Pacific. They are entitled to increase, and in the natural course of events undoubtedly will increase, their activities in these lines. We should endeavor in the present to safeguard the opportunities of the future. We should ask for nothing but what is just, giving due consideration to the rights and needs of all, demanding no special privileges for ourselves; but we should, on behalf of our own interests and of the cause of peace, frame our policies and practices with a view to the defense of the principles upon which we, along with the other powers, have agreed.

The international problems of the Far East are world problems. As such, they merit and demand the attention of every nation which has a world outlook and world interests.—Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," pp. 401-403.

### A Mandate to Christian Institutions

The movements in China are like the currents in a wide, deep sea. The instruments to measure them have not yet been made—it may be doubted whether they have yet been invented. Here is antiquity in the mass. Here is pride of intellect—a pride slowly crystallizing through the centuries, but now rudely shocked by revelations of the nation's sluggish response to aggression, and its incompetence in clearing the highways of its own destiny. Its keener self-respect is wounded by the realization of the corruption of its leaders. Suddenly from its slow indifference comes the students' strike. It is like the flash of a blade so long resting in its scabbard that men had guessed that there was scabbard and no blade. The new protest against corruption issues from the schools—many of them the mission schools and the national schools—for which the Christian institutions have set the type. Over large sections of China reaches the curse of banditry. The exactions of fear exhaust the resources of the people and paralyze industry. It impresses one as sheer lawlessness. There is in it also protest. At times it is not far from patriotism—misguided but genuine. In Foochow the stage is set for another Shantung. We may not venture to adjudge the guilt in the clash of interests and arms, but the challenge of China, to the neighbor nation whom she fears, to show cause rings with a note with which Celt and Anglo-Saxon are not unfamiliar. The year which has brought this huge, old nation into the very center of the world's thought and diplomacy has confirmed the long cherished conviction of leaders . . . that to the Christian school, with the Christian Church, has been given the mandate for China's rescue and reconstruction.—Extract from Report of Dr. Frank Mason North to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, New York, December 5, 1919.

### What Missionaries Have Done for China

In the first place, China owes a great deal to the foreign missionaries for the introduction of *modern education*. Not only through their translation of books of modern science, but also through their personal efforts in teaching modern science and arts and in establishing modern schools and colleges, missionaries, particularly those from this country, have awakened an interest on the part of the Chinese masses in the importance and value of modern education. The present widespread educational movement in China is traceable in its origin to a very large extent to the humble efforts begun half a century ago by pioneer missionaries of the Christian Church in China. The efficiency of missionary institutions in training men of discipline and character is a fact generally admitted. Indeed, many of the missionary schools and colleges are recognized as among the best of our educational institutions.

In the second place, *the missionary, as a doctor*, has rendered no less

service to China than as an educator. The missionary hospitals and dispensaries, numbering, I am informed, nearly four hundred, are not only places of comfort to the sick and suffering, but also serve as centers from which the light of modern medical science radiates to the length and breadth of China.

Then the missionary *as a moral and religious teacher* and as a social reformer has been a distinct force in China. Perhaps no one can tell how many miserable lives have been made happy and how many living in darkness have been brought to see the light by missionary teaching. Many of the epoch-making reforms, such as the suppression of opium and the abolition of foot-binding, have been brought about with no little support from the workers of the Christian Church in China.

I hold missionary work in high regard, as do many of my fellow-countrymen. The Christian Church has not only rendered valuable service in propagating Christian doctrines, but has by her various activities contributed to the modernization of China, and under the new regime of republicanism Christianity is bound to make even more rapid progress and accomplish much more in China than she has in the past.—Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to the United States, in *Missionary Review of the World*, October, 1916, p. 763.

### **Agreement as to the Meaning of Life**

It is not chiefly an economic problem that distresses men. There is such a shrinking of the world, it is true, that wages in Glasgow or Liverpool may come to depend upon the economic conditions that hold in the Pacific. But this plain and admitted fact, terrible as it is in its possibilities, is not to be considered by itself. Nor is the race problem political only, unless a deeper meaning is given to politics than it commonly bears. It is in reality a spiritual problem; it is concerned with ideals and values. Nations must live together, but how can they live in the same house in peace unless they are agreed upon the meaning of human life, and upon its true values and its destiny? If the nations must differ here, it would be of little value that they spoke the same tongue, or were linked by wireless telegraphy; there could be no fellowship of an enduring kind. The quest of the moment must be for a reconciliation of all nations upon a certain interpretation of human life which will give common values and yet not rob the nations of their distinctive glories and commissions.—E. Shillito, *International Review of Missions*, January, 1919, p. 22.

## CHAPTER VII

### IS JAPAN'S SOVEREIGNTY IN KOREA A BENEFIT OR A MENACE TO THE ORIENT?

#### I. What significance has the status of Korea for the future of the Far East?

1. Look at the map and see what gives the control of Korea so much importance in reference to the domination of the Far East.
2. What nations have sought to control the Korean peninsula during the last forty years? What special consideration led each to desire this control?

#### II. Has Japanese control of Korea been beneficial or harmful to the Koreans?

1. How did Japan's occupation of Korea come about?
  - a. As a result of a national zeal for territorial aggrandizement?
  - b. As a field for Japanese colonization?
  - c. Out of a demand for national self-protection against Russia?
  - d. As a counter-move against the scramble for "spheres of influence" of various European powers which were working towards the dismemberment of China?
2. Does Japan seem to you to be administering Korea for the sake of the Koreans or for that of the Japanese?
3. If Japan wishes to maintain control in Korea, which policy do you feel is the better for the Japanese Government to pursue:
  - a. One of friendly sympathy for Korean sentiment, granting, for instance, every possible concession in the use of the Korean language in schools and assemblies, in books and periodicals, and making no rigid requirements as to the use of the "national language"?
  - b. Her accepted method of pressing the use of the Japanese language in every possible way as an appropriate means to rapid assimilation?

According to the experience of the United States, what relation

is there between the maintenance of their national customs and the use of their mother tongue by immigrants and their rapid Americanization? What has been the American experience in the Philippines?

4. In what ways do you feel Japanese control will be a benefit, in what ways a detriment, to Korea and the Koreans?

### **III. What effect has Japan's sovereignty in Korea upon the welfare of the Far East?**

1. In what ways do you feel Japanese control of Korea will be a menace to the peace of the Far East? In what ways a real aid to a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern problem?
2. Which would be best for the future peace and welfare of the Far East, that Korea should be independent, that she should belong to Japan as a dependency, or that she should enjoy some large measure of self-government with full and responsible representation in the imperial parliament? Why do you hold this position?

### **REFERENCE MATERIAL**

#### **The Strategic Position of Korea**

The peninsula of Korea juts out from the mainland of Asia toward Japan between the Japan Sea and the Yellow Sea. The Japan Sea is as important to Japan as is the North Sea to Great Britain. The Yellow Sea is as important to China as is the stretch of the Atlantic between Boston and Newport News to the United States. Korea has been called a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. This expression is no exaggeration. Were Korea in the hands of any European power, the menace to Japan would be as the menace to Great Britain of Belgium in the hands of Germany. A European power ensconced in Korea could separate Japan from China and control the outlet of northern China to the Pacific. . . . Korea lost her independence through the imperialistic ambitions of European powers in the Far East. She will regain her independence only through the definite renunciation of those ambitions.—Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of Asia 1900-1919," pp. 346, 369.

#### **From Recognition of Independence to Declared Annexation**

At the beginning of the war with China in 1894 Japan had made a treaty of alliance with Korea, in which Article I declared: "The object of the alliance is to maintain the independence of Korea on a firm footing." In the treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the war China recognized "definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea."



establishment of Japanese rule in Seoul and all over Korea proved conclusively that, courteous and persuasive as she might be in her intercourse with Western countries, Japan was, and would remain, thoroughly Asiatic in her way of dealing with any overt resistance to her authority or even moderate criticism of her policy.—H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," pp. 147, 148.

### Exploitation versus Colonization

The Japanese are exploiting Korea, Manchuria, and China. In the first they have a free hand, for it is theirs, and the immigration of Japanese is in every way encouraged. But the traveler landing in Fusan, a city which has been a Japanese headquarters for many centuries, finds all the humbler occupations in the hands of Koreans. The Japanese, more numerous here than elsewhere in the province, already form a caste in which the Japanese coolie can find no place. In Manchuria the same is true in a more pronounced degree. In China, the Japanese compete with many other nations for the privilege of organizing its vast human energies and developing its illimitable resources. The purpose of the recent unprecedented demands of Japan was to secure a paramount position in China in this important work.

But Japan is not colonizing China or Manchuria or even Korea to any appreciable extent. Her position as exploiter is one of immense significance to her, to China, to the world at large, and to ourselves . . . a position comparable to that of Britain in India, and perhaps destined to be as influential, but it does not solve the problem of Japan's abundant population. The Japanese organizer and the Japanese capitalist find their opportunity, but the coolie must look elsewhere.—Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 217, 218.

### What Japan Has Done for Korea

It must not be supposed for a moment that the Japanese administration in Korea has been wholly evil.

It will be recalled that there had been several decades of advice from Japan to Korea, and of the assertion of Japan's paramount position in the peninsula. It was not until 1904, however, that Japan, on the plea that Korea was not able to govern itself, began to take formal management of its concerns. By the treaty of November 17, 1905, the control of foreign affairs passed into the hands of Japan and a Japanese Resident General became practically governor of the country. Despite the bloody insurrections of the next two or three years the Japanese hold upon Korea was greatly extended, until in August of 1910 the annexation was proclaimed.

Now, during the period of the protectorate, and the later period of full Japanese sovereignty, many excellent things have been brought to

pass under the auspices of the Government. For example, great areas of waste land have been reclaimed and improved; though I understand that there is little encouragement to individual citizens, because the law provides that such reclaimed lands shall revert to the community after a period of eight years. Eighty per cent of the Korean population consists of farmers, and agricultural methods have been greatly advanced and the cultivation of new products developed. Cotton, silk worms and mulberry trees, live stock, hemp, tissue, apples, pears, grapes, peaches have been introduced. There is in this period a marked increase in the land under cultivation and in the products of the land. The country had under the old regime been largely stripped of its trees. The protection of forests and the afforestation of the denuded hills are already changing the landscape. Millions of trees are planted each year; it is said that not less than 300,000,000 in all have been added to the country's store.

Mining has been so increased that, whereas in 1910 the mineral product was valued at 6,000,000 yen, in 1916 it had reached a total of 14,000,000 yen. Fisheries have been encouraged, factories have been built, and the beginnings of national industry are now perceptible; subsidies are granted for weaving, paper-making, pottery, etc. The result is an immense increase in exports, the foreign trade showing an advance from 53,000,000 yen in 1909 to 131,000,000 yen in 1916.

Railroad communication has, of course, been extended, a fifty per cent advance in mileage being shown from 1910 to 1916, and an increase of over 150 per cent in passenger traffic.

Highways have been built rather rapidly. Before the annexation there were of first, second, and third-class roads only about 500 miles. In March, 1917, there were more than 6,100 miles completed and more than 8,000 miles projected, but not yet finished. Rivers have been improved. Harbors like those of Fusan, Chemulpo, and Wonsan have been developed. Lighthouses and buoys have been provided and a thorough land survey has given definiteness to questions of ownership.

Streets have been widened and paved in the principal towns. Handsome public buildings have, in some places, been erected, and steps have been taken for the preservation of historic buildings and relics.

Much attention has been given to questions of sanitation and public health. Water supply by public works has been taken up in twelve cities. Foods, drinks, and drugs are inspected. Public hospitals have been founded in each province. Vaccination has been insisted upon. Vigorous efforts have been made for the control of epidemic diseases, smallpox having almost disappeared. And provision has been begun for the care of the deaf, blind, insane, leprous, and orphans. Fire brigades give protection in the larger places.

Weights and measures have been standardized. System has been brought into the financial administration and the matter of taxation. It is claimed by some, to be sure, that taxes are four times as heavy as

before the annexation, but the official reports show that the government civil expenses, which were 9,500,000 yen in 1905, had also increased to 52,000,000 yen by 1912, and to 63,000,000 yen by 1917. Of the total expenditures in the country for civil and military purposes, Japan contributed 27,000,000 yen in 1907 from the imperial treasury. That annual amount has been gradually reduced and this year the civil contribution from the Japanese empire has come to an end, though I believe the expenses for the maintenance of the military forces are still a charge on the imperial treasury.

Honesty has marked the general administration. Encouragement has been given to thrift and savings. The laws have been codified; the penal code has been revised. A larger measure of peace and order had unquestionably prevailed previous to this revolution. Importantly the educational system has been vastly extended. From 1910 to 1917 common schools for Koreans were nearly trebled and the number of pupils nearly quadrupled. Under the old regime little had been done by the Government for public education. At the present time schools for Koreans dot the entire land, although it should be added that, according to the best estimates, only one tenth of the Korean children of school age are as yet provided with school accommodations. In addition to the primary schools, elementary agricultural and technical schools have been established, with a few higher schools, including colleges of medicine, technology, and law.

It is true that the Koreans feel that these improvements in the country are dictated by no unselfish motive on the part of the Japanese; that they are seeking to make the peninsula better for their own occupation and benefit, rather than for the advantage of the Koreans themselves. One Korean statement puts it: "Their protection, their love and their care are no more than we give to our cattle; we are for them in order to butcher them." But I cannot help feeling that, whether or not the motives be purely altruistic, the sense of orderliness, the knowledge of modern life, the initiative and energy which have enabled the Japanese Government to bring about the present conditions are highly creditable to them, and that in these respects the Japanese Government has done an admirable piece of work, of which its officials have a right to be honestly proud. I regard this list of achievements during the last fifteen years as nothing less than impressive.

On the other hand, when one sees the encouragement of the liquor traffic, when one sees systematized and legalized vice brought from Japan into Korea, when one remembers that tobacco is a government monopoly and therefore the trade one to be encouraged for public revenue, and when one hears that the growth of the poppy, although professedly for experimental or medicinal purposes, is being officially promoted in Korea, he cannot but recognize some of the moral stains upon this creditable record.

More than that, it is perfectly clear that the Japanese administration has failed in its colonial policy in two or three matters so fundamental and so far-reaching in their effects as to be almost fatal.—Bishop Herbert Welch, *Christian Advocate*, August 7, 1919.

### **Underlying Causes of the Korean Agitation of 1919**

All of the reasons given have appeared in some form or other in declarations, petitions, and bulletins issued by the Koreans, and so may be taken as an expression of Korean opinion. The statement contains only what seem to some friends of Japan and Korea to be the most important of the causes involved. It should be said also that it does not embody the immediate causes of this outbreak such as the rumors in connection with the work of the Peace Conference, prevalent ideas of "self-determination," the activities of Koreans abroad, and the death of the ex-Emperor of Korea.

*The desire for independence.* It must be remembered that the assimilation of an alien race is a difficult task at best, and that in this case it is made more difficult by the fact that the Koreans as a people have never in their hearts been reconciled to annexation.

*The rigor of the military administration.* Koreans do not know what it would be like to be under a civil administration. Their whole idea of the Imperial Government is drawn from their experiences of military rule.

1. The fact that the police have gendarmes and soldiers associated with them in the administration of the law leads the Korean to fear the police and to regard them not as civil servants and protectors but as oppressors.

2. This impression is deepened by the harsh and indiscriminate manner in which laws are administered. In the report issued by the Government General in July, 1918 (covering the year 1916-1917) it is stated that out of 82,121 offenders dealt with in "Police Summary Judgment," 952 were pardoned, 81,139 were sentenced, and only 30 were able to prove their innocence. The unavoidable result of such a system is that a naturally peaceful and gentle-minded people are living in a state of constant terror.

3. The spy system has added to the terrorization of the people. Spies, usually low-class Koreans, are everywhere. No one knows when nor in what form the most harmless acts or words may be reported to the authorities.

4. The treatment of those arrested adds to the fear and hatred of the police.

5. The show of force on all occasions adds to the irritation. Civil officials, even primary school teachers, wear swords.

6. This system has brought the people to believe that the administration has no idea of leading them, but only of compelling obedience.

*Many Improvements Benefit Japanese More than Koreans.*

1. Industrial. The lumber industry, for example, although extensively developed, brings no additional benefit to the Koreans. In fact, lumber costs more than formerly.

2. Commercial. The Korean merchants lack modern business training and experience, which makes it difficult for them to withstand the unrestricted competition of Japanese merchants.

3. In many cases licensed monopolies work great hardship to the Koreans and cause resentment, e. g., the cotton monopoly and the fertilizer monopoly in Sen Sen.—Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, "The Korean Situation: Authentic Accounts of Recent Events by Eye Witnesses," pp. 121-125.

**A Korean View of Japan's Colonial Policies**

If Japan is sincere and true in her professions of doing justice to the Korean people, she must do one of three things. She must give Korea:

- (1) Complete independence.
- (2) Autonomy.
- (3) A voice in making and administering her own laws and in selecting the executive and judicial officials for the country.

The first would be the most magnanimous act—a deed that would remain in the world's history as a lasting tribute to the greatness of the Japanese people. But if Japanese statesmen are not farsighted enough to see the ultimate gain of generosity, then they should extend autonomy to Korea. It is the right of the Koreans to administer their internal affairs, even should this right be exercised under the suzerainty of Japan. If this right is recognized, Japan would be following the example of the most successful colonizer in the world—England. If the Japanese Government does not care to grant even this amount of justice, insisting upon its policy of assimilation—a policy which has met with complete failure so far, and which, in my opinion, will never succeed—it is only fair that the Korean people should have a real voice in their government. It is high time for Japanese statesmen to realize that "taxation without representation is tyranny," and that the soldier's rifle or the gendarme's swords will never make loyal Japanese citizens out of Koreans. . . .

Japan took Korea as the prize of the greatest war in her national life and, according to the time-honored European doctrine of economic exploitation and territorial aggrandizement by the right of military conquest, she considered that she had a perfect right to absorb Korea. But the Wilsonian principle of self-determination declares that helpless nations are not to be considered as mere pawns in the international game

of strong powers. The tenet that "*No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live*" is a distinct departure from the old school of political thought. It is a new principle of international justice.—Henry Chung, *Asia*, May, 1919, p. 467.

### The Korean Situation in 1920

Two extreme views have been set before the American people: some Japanese press agencies have been inclined to state that the demands of the Korean people have been met, the crisis is past and everything is well; on the other hand Korean propaganda has represented that there has been no improvement over the conditions of last spring [1919], and that whatever seeming reforms have been accomplished are but camouflage. As usual, the truth lies at neither extreme. . . . Some real progress has been made in the right direction, but nothing like a finality has been arrived at. Whether the plans initiated by the Government will be fundamental and far-reaching enough really to give Korea a satisfactory administration, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, on the Korean side the past year has unquestionably brought a further crystallization of opinion which is hostile to any Japanese government. The minds of many are fixed on complete national independence as the only goal, and they declare that they have no interest whatever in the question of reforms by the present or any Japanese administration. On the other hand many, including some of the most intelligent and far-seeing, are persuaded that there is no hope of speedy independence, and that they must settle down for a long period to build up the Korean people, in physical conditions, in knowledge, in morality, and in the ability to handle governmental concerns. If it is true that in the process of time Korea will have either national independence or such a large degree of local autonomy as will make her relation to Japan somewhat like that of Canada to England, then certainly the strategic thing to do at the present time is to prepare the people for those larger responsibilities which are sure to come to them in the future.

It must be fully recognized that the Japanese Government has by no means as yet won the hearts of the Korean people; rather they are farther off from that today than fifteen months ago. We may have a period of years characterized by restlessness and uprisings here and there which will make it extremely difficult to do for the people the only things which it is possible and proper for us as foreigners to do.—Bishop Herbert Welch, *Christian Advocate*, May 13, 1920, pp. 649, 650.

## CHAPTER VIII

### WHAT ATTITUDE SHOULD AMERICA TAKE TOWARD KOREA'S DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE?

- I. What do you know of the movements for a republic in Korea? Why do you sympathize with this movement for freedom from foreign control, or why do you fail to sympathize with it?
- II. How far are the Koreans justified in their opposition to Japanese control?
  1. What are the considerations which the Koreans set forth which are inimical to Japanese control?
  2. Why was Korea not able to maintain her own sovereignty as have Holland and Switzerland, on the borders of more powerful nations?
  3. When a government seems hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, is a neighboring strong and stable nation justified in stepping in and assuming the reins of power? If not, why not? If so, for what purposes? Has the United States done this on any occasion? When and why?
  4. Is Japan's annexation and control of Korea justified? In discussing this, take into consideration the following which might lead you to justify or to question her action:
    - a. Japan's previous declarations of purpose to respect Korean rights.
    - b. Korea's weakness and corruption.
    - c. The possibility and worth of maintaining Korean national life and independence.
    - d. Japan's possible need of self-protection against Russia.
    - e. The contribution Japan has made to the general welfare of the Korean people.
    - f. The inherent rights of the weaker nations, as set forth by President Wilson.
    - g. The desirability for the Koreans, if annexation must come, that their country be annexed to Japan rather than to China or to Asiatic Russia.
    - h. The rigorous treatment of the Koreans by the Japanese military government since annexation.

5. How far do you feel the agitation against Japan on the part of the Koreans is due to prejudice; how far to real patriotism of Koreans growing out of genuine love for their country?

**III. What attitude should America take toward Japanese control and Korean desire for independence?**

1. If Korea were granted her independence, what hope do you feel there is that she would be able to maintain a republic?
2. What policy do you really feel Japan should pursue in relation to Korea?
3. On what grounds would you urge an idealistic and altruistic policy upon her? How far, if at all, would you consider Christian ideals as an essential to an altruistic policy by one nation toward a weaker people?
4. Just how do you feel America could be of service to Korea and Japan in the solution of this problem?
5. In very considerable measure the missionary work done in Korea has been carried on by American missionaries. Just what claim, if any, upon American sympathy and aid does this fact give the Koreans?

**REFERENCE MATERIAL**

**Independence for Korea**

Ever since Korea lost her identity as a nation the people have never considered themselves subjects of Japan. Although the government regulations do not allow the children to study the language of their fathers in the schools, they gather in groups after school to study the Korean language secretly. Over a million and a half Koreans have emigrated, since the Japanese occupation of the peninsula, into China and Siberia to escape the military rule and economic exploitation of their conquerors. These Koreans, in strange lands, organized themselves into communities, had their own local governments, and refused in so far as it was possible to be controlled by Japanese consuls. . . .

In 1911 the Governor-General, Viscount Terauchi, instituted what is known in the church annals of Korea as the persecution of the Church. Prominent church men, leaders in Korean thought and education, were charged with conspiracy and put in prison. Prominent American missionaries were brought into the trial as being connected with the conspiracy to assassinate the Governor-General of Korea. Here, however, the Japanese overstepped themselves. Their charges against the Korean Church aroused considerable criticism in the West, and when they saw that their attempt was producing a reaction they stopped the



persecution of the Korean Christians and satisfied themselves with limiting the activities of the Church.

The World War and the principle of self-determination as it has been pronounced by President Wilson, fanned the smouldering nationalism of the Korean people into a blaze. On March 1, 1919, two days prior to the funeral of the deceased Emperor Yi, Koreans all over the peninsula proclaimed their independence and put up what they considered passive resistance to the Japanese rule. They selected this date because it was the first occasion since Japan occupied the country that the Japanese authorities permitted the gathering of the Koreans in groups. . . .

The Koreans residing outside of Korea were unanimous in responding to the trumpet call sounded by their compatriots in Korea. The Korean students in Japan were arrested and convicted by the Japanese authorities for their revolutionary activities. . . . The Koreans in China presented petitions to the various foreign ministers in Peking, asking them to use their good offices with their respective governments on behalf of the struggle of the Korean people for independence. The Koreans in America have done, and are doing their "bit." The Congress of the Korean race, composed of the delegates from Korean communities in America, Hawaii, and Mexico, met in Philadelphia, Pa., April 14-16, 1919.—Statement of Claim for Independence and Freedom from Foreign Domination, Prepared by Korean Information Bureau and The League of the Friends of Korea.

### **The Japanese Point of View**

Realizing the island isolation and the limited area and productivity of their own land, the Japanese look upon Chosen on the adjacent mainland as necessary to afford an outlet for Japan's overcrowded population and to produce the additional food supplies that the nation needs. Moreover, from a military and political point of view it is the most exposed portion of the empire, as Japan comes in contact with China and some of the powerful nations of Europe—a serious matter in this unhappy era of racial jealousies and strife. In these circumstances, the Japanese feel that they cannot be content with ruling Chosen as an outlying dependency, as America rules the Philippine Islands and Great Britain rules India, but that they must amalgamate Chosen with the empire and assimilate its people, teaching them the Japanese language, infusing them with Japanese ideals, and developing in them patriotic feeling for Japan as their country. The Hon. M. Komatsu, Director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs of the Government-General of Chosen, wrote on November 4th, 1915:

"The administrative policy fixed by the imperial government of Japan for Chosen fundamentally differs in its aim from that taken by European and American governments toward their colonies. By taking

into consideration historical and racial relations between the two peoples, it is the purpose of Japan to assist, guide, and lift up the Korean people lagging in the race of civilization, and make them not only good and intelligent but also loyal subjects of the empire in name and reality. . . .” It is inevitable in such circumstances that the Japanese Government-General should be sensitive about any influences which they regard as in the slightest degree divisive or as coming between them and the people whom they are trying to assimilate and that they should feel that the carrying out of their policy, in the peculiar conditions which prevail in Chosen, justifies a closer and more complete governmental control. They understand as well as anyone the difficulty of changing the attitude of mature men who have been moulded by the traditions of their own race, and who have personal memories of the tumults and sorrows which attended the subjugation of their native land by the Japanese.—Arthur J. Brown, *International Review of Missions*, January, 1917, pp. 74, 75.

#### Extracts from Korea's "Declaration of Independence"

Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we have come, after these long thousands of years, to experience the agony of ten years of foreign oppression, with every loss of the right to live, every restriction on freedom of thought, every damage done to the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent advance of the age in which we live. . . .

We have no wish especially to find fault with Japan's lack of fairness, or her contempt of our civilization and the principles on which our state rests. We, who have greater cause to reprimand ourselves, need not spend precious time in finding fault with others; neither need we, who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over what is past and gone. Our urgent need today is the setting up of this house of ours and not a discussion of who has broken it down or what has caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects in accord with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be filled with bitterness or resentment over past agonies or past occasions for anger. . . .

Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils of the past by ways that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly feeling make a new world in which the two peoples will be equally blessed? . . .

To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not only loss of peace forever for this part of the Far East, but also will mean for that center of danger as well as safety—the four hundred millions of China—a suspicion of Japan and an ever deepening hatred. From this all the rest of the East will suffer. Today Korean independence would mean not only life and happiness for us but also it would mean Japan's departure from an evil way and exaltation to the place of true Protector

of the East, so that China, too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of Japan aside. This thought comes from no minor resentment, but from a large hope for the future.

A new era wakes before our eyes. The old world of force is gone and the new world of righteousness and truth is here. Out of the experience and travail of the old world arises this light of life's affairs. The insects stifled by the ice and snow of winter awake at this same time with the breezes of spring and the soft light of the sun upon them.

It is the day of the restoration of all things, on the full tide of which we step forth without delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for the glory of our people.

We awake now from the old world with its darkened conditions in full determination and one heart and one mind, with right on our side, along with the forces of nature, to achieve a new life. May all the ancestors to the thousandth and ten thousandth generation aid us from within, and all the forces of the world aid us from without, and let the day we take hold be the day of our attainment! In this hope we go forward.—Quoted by Bishop Herbert Welch in *Christian Advocate*, July 24, 1919.

### **Weighing the Korean Situation in the Balance**

Let us remember that there never was a dirtier Augean stable to be cleansed than that which they [the Japanese] found in the land of The Morning Calm, and that the mess required decisive measures. The historian of the next generation will be in better position to take an impartial view than men of today, who are in danger of having their judgment warped by the personal feelings that have been aroused.

Trying to look at the matter as fairly as possible now, I believe that the balance inclines heavily in favor of the Japanese. I do not defend some of the things that they have done. I sympathize with the Koreans. They would be unworthy of respect if they did not prefer their national freedom. One can understand why the injustice of their own magistrates seemed less irksome than the stern justice of alien conquerors. Nevertheless I confess to sympathy also with the Japanese. They were forced to occupy Korea to prevent a Russian occupation, which would have menaced their own independence as a nation. They are now struggling with their burden against heavy odds, with limited financial resources, and against the dislike and opposition of Koreans, Russians, Chinese, and most of the foreigners in the Far East. While we should as frankly discuss their methods as we would those of our own country in similar circumstances . . . we should avoid the error of assuming that we can help the Koreans by unjust abuse of their rulers.

It would be narrow and unscientific to estimate the historic value of

the Japanese occupation of Korea solely by incidental defects of method or spirit, just as it would be to protest that a transcontinental line of railway should not have been built because the right-of-way injured some man's property, or a brutal foreman committed acts of violence against his person or family. We should view a movement in historic perspective, deprecating indeed the wrongs of the people concerned, and visiting full blame upon those who unnecessarily caused them, but recognizing nevertheless that results, even when achieved by imperfect human instruments, are to be measured rather by their worth to the country and the world than by the follies and crimes of some of the men who had a part in the effort. Looking at the question of Japanese administration as a whole, we must bear in mind that there are a large way and a small way of viewing it.

The large way is to note that in the evolution of the race and the development of the plan of God, the time had come when it was for the best interests of the world and for the welfare of the Koreans themselves that Korea should come under the tutelage of Japan. All great movements in this world, however beneficent in general character and ultimate purpose, involve human agents with their full share of human infirmities. Some of these agents are apt to be selfish, some greedy, some cruel, some lustful. The development of a movement, therefore, is certain to be attended by many individual acts that are wrong. Historic illustrations will at once occur to every student. . . .

The small way of considering a historical question is to fix our attention on such acts of individuals or even on the policies of men temporarily in official position. We should not hastily conclude that, because a period of transition is turbulent and many of its agents are blundering or unscrupulous, the movement itself is bad. It is right that we should plainly and firmly protest against Japanese acts of injustice to the helpless Koreans, right to do everything in our power to remedy injustice; but it would be grievously wrong to act on the supposition that it is not best for Japan to be in Korea and to antagonize the general policy of reconstruction. We sympathize with the natural aspirations of any people for an independent nationality; but the Koreans could not be independent anyway under present conditions in the Far East, and they are far better off under the Japanese than they were under their own rulers or than they would have been under the Russians. Nothing could be worse for Korea than plunging her back into the abyss of corruption, weakness, and oppression of the old regime. A new order is being established. The Koreans are being given better opportunities for advancement. The Japanese are the political and economic agents through whom this uplifting movement is being developed. They have made some mistakes and they will doubtless make more; but on the whole their work in Korea has been beneficent in many ways. Of course it is hard for the Koreans, and for their foreign friends who came to the country in the old days, to

adapt themselves to the changed conditions; but there is no alternative, and it is the part of wisdom ungrudgingly to recognize the inescapable situation. . . .

The Korean who philosophically accepts the new conditions finds that he can get steadier and more remunerative employment than he could in the old days of native rule. He can wear better clothing and have a more comfortable house. His alien masters are, as a rule, more just with him than the native officials were prior to Japanese occupation. If he is wronged by one of his own countrymen, he is more apt to get justice in the courts without bribing an official than he was in the old days of Korean "independence."—Arthur J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," pp. 371-373.

### **The Relations of a Dominant to a Dependent People**

In passing judgment upon the relations of a dominant to a dependent people, three main questions of ethical right arise: (1) The justification for holding an unwilling people in subjection; (2) the political and civil rights that should be granted to them; and (3) the regard that should be had for their material and cultural interests. What answers to the questions thus involved have the Japanese given by their dealings with the Koreans?

It may be asserted, without qualification, that no nation has an ethical right to subject another people, against their will, to its own political domination solely upon the ground that this overlordship is needed in order that its own political or economic interests may be advanced. To admit that there may be such a right of national selfishness is to take away the very foundation of international comity and morality. The principle of national self-defense may be carried to the extent of holding that one nation may object to the passing of a neighboring state under the political control of a third state if the result will be to create a power which will be a danger to the first state's national safety or domestic tranquillity. This principle is, indeed, implied in the Monroe Doctrine, and was appealed to when the United States demanded that the French Government should withdraw its military forces from Mexico. Japan was thus well within its right when it went to war with Russia to prevent her further increasing her political influence in Korea. But the annexation by Japan of that country, against the will of its people, was another matter. At the time this annexation was effected, Korea was not in itself a menace to Japan, and, Russia having been defeated, and even her control to the north of Korea having been transferred to Japan, together with the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, there was no discernible danger that Korea would pass under the control of another power who would thus be able to threaten the national security of nearby Japan. It is impossible, therefore, ethically to justify the

annexation by Japan of the Korean peninsula, on the ground that otherwise the independence of Japan would have been threatened.

The Japanese have, however, sought to justify the annexation on the ground that they are an expanding people, with an already overcrowded territory, and in need of raw materials that their own soil does not provide. And also that, as a politically ambitious people, they need to increase their power in order to be able to take a more prominent place among the nations of the world. These are, of course, the same arguments as those upon which Prussia sought to defend her aggressive policies, and to uphold her right to subordinate the wishes and interests of other peoples to her own ambitions. We need not, therefore, stop to refute them.

There is, however, one ground upon which a stronger nation is ethically entitled to subject another and unwilling people to its political domination. This ground exists when thus, and only thus, the subjected people may be given a regime of law and order which it has been made reasonably certain they are unable to provide for themselves.

When annexation is justified upon this ground, it is clear that the dominant state is committed to the altruistic task of seeking, with single purpose, to advance the interests of the governed, and to prepare them as speedily as possible for the time when they will be able to govern themselves with efficiency and honesty, and, when that time comes, to give them the option whether or not they will remain under the political sovereignty of the dominant state.

The Japanese claim with reference to the Koreans that they are not qualified to govern themselves, though they have not sought to justify the annexation of the country, except in a minor measure, upon this ground. Certain it is that the native Korean government that existed prior to annexation was wretched in the extreme—dishonest, oppressive, and inefficient. This fact the Japanese would be warranted in emphasizing except for the circumstance that they have been unwilling to recognize the obligation to seek to correct, as speedily as possible, this political incapacity. Upon the contrary, . . . the Japanese have sought in every possible way to hinder the progress among the Koreans of even the ideas of self-government or aspiration for it.

Having denied to the Koreans not only independence but administrative autonomy and even an equality of right of participation with their rulers in the enjoyment of offices of public trust, it would seem that there would rest upon the Japanese an especially great obligation to have regard for at least the private personal and property rights of the people thus placed wholly at their mercy. But this obligation they have not recognized, or at least given effect to. In general, as has been already said, the Koreans have, of course, profited by the relative efficiency of the Japanese administration. But even-handed justice has not been dispensed to them, and civil rights have not been provided so that the

individual Korean is able to feel himself, in person or property, secure from oppression. . . .

The policies which the Japanese have pursued in Korea have been dictated by their own political and constitutional ideals. In Japan itself there is little idea of popular or local self-government, or of individual rights as opposed to public authority. It is, therefore, not to be expected that the Japanese would grant to a subject people certain of the political and civil rights which the United States has accorded the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. But there has been no reason whatever why private rights of property and person should not have been respected, why even-handed justice should not have been administered, and, above all, why the attempt should have been made to crush out the distinctive culture and civilization of Korea.

It is not simply that the Koreans are a people of over seventeen millions, and inhabit a country nearly the size of Japan itself, but that they have had a long history of national independence, have created for themselves a language, a literature, and an art—in short that they constitute a nation in every ethnic, historical, and cultural sense of the word. Certainly it would seem that if the principle of national self-determination has any validity at all, it should be applied to this people to the extent of at least guaranteeing to them the preservation of their distinctive civilization and the hope of a time when they shall have control of their own national development. And their case is rendered still stronger when consideration is had of the fact that their present rulers, in political philosophy as well as in political practice, are exponents of principles which the rest of the civilized world has agreed are false and pernicious. It is sufficiently serious that the Japanese should be willing to apply such doctrines in the government of themselves. It becomes a grievous matter when they apply them by force to another people.—Professor W. W. Willoughby, Johns Hopkins University, *Unpartisan Review*, January-February, 1920, pp. 37-42.

### What Is the True Estimate of Korean Character?

The peaceful uprising of the people of Korea against Japan in the spring of 1919 came as a world surprise. Here was a nation that had been ticketed and docketed by world statesmen as degenerate and cowardly, revealing heroism of a very high order.

The soldier facing the enemy in the open is inspired by the atmosphere of war, and knows that he has at least a fighting chance against his foe. The Koreans took their stand—their women and children by their side—without weapons and without means of defense. They pledged themselves ahead to show no violence. They had all too good reason to anticipate that their lot would be the same as that of others who had preceded them—torture as ingenious and varied as Torquemada and his familiars ever practiced.

They were not disappointed. They were called on to endure all that they had anticipated, in good measure, pressed down and running over. When they were dragged to prison, others stepped into their place. When these were taken, still others were ready to succeed them. And more are even now waiting to join in the dreadful procession, if the protests of the civilized world do not induce Japan to call a halt.

It seems evident that either the world made a mistake in its first estimate of Korean character, or these people have experienced a new birth. Which is the right explanation? Maybe both.

To understand what has happened, and what, as I write, is still happening, one has to go back for a few years. When Japan, in face of her repeated pledges, annexed Korea, her statesmen adopted an avowed policy of assimilation. They attempted to turn the people of Korea into Japanese—an inferior brand of Japanese, a serf race, speaking the language and following the customs of their overlords, and serving them.

To accomplish this better, the Koreans were isolated, not allowed to mix freely with the outer world, and deprived of liberty of speech, person, and press. The Japanese brought certain material reforms. They forgot to supply one thing—justice. Men of progressive ideas were seized and imprisoned in such numbers that a new series of prisons had to be built. In six years the total of prisoners convicted or awaiting trial doubled. The rule of the big stick was instituted, and the Japanese police were given the right to flog without trial any Korean they pleased. The bamboo was employed on scores of thousands of people each year, employed so vigorously as to leave a train of cripples and corpses behind. The old tyranny of the *yang-ban* was replaced by a more terrible, because more scientifically cruel, tyranny of an uncontrolled police.

The Japanese struck an unexpected strain of hardness in the Korean character. They found, underneath the surface apathy, a spirit as determined as their own. They succeeded, not in assimilating the people, but in reviving their sense of nationality.

Before Japan acquired the country, large numbers of Koreans had adopted Christianity. Under the influence of the teachers from America, they became clean in person, they brought their women out from the *anpang* (zenana) into the light of day, and they absorbed Western ideas and ideals. The mission schools taught modern history, with its tales of the heroes and heroines of liberty, women like Joan of Arc, men like Hampden and George Washington. And the missionaries circulated and taught the Bible—the most dynamic and disturbing book in the world. When a people saturated in the Bible comes into touch with tyranny, either one of two things happens—the people are exterminated or tyranny ceases.

The Japanese realized their danger. They tried, in vain, to bring the churches under Japanese control. They confiscated or forbade missionary textbooks, substituting their own. Failing to win the support of



the Christians, they instituted a widespread persecution of the Christian leaders of the north. Many were arrested and tortured on charges which the Japanese courts themselves afterwards found to be false. The Koreans endured until they could endure no more. . . .

"What do you want us to do?" men ask me. "Do you seriously suggest that America or Great Britain should risk a breach of good relations or even a war with Japan to help Korea? If not, what is the use of saying anything? You only make the Japanese harden their hearts still more."

What can we do? Everything!

I appeal first to the Christian churches of the United States, Canada, and Britain. I have seen what your representatives, more particularly the agents of the American and Canadian churches, have accomplished in Korea itself. They have built wisely and well, and have launched the most hopeful and flourishing Christian movement in Asia. Their converts have established congregations that are themselves missionary churches, sending out and supporting their own teachers and preachers to China. A great light has been lit in Asia. Shall it be extinguished? For, make no mistake, the work is threatened with destruction. Many of the church buildings have been burned; many of the native leaders have been tortured and imprisoned; many of their followers—men, women, and children—have been flogged, or clubbed, or shot.

You, the Christians of the United States and of Canada, are largely responsible for these people. The teachers you sent and supported taught them the faith that led them to hunger for freedom. They taught them the dignity of their bodies and awakened their minds. They brought them a Book whose commands made them object to worship the picture of the Emperor—even of the Japanese Emperor—made them righteously angry when they were ordered to put part of their Christian homes apart for the diseased outcasts of the Yoshiwara to conduct their foul business, made them resent having the trade of the opium seller or the morphia agent introduced among them.

Your teaching has brought them floggings, tortures unspeakable, death. I do not mourn for them, for they have found something to which the blows of the lashed twin bamboos and the sizzling of the hot iron as it sears their flesh are small indeed. But I would mourn for you, if you were willing to leave them unhelped, to shut your ears to their calls, to deny them your practical sympathy. . . .

Men say—and say rightly—that Korea is the key-land of north-eastern Asia, so far as domination of that part of the lands of the Pacific is concerned. Korea is still more the key-land of Asia for Western civilization and Christian ideals. Let Christianity be throttled here, and it will have received a setback in Asia from which it will take generations to recover.

"The Koreans are a degenerate people, not fit for self-government,"

says the man whose mind has been poisoned by subtle Japanese propaganda. Korea has only been a very few years in contact with Western civilization, but it has already indicated that this charge is a lie. Its old government was corrupt, and deserved to fall. But its people, wherever they have had a chance, have demonstrated their capacity.—Frederick A. McKenzie, "Korea's Fight for Freedom," pp. 5-8, 315-318.

### Extinguishing the Soul of Korea

Something more than mere economic pressure and political domination is needed to extinguish the soul of Korea. History and literature are the records of past achievements, and language is the medium of expression that gives birth to genius. Japanese statesmen fully appreciate the importance of this triple support of national consciousness. They made a systematic collection of all works of Korean history and literature in public archives and private homes and burned them. This is undoubtedly the greatest injustice that the Korean people have suffered at the hands of the Japanese. Korean scholars consider this an irreparable loss second only to the destruction of the Alexandrian Library by Omar in 640. Priceless treasures have been destroyed by this needless vandalism of the Japanese. All Korean periodical literature—from local newspapers to scientific journals—has been completely stamped out. . . .

Under the pretext of unifying the educational system of Korea and bringing it up to a "higher standard," the Government passed educational regulations which forbid religious services and the teaching of history, geography, and the Korean language in all the schools in Korea. Furthermore, these regulations provide that all Korean schools shall be under the strict supervision of Japanese educators, and that the Korean children shall be taught to salute the Japanese flag and worship the Japanese Emperor's tablet. Korean students who go to Japan for their education are advised to attend trade or technical schools, but they are insidiously discriminated against in the higher educational institutions. This is an ironic inconsistency in the face of Japan's position at the Peace Conference, where she is demanding for her subjects rights from America and Great Britain equal to those enjoyed by natives of the countries against whom there is no racial discrimination. It is impossible for a Korean student, who goes to Japan under government supervision, to specialize in such subjects as law, history, or economics in the Imperial University of Tokyo, and he may not go to Europe or America to finish his education.

The tragedy in the case of the Korean is that he suffers the fate of a conquered race, alike with the Poles and the Bohemians before the World War, yet his plight is little known to the outside world.—Henry Chung, *Asia*, May, 1919, pp. 471-473.

## **CHAPTER IX**

### **WHAT BEARING HAS AMERICAN CONTROL OF THE PHILIPPINES UPON THE DESTINY OF THE FAR EAST?**

#### **I. How does American control of the Philippines affect our responsibility for helping to secure a right solution of the Far-Eastern problem?**

1. Does our presence in the Philippines increase or decrease our solicitude as to what happens on the mainland of Asia? Why?
2. Just in what ways does American control of the Philippines make our country a party to the Far-Eastern problem?
3. What is the significance of the Philippines as a commercial and naval base for the United States?
4. What bearing, if any, have American supremacy and American policies in the Philippines on the growth of self-sustaining government in the Orient?
5. How does American occupation of the Philippines affect the possibility of her taking a disinterested part in attempts toward the solution of the Far-Eastern problem?

#### **II. What do you think of America's record in the Philippines?**

1. How did the United States come to be in the Philippines?
2. What has been the purpose of the United States with reference to these wards of the nation?
3. How well has the United States succeeded in carrying out her declared purpose regarding these islands?

#### **III. Is it or is it not possible for America to withdraw from the Philippines without menacing the future of these islands?**

1. How nearly are the peoples and tribes of the Philippines ready to govern themselves?
2. How much danger is there that Japan would seek to take the Philippines were the United States to withdraw? In discussing this, take into consideration the ways in which the Philippines would be a desirable addition to Japan from the point of view:

- a. Of achieving the domination of the trade routes of the western Pacific.
  - b. Of securing an outlet for the excess of Japanese population.
  - c. Of acquiring additional areas for commercial exploitation.
  3. Would the Philippines if independent be likely to be able to defend themselves against an aggressive Japan? What leads you to your opinion?
  4. What considerations would lead you to feel that it would be to the interest of the Filipino people for America to withdraw? What considerations would lead you to feel that it would be to their interest for her to continue her administrative responsibilities?
- IV. Should the nations of the East or those of the West have the dominating influence in the Philippines?**
1. Should the United States in pursuance of a benevolent overlordship in the Philippines seek to relate the people of the islands as completely as possible to the developing types of Asiatic culture and life of the Far East, or should this guidance be in the direction of the fullest possible Occidental culture?
  2. If the Philippines are able to maintain their own independent government and if under such circumstances they should prefer Asiatic administrative affiliations, say with the Japanese or the Chinese, what should be the attitude of the United States?
- V. In general, what should be the future policy of the United States with respect to the Philippines?**

#### REFERENCE MATERIAL

##### How America Came to Be in the Philippines

The Philippines do not, like Porto Rico, stand guard at the gateway of our homeland. They guard the entrance to a remote and different world. To us here at home they are hardly a defense. They are rather a thing to be defended, and that at a distance and against possible claimants near at hand. Their value depends all upon our farther policy. If we are minded to push our battle line out to this front of the far eastern world, to plant our naval stations in every sea and police the planet with our sentinels, then the Philippines are a brave beginning. But we had not planned to do that. We had not thought we wished to do it. Nay, up to the very time when it all happened, we had not wished it. We had resolved to free Cuba and to abate a standing nuisance in our neighborhood. And lo, here we find ourselves in Malay land, deep

enmeshed in the tangled web of the East. It may all be fortunate, but it certainly was not intended. If in advance, any one had proposed to annex the Philippines we should have questioned his sanity.

The decision once reached to annex the Philippines, the treaty was framed with intelligent regard to the true situation. Manila could not fail to be a naval station of importance, and all precautions were taken against its isolation. The commercial route to the Philippines is usually a roundabout one, for ships find it advisable to touch at Japanese and Chinese ports as well as at Manila. But for naval and military purposes a direct route is preferable. Hawaii lies on this direct route about three thousand miles from our shores. In the six or seven thousand miles from Hawaii to Manila an intermediate station was desired. This was supplied by the island of Guam, which Spain was also compelled to yield. With the annexation of Tutuila a year later, the United States completed its system of stepping stones across the Pacific, Hawaii for Japan, Hawaii and Guam for Manila, and Hawaii and Tutuila for New Zealand and Australia. Britain herself could not have chosen them better. She had been our teacher, and we had not sat at her feet in vain.

It is all so natural, yet all so unexpected, so momentous. Two years before, ours was a republic, home staying and with no thought but to continue so. And now an empire had risen, an empire of which we had been the builders but not the architect. Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 106, 107.

### The American Record in the Philippines

None can doubt the material benefits to the Filipinos of American rule during the first fifteen years of our occupation of the islands. But it is equally a fact that we held the people under a system of government contrary to the spirit and letter of American institutions. The violation of the dominating principle of our own Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" and of our belief that "taxation without representation" is inadmissible, was defended by the familiar pleas which uphold the doctrine of European eminent domain. President Roosevelt, who had said in 1904 that the Filipinos were "utterly incapable of existing in independence at all, or of building up a civilization of their own," announced two years later that constantly increasing measures of liberty were being accorded to the Filipinos, and that in the spring of 1907, if "conditions warranted," their capacity for self-government would be tested by summoning the first legislative assembly. On July 20, 1907, election of delegates to the assembly was held. But suffrage was limited. There was a property qualification—a principle Americans had always refused to admit for themselves. Less than 100,000 votes were cast.

The repercussion of the nationalist feeling that swept Asia in 1910 caused uprisings in several islands. Our troops were compelled to take the field again. The Democratic Party went before the country in the election of 1912 with a plank promising independence to the Filipinos at an early date. Congressman Jones of Virginia introduced a bill granting the Filipinos a provisional government from July 4, 1913, and complete independence after eight years. The bill was accompanied by a joint resolution, requesting the President to negotiate the treaty with other world powers to neutralize the Philippines and guarantee their independence by international agreement. An eminent American, who had been an official of our government in the Philippine Islands for some years, wrote at the time: "The Filipino people believe that the platform of the Democratic Party promised them their independence at an early date. Rightly or wrongly, they have thus interpreted the declarations of the leaders of that party made publicly and privately. They are not sufficiently practiced in self-government to draw any distinction between promises and platform promises."

But not until August 29, 1916, did the Congress of the United States provide an autonomous form of government for the islands, with both branches of the legislative body elective. By the terms of the present Organic Act, there are six executive departments, whose secretaries are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate. Only the Secretary of the Department of Public Instruction is an American. Since the passage of this act, local municipal government has been instituted in nearly 900 towns.

The glory of the American occupation of the Philippines is the public school system that has been organized in twenty years. There are nearly 5,000 schools with an enrolment of nearly 700,000 students, served by more than 12,000 teachers. English is taught in every school. To these imposing totals can be added 2,500 university students and 26,000 pupils in 200 private schools. To realize what the Americans have succeeded in doing in the Philippines, one has only to contrast their work in education with that of the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in the East Indies, the two neighboring colonial dominions. In Egypt, a richer country with larger revenue and about the same population, the British Ministry of Education has under its direct management schools for 30,000 pupils. In the elementary vernacular schools of Egypt, the total enrolment is about 250,000! Illiteracy in Egypt is ninety-four per cent after nearly forty years of British occupation. This is one of the principal accusations of the Egyptians against British rule. Material benefits are given the natives in colonies administered by European powers. But nowhere in Africa or Asia, outside of the Philippines, can one see an honest effort being made to help the people toward a higher civilization through education.

The complaint is rightly made by defenders of the European colonial

system that the results of educating the natives have been unsatisfactory. For political agitators who lead the movement for self-government are, without exception, the product of the schools. If only we could have textbooks for Asiatics without mention of the Magna Charta, John Hampden, the fate of Charles I and the Star Chamber, and the American and French revolutions!

The inevitable result of our efforts at education in the Philippines is the determination of the Filipinos to run their own affairs. It is fortunate that the United States went to the Peace Congress with the Organic Act of 1916 in active and effective operation. The American Government and the American people do not oppose the demands of the Filipinos for independence. During the Peace Conference, a delegation of representative Filipinos visited Washington to ask for independence. They received encouragement from officials and newspapers alike. The sentiment of the American people was well expressed by Secretary of War Baker when he told the Filipino delegation that "Americans love liberty too greatly to deny it to others."—Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The New Map of Asia," pp. 137-141.

### The Philippines as a Trade Base

Our fellow-Americans, the Filipinos, are going to be valuable lieutenants in our Far-Eastern trade drive after the war. The extent to which American manufacturers take advantage of the raw materials and the cheap and skilled labor available in the Philippine Islands and establish branch factories there will have an important bearing upon the volume of sales of American goods in the Orient, according to a business man of Manila who is well posted on the commercial outlook in that part of the world. With rich iron deposits and coal equal to the best on Puget Sound, both widely distributed throughout the islands, and copper in the northern highlands of the archipelago, the exploitation of these resources will meet many industrial needs.

"The Philippines are among the most progressive countries in the Orient and the question of skilled labor can be easily solved," says our Manila informant. "Those American manufactured products which would not stand Japanese competition might as well be made by American plants built in the Philippines. With labor as cheap as in Japan and raw materials accessible, the wisdom of erecting branch factories in our islands is self-evident. We would then be in a position to enjoy a reasonable share of Far-Eastern trade." . . .

"Lying at the front gate of Asia, the Japanese will naturally use this advantage," remarks the Philippine merchant. "Add to this the cheapness of their labor and their rapidly growing number of skilled workmen and it is apparent that the United States cannot compete with them in many lines which they manufacture. This weakness in our commercial

position in the Orient may be developed into an invulnerable strength. The Philippines offer the key to our problems."—*Scientific American*, December 7, 1918.

### Getting Out of the Philippines

Philippine independence has been pledged by our Congress, and liberal opinion in Europe or in Asia desires neither to kick us out of the Philippines nor to keep us there against our will. But we can not get out of the Philippines, hastily or heedlessly, without endangering the entire Far-Eastern situation; and we can not base upon a "scuttle" Philippine policy a general Far-Eastern policy that will be sustained by any of our Allies. This is a fact. I have discussed this matter with men in a position to talk authoritatively for Europe and Asia, and I have discussed it as one on record for many years for real Philippine independence. The reason why it is not feasible to turn the Philippines adrift at this moment is because that can not be done without setting up reactions all the way from Calcutta to Chemulpo, from Siningfu to Sandaken. We do not encourage, or justify, Japanese or British occupation when we multiply their difficulties in India, in Ireland, or in Korea.—Patrick Gallagher, *Asia*, September, 1919, p. 897.

If conditions arise whereby other nations, in comparison with America, give people better advantages and opportunities under the changing circumstances of civilization and economic evolution, and better facilities to work, and better protection for their lives and property, then the tide will turn, and gradually people will drift away from America in their political allegiance, toward those better advantages and facilities and protection. It is not from accident or preference that many Americans now do business in China, and in other countries, as British and other foreign corporations. If the proposal to abandon the Philippines without making any provision for their stability and security is carried out, there will be some interesting manifestations of this principle. I never have met a superior type of business man or investor in the Philippines who has any faith in the ability of the Filipinos to conduct a stable government now, and to preserve their nationality without foreign aid. If United States authority and protection are withdrawn from the islands, the principal American interests and property there will be driven to seek protection, and the greater part of them probably will get under the British flag as soon as they can; and many Filipino-owned interests will do the same thing.—Thomas F. Millard, "Our Eastern Question," pp. 384, 385.

### The Filipinos Not Ready to Govern Themselves

I am firmly convinced that the Filipinos are where they are today



only because they have been pushed into line, and that if outside pressure were relaxed they would steadily and rapidly deteriorate.

It is not necessary that there should be much retrogression to cause serious trouble. I have discussed the character and attitude of the present Filipino legislative body. I have shown indubitably what sort of a government the Filipinos themselves established while they had a free hand. I agree absolutely with Blout's contention that they would again establish precisely the same sort of a government if left to their own devices. There would follow first, aggression against the property of foreigners, and then attacks upon their persons, which would not only excuse, but would necessitate, intervention by other governments to protect their citizens. Some of the more intelligent Filipino leaders would set their faces against such conduct as firmly as they did during the rule of the so-called insurgent government, but now, as then, would be powerless to restrain either the more unprincipled among the intelligent, or the great body of the ignorant rank and file, and nothing more than a fairly plausible excuse would be needed to start the ball of foreign intervention rolling.

Many Americans may, in their present deep ignorance of the value of their most recently acquired possessions, agree with that distinguished representative who announced on the floor of the House of Representatives that the Philippines were "a lemon," but agents and spies of Japan have worked throughout the entire archipelago and she knows better. England and Germany have had their business men in the islands for many years, and they know better also.

The Filipinos are not yet fit to govern themselves, much less to govern the Moros and other non-Christian tribes, even if let alone, and they would not be let alone should we turn their country over to them.

Philippine independence is not a present possibility, nor will it be possible for at least two generations. Indeed, if by the end of a century we have welded into *a people* the descendants of the composite and complex group of human beings who today inhabit the islands, we shall have no cause to feel ashamed of our success. . . .

We are giving the Filipinos a fair chance to develop every latent ability which they possess. In the very nature of the case, their future lies, and must lie, wholly with them. There is no royal road to real independence, much less is there any short cut. Our Filipino wards must tread the same long, weary path that has been trodden by every nation that has heretofore attained to good government. . . .

After all is said and done, the real Philippine question is not what path they shall take. . . . It is not whether they shall travel the old, old road a little faster, or a little more slowly. That will ultimately be settled, for them and for us, by the unanswerable logic of events, and we need not worry over it. The real question is, shall they make their long and adventurous journey, guided, helped, and protected by the strong

and kindly hand of the United States of America, or shall they be left to stagger along alone, blind in their own conceit, under the keen and watchful eye of another powerful nation, hungrily awaiting their first misstep?—Dean C. Worcester, "The Philippines Past and Present," pp. 959, 960, 971, 973.

### **Philippine Independence from the Point of View of the Filipinos**

Now that the war is at an end, we feel that the time has arrived when the Philippine question should be settled by the Government of the United States. During the last three years the people of the Philippines have not discussed the question of independence. That has made some people feel that the Filipinos are satisfied with their government and do not want any change. That is a mistake. The people of the Philippines have ceased discussing the question of independence for several reasons. One is that the Jones Law emphasizes the promise that the independence of the Philippines shall be granted whenever stable government shall have been established. When that law was enacted, the Filipinos felt that it was time for them to do things and not to talk. Therefore, they proceeded to enact those measures which are the basis of the present stable government of the Filipino people. They put into effect the measures which were needed to secure the stable government upon which our independence was to be based. Another reason for not discussing independence was that the people felt that they should do nothing and say nothing which might embarrass the United States during the war. The Filipino people are happy today. They are happier than ever before in the history of the country. They are contented and are accomplishing much. But that they are happy does not mean that they would rather live under the present form of government.—Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, *Asia*, May, 1919, p. 428.

The Filipino people would not be just to themselves if, at this moment when their political separation from the sovereign country is proposed, they should fail to express in the clearest and most definite manner the sentiments and purposes that inspire their action. They therefore deem it their duty to affirm: That their independence, instead of destroying or weakening, will tend to strengthen the bonds of friendship and appreciation created by the gratitude of the Filipino people, not only for the final measure of complete justice and humanity that they confidently expect, but for all the previous disinterested work so splendidly performed for the benefit of the Philippines by so many faithful sons of America; that this gratitude will be the first fundamental fact in the future relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands; that in the present state of the international affairs the Filipino people merely aspire to become another conscious and direct instrument for the

progress of liberty and civilization; that in the tranquil course of their years of constitutional development they will maintain for all people inhabiting their hospitable land the essence and benefit of democratic institutions; that they will continue to associate, in so far as this will be acceptable and their strength will permit, in the work of reconstruction, justice, and peace carried on by the United States in continuation of those other undertakings, the high purpose of which was the cause, according to President Wilson, of the magnificent cooperation during the war; and, finally, that in thus preserving their best traditions and institutions in the new situation which will strengthen and perfect them, the Filipino people will continue to make this country as heretofore a safe place of law and order, justice and liberty, where Americans and foreigners as well as Nationals may live peacefully in the pursuit of happiness and prosperity and safe in the enjoyment of their property as well as of their rights and their liberty.—Declaration of the Independence Philippine Commission. Quoted by Maximo M. Kalaw, "Self-Government in the Philippines," pp. 158, 159.

### Japanese Strategy and the Philippines

If Japan has felt it necessary to drive the Germans from Shantung and the islands of the Pacific in order to remove a menace to her own security and to insure the peace of the Far East, may she not feel that she must drive the Americans from the Philippines to the same end?

Must not the American possession of the Philippines be a menace in the eyes of Japanese strategists to the security of Japan and Japan's policies? Are not the Philippines the vulnerable spot at which the Japanese can strike the United States, either tentatively—in diplomacy—or actually—with armed force? It matters not whether the Japanese "want" the Philippines. The United States did not want them—but we took them. We did not need them, but we have them. If Japan feels that our possession of them is a menace to her, she will wish that menace removed. Should she conclude to strike us, she would as a matter of course seize them, and then it would be the unpleasant and difficult task of the United States to fight on the offensive for their recovery. It may or may not be true that we *do not want* the Philippines, or that we would profit by being rid of them; we would, nevertheless, resent and resist any effort to *take them away from us*.—Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 376.

The Philippines are fast assuming a position relative to the Japanese Islands, similar to that occupied by Korea before the Russo-Japanese war.

Japan's industries claim the markets of the Far East as peculiarly their own. They cannot, and most likely will not, even in the future, be able to compete with English and American or German merchandise

under a regime of the open door—ergo, the advisability of closing the door.

The Philippines—to a country, master of sufficient land and sea power to profit fully by the advantages they bestow—is the position from which the “open door” policy can be enforced. . . .

The Philippines are, in foreign hands, a menace to the Japanese doctrine of exclusion in the Far East, but their possession with Hawaii would make Japan invulnerable against attack, on condition always that her militant forces were such as to be able to use those positions.

The adjustment of these divergent interests is destined to test to the uttermost the relative forces, militant and diplomatic, of the powers on the opposed sides of the Pacific Ocean.—Prince Lazarovich Hrebelianovich, “The Orient Question,” pp. 247, 248.

No great national gain can accrue to Japan through the subjugation of the Philippines. The complete possession of the islands would scarcely compensate Japan for the probable cost of such a procedure. It is still an open question whether the Japanese can successfully settle in the tropics. The exceptional opportunities of Davao are at present drawing Japanese to that place, but even there Japanese immigration is still in an experimental stage. It is entirely uncertain whether Japanese laborers can thrive in the other parts of the islands. Many Japanese believe that with Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa, Japan is sufficiently occupied with territorial dominions, and that in the long run it would be more advantageous for her to adopt a policy of righteousness and fair dealing with all nations than to seek new fields of conquest. An assurance to that effect would greatly strengthen her friendship with the Allies and, consequently, her own credit abroad. . . .

Granting then—at least for the sake of argument—that Japan does not endeavor to colonize the Philippines, what are the principles upon which sound and friendly Filipino-Japanese relations can be built? Japan will surely find the Philippine Republic a friendly neighbor and sister. The Filipinos themselves have nothing but admiration and good wishes for an Asiatic people who, by their own strength, have won the recognition of a hitherto doubting world and have carved their proud name in the council-chamber of the great nations. The Philippines are asking only for an opportunity for free and unhampered development of their people and natural resources, so that they can in their humble way contribute to the civilization and progress of mankind. Is it not clear that both the Japanese and Filipino nations can work in harmony toward the furtherance of their common interests?—Maximo M. Kalaw, *Asia*, 1919, pp. 430, 431.

### A Japanese Point of View

The Japanese know the Philippine situation too well to fancy even

for a moment that the islands can be had for the asking. They know that an attempt to acquire the territory will cause endless trouble and countless expenditure, for the Filipinos, who have been opposing American rule, will more strenuously oppose Japanese rule. Certainly the Japanese are not foolish enough to think that such a game is worth the candle. . . . Cold calculation convinces us that it would be far more profitable for the Japanese not to tamper with the territorial autonomy of the Philippines, but to confine their activities there to the exploitation of resources and the development of trade, with the cooperation of the natives.

The idea of converting the territory into an integral part of the Japanese Empire . . . seems highly impractical. But if Japan were ever to acquire the Philippines, the acquisition would be made only under one of two conditions. First, she would not decline to become the mistress of the country if the Filipinos would willingly place themselves under the rule of the Mikado. Business sense forbids Japan to fight for the absorption of the islands at any considerable cost of blood and money. Secondly, Japan might be compelled to annex the country, even against her will, if its internal conditions after the withdrawal of American authority were such as to invite the aggression of ambitious European powers.—Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. 211-216.

### **The Philippines as an Outlet for China's Overpopulation**

Assuming that the neutrality of the Philippines could be secured and that the islands would be forever free from the danger of foreign aggression, that would not solve the immigration problem which the independent Philippines would have to face. Six hundred miles north of Manila, connected by many steamship lines, is the port of Hong Kong and nearby the crowded city of Canton and the overpopulated provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien. Here, within easy distance of the Philippines, is a population of hard-working Chinese almost equal to the population of the United States. Kwangtung province, with an area less than that of the Philippines and with natural resources much smaller, has a population of 31,000,000. These southern Chinese have developed to the uttermost the agricultural resources of their own country. To them the large undeveloped regions of the Philippines have been the promised land for centuries. They were kept out by the Spanish authorities and later were kept out by the Americans. It is inconceivable that with their newly awakened pride of race, the giant China would allow the puny Philippine Republic to bar or restrict the Chinese by either treaty or law. The independence of the Philippines would be the signal for the entrance of a stream of Chinese immigrants. The island could easily support a population of 50,000,000 Chinese, who would make it one of the garden spots of the world and the most prosperous place in the tropics.

Perhaps not so many would come. But certainly the immigration of Chinese to the Philippines, following their unrestricted entry, would be numbered by the hundreds of thousands. With the Filipinos crowded from business and from the most profitable trades by the 50,000 Chinese now in the islands, what would become of them with from 500,000 to 3,000,000 there? Neutrality agreements might prevent other nations from seizing the territory of the Philippines, but no agreement and no law the Philippine Government would be able to enforce would ever protect the Filipinos from this industrial invasion. Chinese would be dominant industrially in the Philippines within a decade after the granting of independence.—Carl Crow, "America and the Philippines," pp. 276-278.

### **The Filipinos and the Non-Christian Tribes**

The Filipinos dislike and despise the non-Christians. They take advantage of their ignorance and helplessness to rob or cheat them of the fruits of their labor, and often hold them as slaves or peons. The non-Christians in turn hate them, and the more warlike wild tribes do not hesitate to take vengeance on them when opportunity offers. The Filipinos as a whole are afraid of the Moros, and with good reason. The Moros frankly assert that if a Filipino government were established, they would resume their long-abandoned conquest of the archipelago, and this they would certainly do. Although the non-Christians are numerically few, as compared with the Christians, they are potentially important because they have the power to make an amount of trouble wholly disproportionate to their numbers. The Filipinos could not rule them successfully, and the probable outcome of any attempt on their part to control them would be the inauguration of a policy of extermination similar to that which Japan is following with certain of the hill men of Formosa. Because of the inaccessible nature of the country inhabited by many of the Philippine wild tribes, they would be able to hold their own for many years, and there would result a condition similar to that which has prevailed for so long in Achin, while the Moros, with their ability to take to the sea and suddenly strike unprotected places, would cause endless suffering and loss of life.—Dean C. Worcester, "The Philippines Past and Present," pp. 951, 952.

## **CHAPTER X**

### **HOW FAR DOES THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE YELLOW RACE CONSTITUTE A PROBLEM IN THE PACIFIC BASIN?**

- I. What is the population of the Far East? How does it compare in the aggregate with the population of the United States? How does it compare with that of the United States in density?**
- II. Compare the two sections of the world as to increase of population, wages, standards of living, possibility of enlistment of industrial workers, potential military strength.**
  1. What aspects of danger, if any, to the future of the United States do you see in the present and the probable future numerical strength of the nations of the Far East?
  2. Of what race in the Far East do you feel America might have most to fear in the future from the military point of view? From the point of view of commercial and industrial competition? From that of land hunger? Why?
- III. What advantage should America take of the supply of cheap labor in the Far East?**
  1. Would you like to see American manufacturers start factories in the Far East in order to get the advantage of such labor? Why, or why not?
  2. How far would you favor the reduction of the high cost of living in America by the extensive importation of goods made by cheap labor in the Orient?
  3. In case of continued labor shortage in the United States, would you or would you not favor the admittance of a limited number of Oriental laborers to the United States? If so, would you wish to admit enough really to make labor plentiful and cheap? If not, why not?
- IV. How can this vast population of the Far East best help the world?**
  1. Given a great and growing population in the Far East, in what

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ways do you feel it could best be used to help the world, including of course, Eastern Asia?

2. How much loss at present to the world does their lower standard of efficiency and production seem to you to represent?
3. Just how far should America concern herself with the standard of living of the peoples of the Far East? In discussing this take into consideration:
  - a. Their ability to buy from us.
  - b. Their ability to sell to us.
  - c. Their ability to produce for the world.
  - d. Their possible competition in world markets because of cheap labor.
  - e. Their desire to emigrate.
  - f. Their possible tendencies toward unrest and revolution growing out of basal economic need, and the probable international effects of such unrest.
  - g. Our duty to maintain an altruistic interest in the welfare of other peoples.

### **V. What can be done towards a solution of this problem of population?**

1. In what ways does the introduction of modern inventions and improvements help and in what ways hinder such a solution? How do the introduction of railroads and the extension of trade affect it?
2. Would you like to have the nations of the Far East fully instructed in modern science, including medicine and sanitation, chemistry, and the manufacture of explosives?
  - a. If so, why? How would you go to work to prevent an ultimate destructive use of science by the yellow race against the white race?
  - b. If not, why not? Just how would you go to work to prevent the spread of scientific knowledge in the Far East?
3. In just what ways can missionary work affect the economic development and the standards of life of these peoples?

## REFERENCE MATERIAL

### **Overpopulation in Japan**

The Empire of Japan is composed of several thousand islands, only five of which are as large as the State of Connecticut, the others being so



small that none of them is of any importance and hundreds are not inhabited. . . . The entire area of the Empire is only 600 square miles greater than the area of California. . . .

However, while the area of this small kingdom is about the same as that of California, the extent of its fields is much less. In California one-third of the total area is under cultivation, while in Japan the cultivated area is only one-eighth. . . . Mountainous Switzerland contains six times the proportion of agricultural land that is to be found in Japan, where the fields under cultivation cover but 20,000 square miles. That is the area from which the present population of 60,000,000 is fed, except as they are able to purchase food from other countries and supplement the produce of the farms with fish and seaweed from the neighboring waters. . . .

It has often been pointed out that the population of Japan is not so dense as in Belgium or England. But Belgium and England are almost wholly arable; Japan is almost wholly mountainous. If we eliminate from the figures of area the unproductive lands of each country, the population per square mile works out, approximately: England, 466; Belgium, 702; Japan, 2,688. A population of 2,688 on every square mile of arable land—less than a quarter of an acre of land for each person! There is more good farm land in mountainous Kentucky than in all Japan. . . . While we in America have the most liberal allowance of land on which to raise our food and the food of others, Japan has the most meager allowance. Japan might exist in luxury on the uncultivated fence corners of America.—Carl Crow, "Japan and America," pp. 8-19.

Japan has a population nearly double that of the whole United States west of the Mississippi. . . . Although she has a vast urban population, she manages by her intensive agriculture to raise nearly all her own food, while England similarly situated imports half to three-fourths of her own. . . . Despite the amazing frugality and admirable simplicity of Japanese life, Japan suffers acutely from congestion of population. Yet that population is on the increase, and the efforts of a solicitous government have thus far not availed to check the increase. Here is the first and most fundamental problem of the Japanese people. There are too many for their little land, and place and food must be found for the growing surplus.

Overpopulation is one of the most serious dangers that ever confronts a nation. People do not know what is the matter. They are conscious of a vague *malaise* which expresses itself in many different forms and lends itself to the most diverse interpretations. Lack of employment, low wages, high cost of living, and burdensome taxes—necessary concomitants of overpopulation—are charged to the iniquities of the industrial order, the rapacity of dealers, and the corruption of govern-

ment. No social order is perfect enough wholly to refute such charges, or strong enough to ignore them. All disturbing and disruptive forces are accentuated by this most fundamental of maladies. Relief in some form is a condition of national tranquillity if not of national existence.—Harry H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 213, 214.

### **China's Multitudinous Millions**

China has a problem of increasing population, which hitherto, has been largely regulated during the centuries by constantly recurring famines, pestilences, and revolts, but with the adoption of sanitary and hygienic conditions resulting in the conservation of human lives, coupled with the introduction of labor-saving devices, this question must become formidable; such conditions, yielding overwhelming tides of human material for industrial slavery, must affect the economic destinies of other countries.—Prince Lazarovich Hrebelianovich, "The Orient Question," p. 208.

No one knows just how many Chinese there are, but the number is probably not much less than 300,000,000 and it may be more. Careful estimates seem to indicate that in spite of famine, pestilence, and civil strife, it has not declined in the past hundred and fifty years. During the earlier more prosperous years of the Manchu dynasty it rapidly increased. Hand in hand with the practically universal ancestor worship has gone the conviction that there is no greater crime than to die without leaving male posterity to carry on the sacrifices at the graves of one's forbears. Marriage is early, usually before the bride and groom are twenty. Concubinage is common among the well-to-do, and for women respectability and marriage are practically synonymous. Under such conditions, if famine, pestilence, and civil war are once eliminated or considerably reduced, population will multiply rapidly. Extensive civil war is not permitted by the powers; famine is being fought by Chinese and foreigners with all the zeal and skill of a humanitarian and scientific age; disease is being reduced and will be reduced much further by modern medical science; voluntary restraint of the birth rate can come only slowly. A rapid advance in population would seem to be inevitable. Eventually modern methods of agriculture, reclamation projects, improved methods of industry, transportation, and commerce will provide added food and wealth, but these will come slowly. The immediate future would seem to have in store increased poverty and unrest for the masses of the nation. China cannot find in unrestricted emigration a relief for the congestion. In Manchuria and Mongolia, it is true, there are great unoccupied fertile areas, and in many parts of China there is wild land that can be reclaimed. But the white race has preempted most of the vacant districts of the world and has forbidden other races to trespass. Australia, the United States, and Canada all have strict exclusion acts

directed against the Chinese. They are not permitted to share with their white brothers the virgin lands of the temperate zones.—Kenneth S. Latourette, "The Development of China," pp. 243, 244.

### **The Struggle for Food Supply**

Of the three great nuclei of population in the world, Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, and Western (and Central) Europe, only one has been able to draw upon the surplus food of the world. Eight hundred million Asiatics have been forced to live on their own meager home resources. As China begins to export coal, iron, textiles, and other manufactured products, however, she will be able, whether politically independent or not, to compete with Europe for the purchase of this food supply. Not only will China's population probably increase with the advent of industrialism, but the standard of living of her population will rise, and her competition with Europe for the sale of manufactured products and the purchase of food will become intense. The cheap, patient, disciplined labor of China's hundreds of millions will be fighting with the Belgian, the German, and the Italian wage-earners to secure the food which it will be necessary to import.

It is not a yellow, but a human peril: a mere addition to the hungry mouths that are to be fed. The supply of exportable food that can be raised in the world has of course not reached its maximum, but beyond a certain point every increase in agricultural production means a more than proportional increase in the cost of the product. To feed 800,000,000 costs much more than twice as much as to feed 400,000,000. Even though China secure only a minor part of the exportable food, it will by just so much increase the strain upon the industrial populations of Europe.

It is a crisis for European industrialism, a slowly preparing crisis with infinitely tragic possibilities. What it involves is not a mere redistribution of wealth and income, but an adjustment of populations to the available home and foreign resources in food.—Walter E. Weyl, "American World Policies," pp. 286, 1897.

### **Choked and Smothered Peoples**

When the masses of the East, crowded out of their own countries, seek breathing room in the yet undeveloped countries of the West, the West is ready to expel them even at the point of the bayonet. Try however hard you may, you cannot escape the logical conclusion which must inevitably be drawn from the existing state of relations between the East and West. One of two things must eventually be done—either the freedom of migration of all peoples from one country to another must be recognized, or the great colonial powers, holding vast territories, rich with resources yet sparsely populated, must give up some of their holdings

in favor of land-hungry peoples, choked and smothered in their native countries. Without dispelling the potential cause of conflict, it is futile to speak of disarmament or permanent peace. The dove of peace builds its nest only in the haunts of justice.

If the East still silently acquiesces in the present order of things, it is simply because the East is powerless to assert its rights. Most of us hesitate to look this question squarely in the face, because its magnitude, with all its portentous possibilities, appals us. Yet it is a question which must be met honestly and courageously, if we are to avoid a world catastrophe mightier than the upheaval which is now shaking Europe from its foundations.—Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. xiii, xiv.

While all the Powers of Europe were engaged in a desperate war of resistance to Teutonic aggression, and we were looking on, practically helpless, at the internecine butchery of the white race, there has been a steady revival among the vast populations which inhabit the territories extending from the Persian Gulf to the Sulu Sea, and from the Amur River to the Straits of Singapore. Nevertheless, we still talk with confidence of capturing more of Asiatic trade and influencing for all time Asiatic development.

Not long ago, European nations were calmly discussing and deciding among themselves how much more of sleepy Asia they should appropriate, for the benefit, no doubt, of the peoples brought under this foreign rule. But now our sense of conscious superiority is being shaken, and when we find the inscrutable Asiatic learning to meet us successfully with our own weapons, we draw back a little. We even begin to see that he may have good grounds for regarding his white rivals as the uncultured and discourteous barbarians that, in many respects, we really are.—H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," p. 276.

The Orient is acquiring a new life—a new vitality. The motive power that will more and more direct its policies is twofold. The first factor is practical. It will come from the pressure of an increasing population—pressure that will grow mightily with every new decade. For Occidental hygiene, medical science, and ideals as to the value of the individual will rapidly multiply China's millions. Japan's population has doubled in fifty years. Will China's population do the same? Where will they live? Whence will they secure their food?

The second factor is psychological. Orientals are not lacking in pride, in courage, in determination, and in ideals. An armed Orient will resent discourtesy, humiliation, and unfair dealing. It will fight for honor—for equal treatment. If the West claims superiority and right based on might, the East when ready will challenge its claim and test its might.—Sidney L. Gulick, "American Democracy and Asiatic Citizenship," pp. 11, 12.

### Economic Significance of Asiatic Labor

It is not likely that the Chinese will take up speedily the cooperative phase of industry. The economic circumstances and social environment have not yet reached the stage where this is possible. In all probability a considerable period of competition must come, as in Japan and Europe, before such a transformation can be brought about. During this period the Chinese will be themselves most formidable competitors on the markets of the world. More formidable even than the Japanese if they work independently. Most formidable of all if they work in combination with those islanders—which is by no means unlikely.

For the Chinese in their own country, as abroad, are the most persistent and indefatigable toilers the world has ever seen. Like the English, they are content to be wage-slaves, so long as they get what they consider to be good pay. They are ready to work long hours in factories at rates of wages which the European laborer of similar capacity would scoff at. By universal admission, in all grades of employment they are proving themselves little, if at all, inferior to their white compeers.—H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," pp. 113, 114.

The migration in the course of a few years, into any single Occidental land, of millions or even of several hundred thousand Asiatic laborers would unquestionably cause serious economic competition for Caucasian laborers. Asiatic unmarried laborers would underbid, outwork, and outlive Caucasian laborers, especially those having families to support. Caucasian labor would doubtless be driven from any field to which Asiatic labor could enjoy free and unresisted admittance.

The alleged danger, however, to Occidental manufacturing classes from the importation of articles manufactured by cheap Asiatic labor is not in reality such as is commonly asserted. For it is to be remembered that the West cannot purchase goods manufactured in Asia unless Asia purchases corresponding values from us. In proportion, however, as Asiatics purchase from us will they give us work. In proportion, moreover, as they sell to us will they be able to buy from us.

There is, nevertheless, a second form of industrial competition with cheap Asiatic labor that merits serious consideration. Suppose the plans of Occidental capitalists succeed for the economic and political domination of Asia. Let us assume also that the mining resources, railroad concessions, manufacturing establishments, and merchant marine of China are practically owned by Occidental capital. It will, of course, employ cheap Chinese labor at the cheapest possible rates. Occidental capital will not interest itself in raising the wages and the scale of life of its employes; for the greater the difference between the cost of Occidental and Oriental labor the greater the profits of capital on Asiatic manufactures purchased in the West. The purchase, moreover, by the West of articles manufactured in the East will not be from Oriental but

from Occidental capitalists. The West will need, therefore, to send to Asia in payment only the amount needed for the actual wages and raw material of the cheap Asiatic labor. The profits will all remain in the hands of Occidental capitalists. It is not, indeed, impossible that the profits from the sales in Asia of Occidentally owned Asiatic factories, mines, and railroads could completely pay for the raw material and the low wages of such labor as is employed in manufacturing articles for export to the West. In that case Asia could export to the West indefinite amounts of manufactured goods without needing to purchase anything whatever from the West. The transaction would be entirely between Occidentals, the purchaser and the seller both being Westerners.

Under such circumstances, the disastrous effect on Occidental factories and factory laborers would be frightful. In other words, the final economic effect on both Asiatics and Caucasians of Occidental economic and political domination of Asia would be highly destructive of the true welfare of both East and West. It would prevent the real economic prosperity and social, mental, and moral development of Asia's millions and make it impossible for them to purchase much from the West. But the sale in the West of articles made in Asia, without a corresponding purchase from the West by the East, would reduce Occidental labor to serious economic straits, possibly even more serious than that of Asiatic labor itself. It would keep both Asiatic and Occidental labor in complete economic bondage. This condition, East and West, would inevitably produce corresponding mental and moral degeneration, and the final complete collapse of democracy in every Occidental land.—Sidney L. Gulick, "America and the Orient," pp. 21-23.

### **Raising the Standard of Living of the Orient**

It is no longer possible for nations to shield themselves behind "Chinese walls" of seclusion and isolation, as we have tried to do hitherto. The Orient tried it and failed, and the same result is bound sooner or later to overtake a like attempt on the part of the Occident. The only solution, then, is to overlook no opportunity to extend a helping hand to the Orient, to aid it in every possible way in its efforts to advance, to grasp the essentials of modern civilized life, and to assimilate its standards of living to our own. In this way, and only in this way, can the danger of future economic competition of a disastrous nature be avoided. The Oriental is quite as susceptible as is his Occidental brother to the pleasure to be derived from creature comforts and luxuries, and he is equally averse to having these taken away from him once he has become accustomed to them. The reason why our present standards of living do not exist in China is the same which explains their non-existence in the Europe and America of only a few generations ago: modern means of communication, of transportation, and of the application of

machinery to the numberless processes of modern civilized life have not yet been introduced. The country is predominantly agricultural. Commerce, manufactures, mining, and transportation have yet to be developed to the point where they can begin to afford a livelihood to any very great part of the population. Political ideals will have to crystallize in the shape of definite, well thought out, generally accepted and consistently followed policies, both domestic and foreign. Until these changes take place, standards of living and the crowding of population upon the limit of food supply will improve but slowly.—C. W. Bishop, *Journal of Race Development*, July, 1918, p. 70.

### The Fundamental Needs of Human Life

The very countries which have been front and center of the world's later progress in civilization have been also the swarmers for peopling the earth. But the case of Europe does not stand alone. The most advanced of all Oriental nations, the Japanese, are still more prolific. At present this nation is said to be doubling its population in about fifty, instead of ninety, years.

There are now undoubted signs that growth in civilization is to some extent a check on fertility, and consequently that such rapid increase of population of civilized countries as has characterized the later centuries will not be kept up. But, on the other hand, the staying of disease, famine, and infanticide, which in the past have been potent in keeping down population, are among the most prized and distinctive marks of progress. And now comes the possibility that the near future will see war, the fourth great check on population, shorn of its truly devastating power. All in all, the conclusion seems unescapable that high and ever higher world civilization implies large and ever larger world population.

Having regard to these facts of population and to the limited size of the earth, and reflecting that advance in civilization is conditioned on nothing less than ever increasing richness of human life—improving physical health, and never ceasing intellectual, moral, and esthetic, and religious growth—and how avoid recognizing that in the future all economic endeavor and much of political endeavor will have to concern themselves far more positively and directly with the indispensable requisites of the great rank and file of populations than they have in the past?

There can be no question that the demand for greater world democratization, which has become the battle cry for all nations now fighting German autocracy and militarism, is also the watchword of a great forward move in world civilization, and that one element in the success of the movement would be the death knell not only of irresponsible political rule but as well of irresponsible economic exploitation.

The indubitable needs of civilized peoples which in future will be the

great inspiration of political action will have to oppose ambition for material wealth hardly less stoutly and vigilantly than it will have to oppose ambition for dynastic and militaristic power. And this will bring a change over nearly the whole of economic theory, purpose, and method.—Professor William E. Ritter, "The Resources of the North Pacific Ocean: Their Extent, Utilization, and Conservation," pp. 5, 6.

### Reckoning with the Unity of the World

Hitherto and always the workers of the world have been distinguished by their international outlook. I think they have been more full of thought and consideration for men and women of other countries, climes, and colors than their own than most of the citizens of this country. But I doubt whether that outlook has yet sufficiently embraced the great future industrial powers of the Eastern nations and of the inhabitants of the great continent of Africa. And I do not think it has been sufficiently realized up to now how close in aim, desire, and, therefore, as it ought to be, in effort the missionary cause of the Church and the true aspirations of labor really are. . . .

The world, for good or evil, is one. The unity of the world is not a dream of the poet; it is a factor with which politicians and industrialists alike have to reckon. The dreamers—the people who are hopelessly out of touch with facts—are the people who confine their lives' interests to their own nation, and consider still that the world is divided up into a number of separate nationalities. The men who have their hands upon facts are those who recognize that now, and from this time on, the world everywhere is one body. The war proved it without any doubt, and showed that you cannot have a great evil in one part of the world without the remotest part of the world shaking in response. The consequences of the war are proving it. . . . We cannot escape the industrial unity of the world. The nations that command raw materials and the cheapest possible labor will command the markets of the world, and it is impossible for any sensible man to shut them outside. The consequences of your having great new nations such as Japan or China, or vast masses of backward peoples such as central Africa—where raw materials are being accumulated in abundance, and labor, for want of any restraining standard, is being exploited—may be great disaster to the industries of the world and great hindrance to the workers of civilization. . . .

As Lord Bryce very rightly said the future of China is of immense significance to the whole of mankind. There you have a great territory containing a population of about 400,000,000 of people strong in body, quick, intelligent and adaptable in mind. It has been said that the Chinaman has all the cleverness of the Japanese and the plodding patience of the German. He can turn his hand to almost anything. There is great truth and significance in that. I read the other day



of a notice in Shanghai: "Furnaces and umbrellas mended. Any mortal thing can do." I think it can be said of that enormous population that, when put to it, it would say: "Any mortal thing can do." It is a territory fertile of food and of every material under the sun. It possesses vast and unexplored mineral resources. I am told that the coal fields of South Shansi could supply at the present rate of consumption sufficient coal to the whole world for thousands of years. There are vast quantities of iron and of copper. There are great waterways and, as soon as railway facilities can be produced, there are literally no limits to the industrial possibilities of China. It is awakening, as you all know, a great giant after these centuries of sleep, stretching its limbs, rubbing its eyes and opening them on a new world and its possibilities. . . . All this immense possibility of industry will be most certainly utilized either by Chinese intelligence and enterprise itself, or by foreign capitalists and merchant adventurers. They will be able to command a practically vast and unlimited supply of labor, ready to work for almost nothing. . . . With a nation of such labor to draw upon, China would be on the eve of a manufacturing development which would act like a continental upheaval changing the trade map of the world. Now picture to yourselves, if China be dominated with an entirely material conception of civilization, and is simply thrust into the maelstrom of industrial pressure, you can see at once how it will affect the workers of the world. . . . I speak with the greatest possible sympathy and friendliness of Japan, because she is our tried and proved ally, but one cannot ignore the fact that, until recently, the cotton mills of Japan were worked with an army of indentured female labor, and I am told that of 100 women who are brought in on these conditions 80 never return home. They either die or are driven to an immoral life. That is only what happens wherever female labor is not safeguarded. . . .

How are you going to get the driving power of conscience that will sustain the efforts of the League [of Nations] and make it everywhere a movement which cannot be resisted, that one's personality is respected and human labor is not exploited? Or, if I turn to these backward races, where are you going to get the power that is really going to restrain the inevitable lust of profit? Where are you going to get the power that is going to give to these backward races sufficient self-respect to respond to the efforts of the mandatory powers on their behalf; without their cooperation and self-respect, how can they be industrially or socially raised? That is the question for the world to find an answer, for, until we have found an answer to that question, where is the driving power of conscience that is going to lie behind these efforts to standardize work throughout the world on a right human basis? Until we have got the answer to that we can get little further. . . .

Therefore, unless you have at work in the world now a great force of spiritual ideals which is rooted and based upon the intrinsic dignity of

every human personality, you will not be able to protect vast numbers of human beings from being exploited at the hands of trade and commerce; you will not be able possibly to protect the workers of the West from being overthrown and overrun by the ill-equipped and half-starved workers. That is the situation which we find, and I ask you, with confidence as to your answer, where are we to find some world standard rooted upon the inherent dignity of human personality? I know of no answer, and I know of no thoughtful person who can give any answer but one, and that is—the power and the prerogative of the Faith given by Jesus Christ. There is no other, and, therefore it is that I would say with all my heart that labor and the Church of Christ have got to come together for the saving and uplifting of the workers of the world. Do not let me be misunderstood. I am not suggesting for a moment—God forbid—that we should say we need all this in order that the workers of the West may be protected against the workers of the East, or the backward races. No, I am sure that is not the sort of appeal that will touch the hearts and consciences of the workers of this country. I believe that they will listen to the call because of every honest desire, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of humanity, to raise the standard of human freedom and dignity all the world over.—The Archbishop of York, Address at Sheffield, England, November, 1919.

## **CHAPTER XI**

### **WHAT CHANCE IS THERE THAT THE YELLOW RACE WILL EQUAL OR SURPASS THE WHITE RACE IN LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD?**

- I. Why has the white man assumed that his race should rule? Why has he assumed that the yellow race is inferior?**
- II. How does the yellow race compare with the white race in possibilities of leadership?**
  1. How far is the white man's assumption of superiority justified? Given an equal opportunity, what chance is there that the yellow man might prove as able as the white man?
  2. What do you think of Japan's progress in the last half century? Do you think that a nation of Anglo-Saxon stock, but recently come out of age-long isolation from the rest of the world, would have done better or worse than the Japanese have done in intellectual and commercial achievement?
  3. What do you feel, as a result of these studies, is the basal weakness in Japan's political and social life? Can this be remedied? How?
  4. What considerations would lead you to expect that the yellow race will share equally with or even surpass the white race in the political, intellectual, and commercial developments of the future? What considerations would lead you to doubt such an outcome?
- III. To what extent is the future leadership in international affairs to be decided on a basis of race?**
  1. To what extent do you feel the uneasiness in America regarding the growing Japanese ascendancy in the Far East is due to American race prejudice or even to race fear?
  2. To what degree is the white man willing to give the yellow man a fair chance to develop to the fullest racial capacity? What evidence do you have of this?
  3. Just what is it that pertains to your own race that seems to you most worthy of preserving and handing on to the next generation? Why?

4. What procedure, in your judgment, will best provide for the largest possible development of each people in accord with its own peculiar genius and at the same time enable each race or nation to make its largest contribution to the life of other races and nations?
5. In your judgment, just what qualities and conditions are most likely to be determinative of leadership in international affairs in the future? How far are these qualities or conditions racial in nature? If they are racial, which race seems to you to be best endowed for the test of the years to come? Why?

**IV. What is the probability as to the full recognition of equality as between the white and the yellow races?**

1. The Japanese representatives at Paris tried to have racial equality written into the Peace Treaty. Just what would you say racial equality is? Equality in respect to what?
2. Is racial equality something to be asserted or to be achieved?
3. If it is something to be asserted, just how or where and how is acknowledgment to be made or recognition to be granted so as to make the assertion effective in a changed attitude on the part of other races which have hitherto claimed superiority?
4. If it is something to be achieved, just what achievement would, in your judgment, suffice to win the desired status?
  - a. Just what would you be willing to say to a Japanese, Korean, or Chinese school friend that it is necessary for his race or nation to do before you would be willing to acknowledge his people as on a level with your own?
  - b. Just what bearing would another successful war on the part of a yellow people against a white people, like the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, have on your point of view?
5. If such a declaration of racial equality had been incorporated in the Peace Treaty, would this fact, in your judgment, have helped to command for the races of color that world-wide recognition of equality which makes for national and racial self-respect? If so, in just what ways? If not, why not?

**REFERENCE MATERIAL**

**From the Oriental's Point of View**

What embitters the Oriental, is the Westerner's assumption of superiority, his presupposition of a right to rule, his arrogance, his unconcealed contempt of the yellow man as an inferior social being. Moreover, he condemns the cynical materialism of the white races, and

the white man's unnatural and hypocritical assumption, in his eyes, of moral excellence. Japan's exhibition of what an Oriental nation can do in a struggle with Western civilization has awakened new interests and ambitions in every Eastern people.—"The Problem of Japan," by an Ex-Councillor of Legation in the Far East, pp. 186, 187.

### **Dropping the White Man's Burden**

During the greater part of the nineteenth century the peoples of European race claimed to have a manifest superiority over Asiatics. But history demonstrates conclusively that such superiority does not exist. Nor was this the attitude of European travelers and adventurers in the East in the first instance. Most of these men, persons of ability, knowledge, and repute in their own countries, were amazed at the civilization, wealth, and magnificence of the courts they visited and the general well-being of the populations under native rule, which also they admired. For many a long day deference rather than arrogance was the tone of the white men towards the Emperors and Kings, Maharajahs and Nawabs, Viceroys and Mandarins whom they encountered. The high qualities and great attainments of these potentates and their ministers then obtained due consideration. The arts and sciences, philosophy and jurisprudence of these remote societies were appreciated and respected. The infinite obligations of the West to the East were still recognized: the capacity of Asia, in war as in peace, was not forgotten.

Then the Eastern world lay dormant for a time. Europe advanced rapidly in material development and scientific knowledge and acquirement, while Asia ceased to discover, or invent, or even to adopt and absorb. Improved weapons and the new great machine industry gave Europeans the temporary advantage in war and in trade. But how long will this last? What security have we of the permanence of this superficial predominance? . . .

Japan herself, whose leadership of Asia afield and afloat may yet unless we are very careful teach white men a lesson all over the world, was driven into close contact with Europe and America against her will, first, by Commodore Perry's dexterous diplomacy, supported by the power of the United States, and then by the much less justifiable measures of other white nations. Japan was, in fact, compelled to enter upon foreign commerce with Europeans by the familiar process of bombardment and butchery, which their immensely superior weapons of offense rendered merely a passing amusement for the civilized aggressors. That was but yesterday. It would be a desperately dangerous experiment to repeat today. Well for us if it is forgotten tomorrow. Asia raided and scourged Europe for more than a thousand years. Now for five hundred years the counter-attack of Europe upon Asia has been going steadily on, and it may be that the land of long memories will cherish

some desire to avenge this period of wrong and rapine in turn. The seed of hatred has already been but too well sown.

The continent which has long regarded itself as the home of the progressive peoples and the hope of the entire planet is beginning to forfeit its assumed supremacy. The warlike and industrial potentialities of the near future are passing slowly but surely to the Far East. However the recent stupendous war may finally end, the whole of educated Asia can read its meaning written across the map of the world. If all those portions of the globe which are inhabited or dominated by the white races are seriously taking account at the present moment of their strength, their population, and their possibilities for the increase of their wealth on a larger scale than ever before, we may be sure the ablest men in Asia are not blind to what can be achieved in their own countries in peace and in war. It is true that the differences between the Asiatic peoples are as acute as any which exist in Europe. But against the white man they are practically all at one.

Yet the white man still holds control over nearly half of Asia and its vast population. Asia comprises, including its islands, little less than 1,000,000,000 of the human race. England, France, Russia, Holland, and the United States are all deeply concerned in the future of this mass of people, in view of the scope of territory and population they control. All will be greatly affected by the general political, economic, and social movement of Japan, China, and India. In a word, the position of Great Britain foremost, and of the other powers in their degree, is now being steadily undermined. The determined effort to secure Asia for the Asiatics, once begun as earnestly in action as it is now being seriously considered in thought, might spread with a rapidity which would paralyze all attempts at reconquest, if, indeed, such attempts could ever be effectively made. The West deprived of British India, the Asiatic provinces of Russia, French Tonkin and Cochin China, Dutch Java, Sumatra, and the Celebes, the Philippines under the United States, would be a very different Europe from that to which we have been accustomed.

That is a possibility of which the West, with forces now weakened and depleted to a wholly unprecedented extent, must soon take account. Unconsciously, but none the less certainly, it is making way. Where fifty or even twenty years ago the continuous expansion of Western domination over the East was taken for granted, now an uneasy but not yet openly admitted feeling is growing that the tide has turned and that ere long the area of European influence in the East will be considerably reduced.—H. M. Hyndman, *Asia*, October, 1919, pp. 995, 996.

### What Is the West Thinking of the East?

Unless the peoples of the West learn to view their relations with the East in a new light, it is futile to expect their governments to deviate

from the path they have been following. What, then, is the West thinking of the East?

Speaking in general terms and disregarding exceptions, the West, the powerful, imperialistic West, looks upon the feeble, resigning East as an entirely different world which must occupy an inferior position in the scale of world communities. To extend a helping hand to the East, to guide its unsteady steps into the paths of progress and civilization, to lift it from sloughs of despondency and accord it a place of equality—such a task is not given to the West to undertake. Look at India and China, and all the rest of Asia, with the lone exception of Japan. Here you have a concrete example of the Occident's attitude towards the Orient. Japan has saved herself from the common fate of her unhappy neighbors because she was quick enough to see that the only way to win the respect of the aggressive Occident was to "beat it at its own game."

When Socialists in Europe and America pledge themselves to internationalism they are thinking only of Europe and America, forgetting that across the oceans teeming millions are crying for greater fields of activity and for redemption from bondage to Western capital. When the trade unionists of Europe and America speak of the brotherhood of workers, they are thinking only of their own race. When the pacifists of Europe and America advocate world peace, they seem to mean maintenance of peace by sustaining the *status quo* of the relations of the East and West—by permitting the West not only to continue its occupation, in all parts of the world, of more territory than it is justly entitled to possess but to exclude from such territories all dark-skinned races whose overcrowded home lands not only offer scant opportunity to their natives but are themselves subject to untrammelled exploitation at the hands of the West. Even Christianity has abruptly stopped and struck its standard before the racial wall, and has no courage to advance. A Western nation may declare a Monroe Doctrine, but is reluctant to accord an Asiatic nation a similar privilege. The West expects the East to open its doors to the exploitation of the white race, but reserves the right to slam its own doors in the faces of Orientals.

It all comes to this, that to the Western mind, the East is a negligible quantity to be dealt with as whim or fancy may direct.—K. K. Kawakami, "Japan in World Politics," pp. x-xii.

### The Question of the "Yellow Peril"

As regards the whole question of the relations of the present dominant races to the rest of the world, two schools of thought are fighting desperately—the old and the new. One represents the conviction of innate superiority involving the right to acquire and exploit without any reference to the desires and feelings of the exploited. The other . . . represents the new spirit, and the one upon which the future

welfare of the world must depend. It embodies the recognition of the right—not merely of every *Western* nation—but of *every* nation to what the former German Kaiser used to call “a place in the sun.” It represents the honest attempt to make realities of the cant phrases and party catchwords of the last century, and as it grows and develops it will come to include the recognition of the right of every race, whether great or small, to follow along orderly lines of progress its own destiny in accordance with its own desires and propensities. At present it has its limitations, but it carries within it the germ of mankind’s political and social salvation, because its conceptions are deeply rooted upon the eternal bedrock of justice.

The great question is—Will it triumph at this juncture? Or is it to be submerged by the older, grosser, more selfish conception? If it is, let the world beware. If the West decides to reject the new light—to uphold still its ancient claim of a right to annex, control, and exploit the rest of mankind, irrespective of their wishes and feelings, a time will come when the nations of Europe and America will have to face, not only a *yellow* peril, but the peril of all the races whose feelings and rights they have outraged through the centuries. It will not be in our day; it may not even be in the days of our grandchildren; but it will surely come. The rest of mankind will rise in indignation, and with a might which justice gives the wronged, and ask, “By what authority do you arrogate to yourselves the right to parcel us among yourselves, to force us into treaties against our wills drawn up to your gain and our loss? You have denied us the right of entry into your own countries, while claiming the right of entire freedom to do what you like in ours. Not only have you refused in your own lands any of the privileges you have claimed for yourselves in ours, but even in the lands of our birth you have denied us the rights which are ours by every moral law. In what lies your justification when you force us to destroy our own systems of life and social economy so that we may adapt ourselves to your needs? We do not admit your right; we refuse in future to live at your dictation. Be gone! We will have no more of you.”

We do not believe that such a situation will arise. We cannot believe that the old dark point of view will conquer. But if it does, and if as a result the world is plunged into such a sea of devastation and distress as it has never seen before, upon whom will the guilt lie? Surely not upon those races who, after suffering coercion and wrong for a long period of years, rise to defend themselves and to win that freedom which every true Englishman and American values more than life.

No; there is no “Yellow Peril,” and if the West be true to its highest ideals, earnestly endeavoring to give the less powerful nations those rights and opportunities which it values for itself, such a peril will never arise.

But if the counsels of the reactionaries prevail, this Peril must always



be taken into consideration and recognized as a potent factor of the future. Yet in justice it should be called not the "Yellow Peril," but the "White Peril," for those who inflict the wrong must be held responsible for the result.—Samuel Evans Stokes, *Modern Review*, August, 1919, pp. 131, 132.

### The Marvel of the Modernization of Japan

When an American squadron arrived to break down her isolation, she did not possess even the beginnings of a national fleet or a national army; of an ocean-going mercantile marine; of a telegraphic or postal system; of a newspaper press; of enlightened codes, of a trained judiciary, or of properly organized tribunals of justice; she knew nothing of Occidental sciences and philosophies; was a complete stranger to international law and to the usages of diplomacy; had no conception of parliamentary institutions or popular representation; and was divided into a number of feudal principalities, each virtually independent of the other, and all alike untutored in the spirit of nationality or imperialism. In thirty years these conditions were absolutely metamorphosed. Feudalism had been abolished; the whole country united under one administration; the polity of the State placed on a constitutional basis; the people admitted to a share in the government under representative institutions; an absorbing sentiment of patriotism substituted for the narrow local loyalties of rival fiefs; the country intersected with telegraphs and railways, and its remotest districts brought within the circuit of an excellent postal system; the flag of the nation carried to distant countries by a large mercantile marine; a powerful fleet organized, manned by expert seamen, and proved to be as capable of fighting scientifically as of navigating the high seas with marked immunity from mishap; the method of conscription applied to raising a large military force, provided with the best modern weapons and trained according to Western tactics; the laws recast on the most advanced principles of Occidental jurisprudence and embodied in exhaustive codes; provision made for the administration of justice by well-equipped tribunals and an educated judiciary; an extensive system of national education inaugurated, with universities turning out students capable of original research in the sciences and philosophies of the West; the State represented at foreign courts by competent diplomats; the people supplied with an ample number of journals and periodicals; the foundations of a great manufacturing career laid, and the respect of foreign powers unreservedly won. Such a record may well excite wonder. . . .

If that were all she had done, it might not be fair to say that any intelligent people would have acted with less vigor under similar circumstances. But Japan did not confine herself to adopting the externals of Western civilization. She became an eager pupil of its scientific, political,

moral, philosophic, and legislative systems also. She took the spirit as well as the letter, and by so doing differentiated herself effectively from Oriental states. It has been objected that this wholesale receptivity was limited to a few leaders of thought—to the literati and the military patricians whose will had always been law to the commoners. Certainly that is true as to the initiative. But it is unimaginable that such sweeping changes could have been effected in a quiet and orderly manner had not the hearts of the people been with the reformers. In Japan no railways were torn up, no machines wrecked, no lines of telegraph demolished by laborers who feared for their own employment or fanatics who saw their superstitions slighted. Rapid as was the pace set by the leaders of progress, the masses did not hang back. That tribute at least must be paid to the nation's intelligent liberality by any honest writer of its modern history. We may deny that other peoples might not have done as well, but we can scarcely affirm that any would have done better.—Captain Frank Brinkley, "Japan: Its History, Arts, and Literature," pp. 9, 12, 13.

### **Japan's Greatest Need**

In my conversations with prominent Japanese during my two visits to Japan, I was accustomed to bring in the query: "What do you regard as the chief need of modern Japan?" After collating the answers at the end of my tours, I found that the consensus of opinion was that Japan's most urgent need is a new basis of morals; that the nation has broken loose from its old religious moorings and has not yet made new ones. . . .

We of the West have given the Japanese our weapons to increase their military efficiency, our inventions and discoveries to increase their manufacturing and commercial efficiency, our educational and scientific methods to increase their intellectual, our medical and surgical equipment to increase their ability to treat disease; are we not under equal obligation, to say the least, to give them the Gospel that will increase their spiritual efficiency and enable them to make right use of all their other powers?

The Japanese already have a political vision. They covet the leadership of Asia, and they are preparing for it with a skill and energy which elicit the wonder of mankind. They already have a commercial vision, and they are strenuously trying to realize it. They already have an intellectual vision, and they have built up one of the best educational systems in the world. What Japan now needs is a spiritual vision which will purify and glorify these other visions.—A. J. Brown, "The Mastery of the Far East," pp. 654, 655.

### **Making World Democracy Real**

A "square deal"! That is just what every man and woman, every

nation and people, every culture and civilization, needs to have if democracy (real in contradistinction to sham democracy) is to be made a reality. If every individual, every nation, every culture, be given an opportunity to prove what good qualities it possesses and what task for society as a whole it is capable of performing; if every individual assume a place in the social scale in accordance with his or her proved qualities and capabilities; if mankind realize once and for all that to a social position which is lofty because its holder is a person of high ability there attaches an added obligation to be courteous, generous, upright, honest, unselfish, considerate, temperate in language and in act, brave, and self-sacrificing, and that to a position which is humble because the holder's abilities are modest there attaches no disgrace or shame whatsoever; if these things and others of a kindred sort become social realities, then we shall begin to have real democracy. The anti-democratic forces at large in the world today are not inequality in social and political rank, paternalism, wealth and the possession of wealth, titles in recognition of merit, and kindred things; rather, the real anti-democratic forces are the hereditary principle, nepotism, unkindliness, materialism, Marxism, Bolshevism, Teutonism, race-contempt, color-lines, cultural exclusiveness. . . .

As every human being should have a "square deal," so should every culture and civilization; as every man or woman should have ample opportunity to prove himself or herself, so should every society and every human institution. When we of the white race of Europe humbly confess that we do not possess all the excellence in the world, and when we acknowledge that others may be able to teach us much that will help us, just as we teach them much that aids them, then, with the introduction of such race-appreciation, will come real world democracy. The planet will become a social constant, and a social whole. . . .

The lack of a sympathetic understanding that shall transcend boundary lines has been the basic cause of the multitudinous wars which fill the pages of history. How can democracy win a true victory if there is no democracy between nation and nation?

Similarly, to extend the matter beyond the bournes of our own race and culture, how can real world democracy ever come into being so long as one race looks down upon, exploits, and exterminates all the rest, obliterating both the evil and the good in their cultures by the enforced introduction of both the evil and the good in its own? How can a true democracy be created for the world unless every one of the world's peoples be given an equal chance to prove what degree of political, social, and cultural virtue it may possess?—P. A. Means, "Racial Factors in Democracy," pp. 233, 234, 235, 238.

### **Causes of Racial Misunderstanding and Conflict**

The greatest and most difficult problem of the modern world is to find

the right adjustment of the relations between the progressive nations of the West and the peoples of Asia and Africa, whose development until recently has been largely stationary. Its solution demands a fuller exercise of the imagination, a larger measure of disinterestedness, and a more sustained moral effort than any people has attained to in the past.

The difficulty is increased by the possibilities of misunderstanding that are rife in the divergent standpoints of those who have to cooperate with one another. Whereas in the earlier contacts of Europe with Africa and the East the superior energy, technical knowledge, and moral force of the Western peoples led in many instances to an easy acquiescence in their leadership, we now witness everywhere a growing reaction. A strong national consciousness is awakening not only among the peoples of Asia but also among the tribes of Africa, and is certain to increase in volume and intensity. The superiority of Western civilization is no longer undisputed among the educated classes in Asia. Its weaknesses are being discovered, freely exposed, and often exaggerated. The right of the white man to dominate the world is repudiated with growing vehemence. Unless there is a general awakening to the gravity of the situation, we may speedily drift into a state of misunderstanding, distrust, and antagonism from which there will be no outlet or escape except through seas of blood, the sacrifice of much that is best in life, and the loss of that cooperation of different races which, successfully pursued, might lead to the enrichment of all.

The causes of racial misunderstanding and conflict are many and complex. Economic factors play a large and important part. The objection to Asiatic immigration on the Pacific Coast of America and in Australia arises from the desire to prevent a depreciation of existing standards of life. This demand is in itself just and reasonable, and so long as it is made and maintained in a spirit of fairness and consideration it need not provoke bitterness or lead to conflict. But unhappily it has often found expression in inexcusable acts of violence and unreasoning selfishness, which have aroused feelings of passionate resentment. Again, where different races are brought into contact with one another we frequently witness determined efforts on the part of professions, trading communities, and labor organizations to keep the field of opportunity as a strict preserve for members of their own race, and to resist violently any attempt by representatives of the other race to enter it. This attitude is often due to a social instinct which seeks to preserve the standards of life from depreciation; but it is sometimes simply an expression of that class or personal selfishness which is everywhere the enemy of the real interests of the commonwealth and which must be combated by every true friend of humanity. While the white man thus seeks strictly to protect his own interests against the competition of other races, he has few scruples in invading the life of other peoples or in exploiting their needs and resources for his own benefit. This selfish exploitation

and the acts of injustice and violence which have been associated with it cannot fail to arouse feelings of resentment and antagonism in those who have been the victims of the spoliation. All these forces are economic rather than racial, but they exert a powerful influence wherever different races are brought into contact with one another and profoundly affect their mutual relations.

Where the races differ widely in their modes of thought and habits of life, economic rivalry is aggravated by the difficulty of mutual understanding. There is, in many people, a natural antipathy to what is unfamiliar, and this can readily be fanned into a flame of violent dislike. It is easy to depreciate virtues which are not our own and to exaggerate the objectionable nature of vices to which we ourselves are not prone. Thus each race may quickly come to believe the other to be worse than it really is. Differences in color and in speech are the obvious marks of a separate class, and hence members of each race come to think of those of the other as belonging to a class; they are apt, in consequence, to attribute the faults of a few to the class as a whole, instead of judging each individual, as he ought to be judged, by his personal qualities. The same conspicuous differences tend to obscure the common humanity which underlies them, and consequently, when disputes arise, there is a smaller fund of human kindness and fellowship on which to draw for composing them.

It is perhaps necessary to recognize, besides the forces which have been mentioned, a deep-seated protective instinct at work to preserve racial integrity and purity. Mr. Maurice Evans, who has given many years of study to the relations of Black and White in South Africa and in the southern states of America, holds that this is the only explanation of the rooted and unbending determination of the white race to withhold from the Negro any share in its own social life. This determination is found even among those who are the true friends of the black man, and who sincerely desire the education and progress of his race. It would be folly to ignore a factor so significant and vital as race, or in practical measures to leave out of account those "vast accumulated and entrenched realities of emotion and conviction, of social instinct and historic tradition," which race implies. . . .

It is evident that the interaction of powerful economic forces and strong racial instincts gives rise to a situation which must tax the resources of statesmanship and the moral capacities of mankind to the uttermost. The chief hope of a solution is that the problems should be taken in hand in time. When passions have become inflamed and prejudices have taken root, questions that might once have been settled by compromise and good will may become insoluble and statesmanship be left helpless in the face of invincible misunderstanding and deep-seated mistrust. The influence of reason and reflection must be brought to bear on questions that have hitherto been left to the play of untutored instinct

and blind prejudice. Lord Bryce has pointed out how largely national and racial antagonism has been fostered by historians and poets who have fed the flame of national pride by glorifying the ancient exploits of the race and dwelling on its virtues and achievements. If the dangers involved in racial misunderstanding are to be overcome, we require a policy of education which will aim at stimulating and strengthening the instincts of honor, chivalry, and generosity towards other races. The public mind must become imbued with the idea that the world is a community of nations and races, none of which can be made perfect apart from the others, and that just as a good man finds his highest satisfaction in the service of the community to which he belongs, so the true glory of a nation is to be found in the service it renders to humanity. The instinct of nationality needs to be converted, so that the chief desire of those who love their country will be that it should make the largest contribution that it can to the good of the world.—J. H. Oldham, "The World and the Gospel," pp. 185-191.

## CHAPTER XII

### WHAT ATTITUDE SHOULD AMERICA TAKE TOWARD THE YELLOW RACE?

- I. Did you ever have the experience of genuine and hearty friendships with Orientals?
  1. If so, did you find it harder to establish such friendships with Japanese than with Koreans or Chinese? Were the friendships equally rich and lasting?
  2. Would you like to try to establish such friendships if opportunity offered? Would you feel like going out of your way to show yourself friendly? Why or why not?
  3. If you could choose the race with which to begin, which would you choose? Why?
- II. How far is it possible for the East and the West to understand each other and to work together?
  1. "Oh East is East and West is West,  
And never the twain shall meet."  
To what extent are there inherently different qualities which make it difficult for the East and the West to work together? How far do you feel that color is and must continue to be a divisive factor among the races of men? Do you feel that racial differences are likely to be determinative of the possibilities of wholesome, helpful, and cordial relationships between nations and peoples in a rapidly narrowing world?
  2. So far as you have had opportunity to come to know other races, what seem to you to be the basal characteristics and instincts in human nature which make the whole world kin? Just what human values are to be appraised for their own sake, as of universal significance, and without regard to the particular racial group in the midst of which they may perchance emerge?
- III. Where would the nations of East and West help and where hurt each the other?
  1. What is there in America that you would wish to preserve from the impact of other nations and races living around the Pacific? What is there in our national life from which they should be protected?

2. What is there in our national life worth passing on to these other nations and races? What do they have worth our learning or securing?
  3. Upon the whole, would a greater contact between the nations around the Pacific be beneficial or otherwise to the national life of each?
- IV. What restrictions, if any, do you feel there should be on the relations of America with the nations of the Far East?
1. Why have the Chinese been excluded from the United States? How far is this exclusion act justified today?
  2. What should be done with reference to the feeling against the Japanese on the Pacific Coast?
    - a. If the Pacific Coast states were to prove insistent in anti-Oriental agitation and were to go beyond Congress and the executive department of the national Government in their direct activities of protest, what would be your attitude in the matter?
    - b. How far should the Pacific Coast be bound by action taken for the good of the whole American-Far-Eastern relations, even if this action seemed likely to be really disadvantageous to the coast states? Consider this question both from the national and from the Pacific Coast viewpoints.
  3. How much need is there for additional immigration into the United States? In what regard do you feel the Orientals would make desirable immigrants and fill real needs? In what regard would you consider them undesirable? From just what in the races you would prohibit do you wish to protect the United States?
  4. Is it possible and practicable to make our laws relating to immigration and naturalization apply to all peoples and races alike? What advantage or disadvantage would there be if this were brought about:
    - a. In maintaining friendly relations with all nations and peoples?
    - b. In securing the right kind of immigrants for the best national development of America?
    - c. In relieving pressure upon population in those parts of the world most needing relief?
  5. Do you want the United States to have commercial relations



with these nations, the immigration of whose people we prohibit? If so, what privileges would you ask for Americans in the home-lands of these races? Are you willing to have the nations of the Far East apply to Americans exactly the same principles of restriction of immigration, residence, land ownership, and citizenship that you wish to apply to their nationals? Why or why not?

6. What attitude should America take towards Oriental immigration to Mexico, Central America, and South America?
  - a. What danger is there, if any, that groups of Japanese immigrants would be manipulated from Japan for imperialistic purposes?
  - b. What right, if any, has the United States to protest against the oncoming of land-hungry folk from the Orient, in whatsoever numbers, provided they are received by the Latin-American republics and do not seek to establish spheres of Japanese political influence on the eastern side of the Pacific?
- V. Just what processes are likely to bring about on the part of Americans a worthy appreciation of the racial values to be found in the non-Anglo-Saxon peoples—and especially in the peoples of color?

#### REFERENCE MATERIAL

##### **The Barrier between Asia and the West**

Until the student of East and West lays firm hold on the basic fact that Asia is a mystery to the West and that the West is a mystery to Asia, he cannot get very far. When the barrier of language is overcome there is the barrier of tradition and custom, but above all of distrust. What is at the root of this distrust? As I have so often written, the distrust is a distrust of each other's morality, and, added to it, the delusion that the distrust is on one side only. . . .

America, which has neither grabbed nor tried to grab bits of China, and has returned indemnities to both Japan and China, has given both of them substantial tokens of good will and disinterestedness. But however well placed geographically, however enterprising, and however liberally capitalized American business men may be; spend money as they may on travelers and agencies, and advertise as they may, they cannot at present build soundly in the Far East or in Asia. They cannot do it because they lack a firm foundation. They are building in conditions of mutual distrust between Japan and America and in uncertain conditions in Japan and China, India and Siberia. The commercial problem in the Far East, in Asia generally is, then, first and foremost a political and moral prob-

lem. It calls for that thorough knowledge, that lively imagination, that enlightened sympathy with the position of the other man and how he is placed, which alone furnish the power to appeal with success to the conscience, to the honesty and sense of fair play, to that decent human feeling which is universal. Because the problem of Asia is a mental problem it must be tackled by informed and thinking men.—J. W. Robertson Scott, *Japan Society Bulletin*, January 31, 1920.

### The Significance of Color

Why is it that one group of foreigners is isolated, tortured, and legislated out of the country, while at the same time there are deliberate efforts to educate, adopt and assimilate other groups . . . equally (if not more) obnoxious? . . . How are we to explain that there has been proposed no definitively Slavic exclusion or Latin exclusion or Jewish exclusion law in the United States? How is it possible for the collective mind of a nation to discriminate between two communities of the same mentality, same economic status, and same socio-civic outlook?

The reason is not to be sought in the religious difference between Asia and Europe. For the states as well as the Federal Government tolerate every "ism" on earth. . . . Besides, in modern times the laboring classes are not, as a rule, fanatical enough to examine people's articles of faith before entering on social intercourse. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, as such, are not balanced against Christianity or Judaism in the mind of the masses in the twentieth century.

Do the physical features, the physiognomic expressions, then, account for the differential treatment of the Asian and European immigrants by the laborers and their leaders in America? One might be tempted to say, "Yes." But, humanly speaking, native Americans themselves are too often familiar with the accidents of embryology to demand an ideal grace of line and proportion of limbs as the *sine qua non* of friendships, unions, or communal gatherings. And surely their esthetic repugnance is not daily aroused by every instance of deviation from the anthropometrically perfect cephalic index or by every aberration from the Venus of Melos type.

What, in the last analysis, is the fundamental *differentium* between the Asian laborer and the European laborer? The Asian is yellow and brown, the European is albino, i. e., colorless or white. It is the complexion of the skin that is ultimately responsible for the exclusion of Asia from the labor market of America. It seems almost ridiculous that so much should depend on so slight distinctions.

Race-prejudice, especially as it has developed in the United States, is at bottom practically tantamount to skin-prejudice. According to humanitarians this may indeed be a regrettable phenomenon, but as long as it exists it is impolitic to be blind to the fact or minimize its social

significance and explain it away by ethnological investigations. It is an open question, moreover, if color-prejudice or race-prejudice in any of its forms is ever likely to disappear from the human world. Until, however, the prejudice is removed or modified and mitigated by conscious educational and social service agencies, it is reasonable to recognize that the anti-Asian animus of America would remain a most powerful *casus belli* between the East and the West.—Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Bengal, India, *Journal of International Relations*, July, 1919, pp. 45-47.

Here is the real root of the racial difficulty throughout the world. There exists a widespread racial antipathy founded on color—an animal-like instinct, if you will, but an instinct which must remain in existence until the world becomes Utopia. It is this instinct which seems to forbid really frank intercourse and equal treatment. How this is to be minimized in each separate region should be one of the first studies of statesmen, for the day is surely come when common sense demands that the line of least resistance should be sought for and gradually approached.—B. L. Putnam Weale, "The Conflict of Colour," pp. 110, 111.

### Racial Differences

It is not legitimate to argue from differences in physical characteristics to differences in mental characteristics. The physical and mental characteristics observable in a particular race are not permanent, modifiable only through ages of environmental pressure; but marked changes in popular education, in public sentiment, and in environment generally, may, apart from intermarriage, materially transform physical and especially mental characteristics in a generation or two.

The status of a race at any particular moment of time offers no index to its innate or inherited capacities. . . .

We ought to combat the irreconcilable contentions prevalent among all the more important races of mankind that *their* customs, *their* civilizations, and *their* race are superior to those of other races. In explanation of existing differences we would refer to special needs arising from peculiar geographical and economic conditions and to related divergences in national history; and, in explanation of the attitude assumed, we would refer to intimacy with one's own customs leading psychologically to a love of them and unfamiliarity with others' customs tending to lead psychologically to dislike and contempt of these latter.

Differences in economic, hygienic, moral, and educational standards play a vital part in estranging races which come in contact with each other. These differences, like social differences generally, are in substance almost certainly due to passing social conditions and not to innate racial characteristics, and the aim should be, as in social differences, to remove these rather than to accentuate them by regarding them as fixed.

The deepest cause of race misunderstandings is perhaps the tacit

assumption that the present characteristics of a race are the expression of fixed and permanent racial characteristics. If so, anthropologists, sociologists, and scientific thinkers as a class could powerfully assist the movement for a juster appreciation of races by persistently pointing out in their lectures and in their works the fundamental fallacy involved in taking a static instead of a dynamic, a momentary instead of a historic, a local instead of a general, point of view of race characteristics.—G. Spiller, "Papers on Interracial Problems," pp. 38, 39.

### **A Single Problem for Great Britain and the United States**

It is of the utmost importance . . . that England and America and the white races generally should form a serious judgment upon the course they intend to pursue towards China and the Chinese. England and America, especially, are allowing matters to drift after a fashion that can scarcely fail to be dangerous. While both are crying aloud for the "open door" and proclaiming the necessity for Chinese independence, neither the British Empire nor the United States is taking any definite steps to secure either the one or the other. At the same time the British Empire, by the action of its colonies in Australia and British Columbia, and the United States, by its surrender to the agitation in California, are putting themselves completely in the wrong by their policy of excluding the civilized Mongolians from their respective countries. Especially is this policy untenable when both powers are demanding the fullest rights of entry and settlement in China itself against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. In my opinion it will be impossible in the near future to keep the yellow races permanently out of British and American territory, should they continue to wish to immigrate and settle there. But it is most important that, if this is really the case, the two nations most directly concerned in the attempted solution of this difficult problem of Asiatic emigration and immigration should hold close conference on the question. To drift is to move towards war, as we have seen recently in European affairs.—H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," pp. 197, 198.

### **Need for a Sound Policy**

The writer has everywhere contended that a real difficulty has arisen in the new contact of the East and the West. California and the Pacific Coast states are right in contending that free immigration from Asia would be disastrous; but so also is Japan right in contending that invidious and humiliating race legislation is not friendly or Christian. Some solution accordingly must be found that recognizes and provides for the right on both sides. . . .

America needs a sound policy for dealing comprehensively and constructively with all the closely interrelated problems, arising out of our

enormous and varied immigration legislation, fitted to take the place of existing incomplete, disconnected, and piecemeal laws and methods. The legislation needed should deal with: The regulation of immigration; the registration of aliens; the distribution of immigrants; the education of aliens for American life; the protection of aliens by the Federal Government; the naturalization of aliens.

Legislation dealing with these matters should be controlled by the following principles: (1) The United States should so regulate and, where necessary, restrict immigration as to provide that only so many immigrants of each race or people may be admitted as can be wholesomely Americanized. (2) The number of those individuals of each race or people already in the United States who have become Americanized affords the best basis of the measure for the further immigration of that people. (3) American standards of living should be protected from the dangerous economic competition of immigrants, whether from Europe or from Asia. (4) Such provisions for the care of aliens residing among us should be made as will promote their rapid and genuine Americanization, and thus maintain intact our democratic institutions and national unity. (5) The Federal Government should be empowered by Congress to protect the lives and property of aliens. (6) All legislation dealing with immigration and with resident aliens should be based on justice and good will, as well as on economic and political considerations.—Sidney L. Gulick, *International Review of Reviews*, April, 1918, pp. 174, 175.

### The Question of Inferiority

The Japanese question illustrates the whole problem of immigration in such a way that it ought to be studied carefully on both sides of both oceans. Our Nipponese friends seem to think they are badged as inferiors when we express a desire to exclude them from our stream of immigration or refuse to naturalize them; and the way in which the matter is discussed often seems to justify this belief on their part.

But their inferiority or superiority is not involved in the case at all. Our theory of immigration is that the immigrant is a lump of humanity thrown into the American melting pot, and that every incomer is an ingredient which must melt or fuse or it should not be admitted. The immigrant must be suitable for intermarriage actually or potentially with our people, so that the pure strain of the first generation will in a few generations disappear by dilution. This has happened with the British, the Scotch, the Irish, the Dutch, the Germans, the Danes, the Swedes, the Norwegians, the French, the Swiss, the Bohemians, and the Poles. It is only when we reach the Italians, who are mainly recent comers; the Greeks, for the same reason; and the Balkan people and those of hither Asia that we find the strains more resistant to amalgamation by intermarriage. And though intermarriage is perhaps the most powerful

agent of amalgamation there are other traits growing out of historical environment which make amalgamation more and more difficult as we draw our immigrants from points farther and farther east. . . .

In many respects the Japanese are superior to us. They are industrious and enterprising and intelligent, and in the matter of producing food from the soil they are superior to Americans. They are more frugal than we, and can live on a smaller proportion of their product. The Japanese has no difficulty in mastering our literature and our science. But why does he come to America? To become part of this republic? To express his admiration for us as a people and for our institutions? To intermarry and blend his racial strain with the American strain? And if he really wished to do these things—if he had no racial pride and no racial exclusiveness—is he a man who would be received among us and taken into our racial blend by our own people? It is not a case of inferiority or superiority on either side, but of racial attractions and racial repulsions.

A bit of firebrick in the melting pot, too refractory to be melted—such is the Japanese, and such are many other would-be immigrants. Whether the fault be in the nature of our people or of theirs, the interfusion cannot take place, as it must if this nation is to live and fulfill its democratic destiny.—Herbert Quick, *Saturday Evening Post*, June 28, 1919.

### Chinese Wanted in California

Chinese workmen . . . local opinion holds, are essential to give California the labor she needs for immediate industrial and agricultural requirements. This requirement cannot be met by her own white population, partly because there is not enough of it and partly because the white American citizens in California are becoming less and less inclined to do all the work that must be done. . . .

Chinese are wanted because they are more patient and therefore more efficient workers than the Americans themselves in the great gardening and agricultural expenditures of the state. The Chinaman does not care how many hours he stoops to do the work that cannot be done without stooping in an asparagus bed. He is not overcome by the monotony of picking fruit for somebody else. California is going to try once more to get Chinese labor. She will urge Congress to suspend the exclusion act for three years and let a million Chinamen come in. They are going to be needed in the new cotton fields. California is not afraid that a great mass of womanless Chinamen will become discontented and furnish converts to I. W. W. doctrine. They cannot conceive of a Chinese Red. California promises that if she can have a million Chinese workers in the next three years she will cut her own cost of living by thirty-three per cent and reduce the cost of her products which she ships to other parts of

the country by the same amount.—Charles A. Selden, *New York Times*, January 25, 1920.

Mr. Selden's report of California's desire to have a million Chinese workers is exceedingly interesting. Only thirty to forty years ago California insisted that Chinese were intolerable. Anti-Chinese agitation led at times to extreme violence.

Yet now important Californians are actually advocating the admittance of a million Chinese coolies—because they would be so docile, obedient, without family encumbrances, and without ambition to own land or do business on an independent competitive basis! If their proposals should be accepted and the needed laws be passed by Congress, the writer has no doubt that in less than a decade the disastrous consequences of that policy would be evident and a new and bitter anti-Chinese agitation would arise.—Sidney L. Gulick, *New York Times*, February 8, 1920.

### Economic Advantages of the Japanese in America

The real objection to the Japanese is that he is willing to accept life and labor on less favorable terms than we are. If he stays he gets our job, our farm, our place in the sun, by the working of an inexorable economic law, and the instinct of self-preservation compels us to resist. The more of a case we can make out against him, the easier it is to rouse the necessary spirit of opposition. So he is "dishonest," "tricky," "un-American," "immoral"—objections too often urged by those not qualified to cast the first stone, and not more true of him than of other men. But the one thing that is true and that is enough, if not to justify our opposition, at least to create it among any virile people on earth, is the fact that he can underbid us and so displace us and take our birthright. Perhaps this does not justify us in excluding him, but the point is not worth discussing. We shall exclude him—if we can.—H. H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 218, 219.

### The Oriental Influx into Latin America

"When you have filled up Korea and Manchuria," I said to Count Okuma in Tokyo the day after the annexation of Korea, "whither will the increase of your people go? Your population tends to double every thirty or forty years, and Japan is crowded. Will you not be obliged to quarrel with France for Indo-China, with England for Australia, or with the United States for the Philippines?"

"No," replied the veteran statesman and sage; "South America, especially the northern part, will furnish ample room for our surplus."

I recalled his prophecy when I noted how the Japanese are sifting into Peru. The statesmen of the west coast [of South America] lie awake nights dreading lest the Orient should overflow in their direction.

They may exclude the Chinese for the present; but every one foresees that new China will in time launch a navy, and will then be able to exact for Chinese the same treatment that other immigrants receive. As for the Japanese, no South American government or possible combination of governments dares discriminate against them. Japan's navy is too strong for the South American navies.

This Asiatic anxiety is not confined to the countries fronting on the Pacific. The nations of the east coast, from Venezuela to Argentina, realize that it will not be long . . . before Oriental immigration becomes a problem for them, as it already is for the west coast. Not long ago the immigration authorities at Buenos Aires, confronted unexpectedly with a shipload of Hindus, promptly turned them back as "undesirable." Their action was high-handed, for there is nothing in the immigration laws of Argentina to warrant discrimination against Asiatics, but it met with general approval.

Provided that no barrier be interposed to the inflow from "man-stified" Asia, it is well within the bounds of probability that by the close of this century South America will be the home of twenty or thirty millions of Orientals and descendants of Orientals. . . .

But Asiatic immigration of such volume would change profoundly the destiny of South America. For one thing, it would forestall and frustrate that great immigration of Europeans which South American statesmen are counting on to relieve their countries from mestizo unprogressiveness and misgovernment. The white race would withhold its increase or look elsewhere for outlets; for those with the higher standard of comfort always shun competition with those of a lower standard. Again, large areas of South America might cease to be parts of Christendom. Some of the republics there might come to be as dependent upon Asiatic powers as the Cuban republic is dependent upon the United States.

In any case, an Asiatic influx would seal the doom of the Indian element in these countries. The Indians have excellent possibilities, but it will take at least three generations of popular education and equal opportunity to enable them to realize these possibilities. At present they are depressed, ignorant, and unprogressive. Outside the larger towns, virtually nothing is being done for their children, who will grow into men and women just as benighted and hopeless as their parents. As they now are, the Indians could make no effective economic stand against the wide-awake, resourceful, and aggressive Japanese or Chinese. The Oriental immigrants could beat the Indians at every point, block every path upward, and even turn them out of most of their present employments. In great part the Indians would become a cringing . . . caste, tilling the poorer lands and confined to the menial or repulsive occupations. Filled with despair, and abandoning themselves even more than they now do to pisco and coca, they would shrivel into a numerically negligible element in the population.



Strange to say, whether such is to be their fate depends upon the policy of the United States; for this is the only power in the Western hemisphere strong enough to "speak in the gate" with the armed Japan of today or the armed China of tomorrow. When the South American countries, especially those of the west coast, beseech the United States to back them up in discriminating against Asiatic immigrants, we shall face a decision of tremendous import to mankind; namely, whether or not the Monroe Doctrine shall not only protect the South American republics against the Old World powers, but shall also be held as a buckler between the South American peoples and the teeming Orient. Then we shall be obliged to consider, for one thing, whether the race possibilities of the millions of upland Indians are such as to warrant our shielding them for a time from the annihilating competition of the capable Orientals.—E. A. Ross, "South of Panama," pp. 91-93.

Most of Latin America is tropical and therefore little suited to Japanese colonization. Very much of it is peopled by an inferior race, and is therefore a field for exploitation rather than for colonization, for the same reasons that hold in China and Korea. The most attractive part of it, on the other hand, is in the possession of Europeans who will almost inevitably have the Anglo-Saxon's reasons for excluding the Oriental. Possibly Mexico offers the most favorable opportunity, and possibly here or elsewhere in Latin America Japanese settlement may be attempted.

Curiously enough, even here the Anglo-Saxon interposes his veto. There can be no question that the American people would look with extreme disfavor upon the establishment of Japanese colonies anywhere in the Western hemisphere and especially in any proximity to our own boundaries. Nothing could at first sight seem more churlish than this attitude of universal opposition to the Oriental. Not content with keeping him out of our own territory, we threaten to pursue him far beyond it. We segregate him as we do the pestilence, drawing our cordon around his narrow domain. . . . We object to the Japanese in California on economic and social grounds. In Mexico that objection does not hold. If the Mexicans do not object to Japanese competition, that is quite their affair. We do not object to the Japanese in Mexico.

But we do object to Japan in Mexico. If we knew that the Japanese settler in Latin America did not in any sense bring his country with him, that he would never claim its aid and it would never claim his allegiance, any objection on our part to his settling there would be an unpardonable impertinence. But there is an increasing tendency on the part of modern nations to retain the allegiance of those born under their flag, who take up their abode in other lands. The doctrine that the fatherland has a perpetual claim upon the allegiance of its sons, even when permanently domiciled under a foreign flag, has been asserted of late with growing

emphasis, and has given to emigration a sinister political significance. A settlement of aliens, therefore, becomes a foreign outpost and potentially a foreign fortress. All this is perfectly in keeping with the instinct of nationality. . . . There is something that is dearer than the welfare of the individual—dearer to those who stay, and dearer to those who go—and that is the welfare of the nation and of the culture and life of the race. It is a degenerate and unworthy people that can expatriate itself without a pang—without serious reservations. As the culture and spiritual life of the race find more and more perfect expression in the developing organ of the nation, we must expect the nation to make an ever stronger appeal to the individual whose spiritual heritage it holds in its keeping. We must expect, too, that the nation, ever more delicately equipped, will grapple to itself with hooks of steel all those who can serve its purpose in the strenuous competition of civilization with civilization. Each culture will claim its own and seek its own over land and sea.—H. H. Powers, "America among the Nations," pp. 219-221.

### Two Warnings to America

There are two warnings we should take to heart with utmost seriousness.

One of them is that we must face our special problems in a spirit broadly fair and international. We must shape our relations with Mexico, with Latin America, with China and Japan, in a spirit of true and full Christian internationalism, seeking no selfish advantage, determined to do as we would be done by—asking not what we have the power to do, nor what is to our interest to do, nor even what we have the right to do, but what our international duty may be, how we may best insure justice and good will in increasing measure throughout our relations with these nations that touch us most nearly, and that watch us with that jealous care inevitable when one knows that another is stronger than himself and is not quite sure that he is just and generous. We must fear to inflict injury even more than to suffer it; we must ~~earn~~ the respect paid to just and generous character even more than the respect yielded to obvious power; we must be, in all our relations, conspicuous for that Christian internationalism for which we have fought against Germany.

The second warning is that we citizens of America must look forward and not back. We have set our hand to the plow. To look back is to prove ourselves unfit for the Kingdom. To fail to go to the end of the furrow is to be unworthy of our past heritage and of our present position. There is danger that . . . we shall be content to lapse into isolation again, shall make a fetish of Washington's warning against "entangling alliances," shall be content to make America great and forget to make America the great servant of mankind. Thomas F. Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," pp. 94, 95.

## **CHAPTER XIII**

### **WHO WILL CONTROL THE PACIFIC BASIN?**

- I. Who will control the Pacific Basin from the point of view of the carrying trade?**
  1. Would you prefer to invest money at this time in American, British, or Japanese shipping? Why?
  2. Which nation seems likely to have the largest interest in the carrying trade of the Pacific?
    - a. Which can produce the ships to best advantage?
    - b. Which can best man the ships?
  3. Do you or do you not wish to see America achieve supremacy in the Pacific carrying trade once more? Why? Why not?
- II. Who will control the Pacific Basin from the point of view of naval supremacy?**
  1. Which nation has the most advantageous positions with respect to home shores and the distribution of possible naval bases?
  2. Which nation is in the strongest position with respect to needful material for naval construction work?
  3. Which has the greatest stakes in people and realms which might seem to require naval protection?
  4. Would you like to see the American fleet in the Pacific increased in strength? Why? Why not? What would you like to see done with it?
- III. Who will control the Pacific Basin commercially and industrially?**
  1. Which nations have the richest stores of raw material as a basis of manufacture and world commerce?
  2. Which is most likely to develop the technical processes necessary to great industrial and trade expansion?
  3. Which is showing the finest development of social and economic justice for the working classes as a basis for future industrial peace and high productive power?

4. Which has the greatest supply of cheap labor?
5. Just what ambitions do you have for American participation in the developing trade in the Pacific area? Why?

**IV. Who will dominate the Pacific Basin culturally?**

1. Is the Occidental or the Oriental type of culture likely to become dominant throughout the Pacific area? Why?
2. Are the two types of culture likely long to retain practically all their respective outstanding differences, because of racial inertia and the lack of close contacts between any considerable groups of yellow and white inhabitants?
3. Is there likely to be a fairly rapid interpenetration of the varying cultural standards and ideas, each borrowing from the other, as travel and the intercommunication of ideas increase?

**V. Will geography or race be likely to be the more influential on the trend of history in this general area?**

1. To what extent is history likely to be conditioned by fundamental geographical facts, such as mountain ranges, a broad ocean, favorable or unfavorable ocean currents, island groups, temperate, tropical, or frigid zonal conditions, and natural resources?
2. To what extent is it likely to be conditioned by national and racial ideals, prejudices, abilities, and purposes?

**VI. Just what should be the attitude of America toward the control of the Pacific Basin?**

1. Just how does this question affect America?
2. Of the various elements which seem to you to enter into the process of getting and maintaining such a control, which would you regard as of most importance? Which as of the greatest present urgency?
3. What, in your judgment, would be a reasonable share for the United States to have in the control of the Pacific? How far do we now have such a share?
4. Should the United States seek its fair share in the control of the Pacific through competition or through cooperation with other powers? If through competition, what powers are likely to be our chief competitors? Why? If through cooperation, then with what powers? Why?

- VII. If you wish to preserve the best in American life for the period of your lifetime and that of your children, just what civilization-insurance would you seek to provide within the Pacific Basin?
- VIII. What hope is there that Christianity, originating in Asia, and now long the dominant type of religion in the West, will be accepted and become dominant also in the Far East?
1. What contribution to the life of America seems to you to have been made by Christianity?
  2. Has Christianity been fairly put to the test in America as a basis for the religious life of the nation?
  3. Just what needs of the peoples of the Far East seem to you most likely to be met through the acceptance of the Christian faith?
  4. What is your expectation with reference to the progress of Christianity in the Far East? What are likely to prove the greatest obstacles to its acceptance?
  5. In what measure do you feel that such progress should be promoted through missionary agencies and activities?

#### REFERENCE MATERIAL

##### **America and the Trans-Pacific Carrying Trade**

Japan has, perhaps more than any of the other Allies, taken advantage of the War to further her own political and economic interests. She has resisted attempts of the War Trade Board to place restrictions on her imports to the United States, and has driven shrewd bargains with the Shipping Board for vessels purchased from Japanese yards. In particular, Japanese lines have almost monopolized the carrying trade of the Pacific. American vessels were transferred to the Atlantic because of the larger profits to be earned in the war zone, and British vessels were withdrawn from the Canadian and Oriental routes because of the war needs of Europe. In this situation the Japanese have extended their carrying trade at the expense of both Great Britain and the United States. Without any corresponding increase in the cost of operation, they have benefited by the enormous increase in freight rates. Their lines have prospered and expanded, and a powerful group of new shipping millionaires has arisen in Japan.

With the return of normal conditions, the United States will unquestionably wish to utilize part of her merchant marine in trade with the Orient. The shipyards on the Pacific Coast are turning out a large

tonnage, and vigorous efforts will be made in that section of the country to employ a considerable number of these vessels in trade that will develop the Western seaports. The Japanese will no doubt try to retain the favorable position they now occupy in the carrying trade of our Pacific Coast.—Raymond Garfield Gettell, *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1919, pp. 255, 262.

Most of our fears of competition on the Pacific are based on the past—conditions which we had to meet before America woke up. The future, with America fully awake in all her strength and energy, is bringing us a great modern ocean transportation plan, something which cannot be measured by anything in the past. It is not competitive trade that we are going into but creative trade—the systematic development of customers and service on regular trade routes through salesmanship, banking, investment abroad, and the development of other nations' resources for their benefit as well as our own. And it will be trade, not so much in competition with the cheap labor of Oriental countries, as in helping them to reach the higher living standards which they so much need, and which are already beginning to be realized in the case of Japan, which has made the best start in industrial development.—Edward N. Hurley, *Asia*, November, 1918, p. 909.

### Japan in International Trade

As she [Japan] becomes more and more conscious of the similarity of her position to that of Britain, she naturally inquires where the British live who back this tremendous power and on what fields they reap their harvests. The answer is the sea. The British red upon the map tinges the ocean's blue from pole to pole and drowns all other tints. Upon the sea many millions of Britons win their livelihood, and here are invested thousands of millions of British capital whose dividends put the world under tribute to Britain. Why may not Japan share this opportunity? This is, in fact, her most hopeful outlook and her most immediate ambition. It is one, too, which we have unintentionally done all we could to help her to realize. . . . We have enacted legislation which has handed our Pacific commerce to Japan on a silver platter. The commerce of Japan has gone forward by leaps and bounds, profiting enormously by her shrewd rather than disinterested attitude in the present struggle. Her vast fleet, supplemented by recent acquisitions from our own, is kept in safe and lucrative employment which it will doubtless continue to enormous advantage in the early years of peace. There seems to be no reason why Japan should not dominate, not to say monopolize, the trans-Pacific commerce.—H. H. Powers, "America among the Nations," p. 234.

Japan has everything in her favor for immediate achievement in the Pacific Ocean; she has an overflowing population with a high birth rate;

she has the singular advantage of entering upon a new career in the wide world with the heredity and faculties and sinews of a vigorous past career; in this she is like a tree that has been kept pot-bound till its roots have absorbed most of its vitality and is then transferred to an unlimited range of soil in the open—it is bound to luxuriate in its new sphere. Japan is both old and young; she has her roots far into a distinguished past and she is stretching out in all directions, as capable of development and as full of ambitions as a youth just entering on the world. Still more, she has a great continent beside her to exploit, a great market for her goods, and a great quarry of labor. But perhaps the most striking feature of reborn Japan is her passion for education and especially for Western education.

Were Japan to jettison that Prussian model of government which she deliberately adopted at her revolution not much more than a generation ago, she would go far to remove all suspicion of her designs in the Pacific and all fear of her following in the footsteps of her model.—J. MacMillan Brown, LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the University of New Zealand, *Journal of Race Development*, April, 1919, pp. 369-371.

### China's Bearing on the Future of the Pacific

The Pacific Ocean is becoming the center of human interest and commercial activity, and China with her four hundred million people, is its true axis. From whatever undermines China's independence and integrity the United States cannot hope to escape unaffected. For with their economic progress and their advance as a Pacific power, and also as a nation determined to keep alive the spirit and forms of democracy in the world, the future peace and prosperity of the American people are bound up in the satisfactory solution of the present precarious situation in the Far East, more particularly in China. . . .

If in solving the Chinese Question the great Allied countries choose to continue the old selfish and disruptive policy of subjugating China and exploiting her for their own chief benefit, thereby keeping her in a state of political and economic semi-paralysis, rather than to apply the principles which they all have been vociferous in announcing as their objects in the War, then China will surely be the scene of approaching commercial jealousies among nations, the arena of coming diplomatic wrangles, and the seat of future world wars. If, instead of being handled justly and equitably, the problem is simply glossed over, as of old, with the fallacious and mischievous idea widely prevalent among foreigners that anything "goes" in China and that anything will do for the Chinese, the evil day cannot be long averted. Now that the War is over the acid test will be applied to all professions of disinterestedness and humanity. . . .

The destiny of China and the future peace of the Far East, and

hence of the world, lie in the decision of the big treaty powers as to their policy *vis-a-vis* the young Oriental republic. Their choice is a simple one. They may choose to obstruct and destroy, as they have been doing since the middle of the last century, or they may choose to restore and cooperate, as the new world order demands. The first violates and cripples China's autonomy, diminishing her power of resistance against the constant foreign aggressions, aiming at her subjugation and at the wresting of exclusive commercial privileges within her territory, and so leads to the clash of antagonistic ambitions and designs among the powers. The second stimulates the development of China into a strong and progressive nation, capable of holding her own position in the world and of maintaining, without outside help, the open-door policy of equal opportunity for all, thereby eliminating international jealousies and intrigues from the Far East. The one creates international rancor and race hatred, and is destructive alike of foreign trade and other foreign intercourse. The other is conducive to good will and comity among nations, and permits the unlimited expansion of all foreign intercourse, commercial and otherwise. The one is productive of evil, the other of good. The one leads to war, the other to peace. The one is for the misery and downfall of mankind, the other for its happiness and advancement. Which shall it be? Obstruction and Destruction, or Restoration and Cooperation?—Chong Su See, "The Foreign Trade of China," pp. 383, 385, 387, 388.

### Control of the Pacific Ocean

Few political questions have been more befuddled by shibboleths than those of the Orient and the Pacific. The Pacific is the largest ocean. Its "mastery" has a Nietzschean flavor that is compelling. But let us analyze it.

In time of peace it is hard to conceive of any mastery of an ocean except on the part of the nation that ships the most goods across it. It is the goods, not the nationality of the carriers, that counts. American commerce all over the world before the European war, was great and increasing, in spite of the fact that it was carried largely in foreign bottoms. The Japanese have recently awakened to the fact that their heavily subsidized Pacific steamship lines carry the larger percentage of their freight, not from Japanese ports, but from Hongkong, China, to America and back, so that, as their subsidy covers a prospective loss, they are taxing themselves for the empty glory of carrying foreign goods under the Japanese flag!

It is otherwise, of course, in time of war. The United States has discovered to its consternation that its trade may suffer from lack of American ships. On the other hand, there is no real analogy between Europe and Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is possible for England



with her powerful fleet and the possession of Gibraltar and the English Channel in a measure to control the Atlantic so far as Germany is concerned. Such a condition would be out of the question in the vast expanse of the Pacific. The exploits of the will-o'-the-wisp Emden in the autumn of 1914 are a striking commentary upon the inability of the great Japanese fleet adequately to patrol that waste of waters. No nation can dominate the Pacific, so long as any other nation can maintain a fleet there.—J. F. Abbott, "Japanese Expansion and American Policies," pp. 95-97.

The Far Eastern and Pacific situation are intimately linked into a single problem, which, from being a race for commercial and colonial expansion in the early nineteenth century, has with the first years of the new century become a question of which the dominating factor is Japan and Japanese interests, in conflict with those of various Western nations in the course of their trade expansions in that region.

The dynamic elements of that situation are: the vast agglomeration of buyers called China; the approaches to that still unpreempted market of supposedly unlimited absorptive capacity; the exigencies of national defense imposed upon Japan by her geographical conditions; and her necessity of securing her position against any pressure which the West could bring to bear, to force the subordination of her own vital economic interests to those of other nations. . . .

The Monroe Doctrine and the defenses of the United States' shores, the shores included within the limits set by that doctrine, the western and eastern shores of both Americas, and the island character of that land [Japan] demand that the United States do not consider the shores of the Americas as the limits, but that the limits of the dominion compromised by that doctrine are the shores of the continents to the east and west, imposing upon the United States the necessity of controlling the Atlantic in the east and the Pacific in the west. That control is the *conditio sine qua non* of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.—Prince Lazarovich Hrebelianovich, "The Orient Question," pp. 202, 203, 245, 246.

### The Conflict of Civilizations

At this juncture the East, with its swarming hordes living a listless life from century to century, and the West with its energetic, individualistic impulses, but without any consistent philosophy of civilization, meet face to face. That this threatens to accentuate the reactionary forces, to strengthen autocracy and brute force, and to weaken everything that bases itself on reason, reflection, and individual right is natural and evident. While some presaging spirits cherish the hope that Eastern thought will yield a harmonizing principle to the life of the West, others abandon themselves to the fear that we are destined to be driven back

into another period of darkness in which intelligence will slumber and brute force reign supreme.

The unfavorable influences that are to be expected from Oriental civilization may be summarized briefly as follows: a pessimistic view of life; an undervaluing of individual rights and the power of individual initiative; a caste spirit which looks upon men as mere incomplete portions of a larger unity in which their existence is entirely swallowed up; the degradation of women, whom Western ideals have placed on an equal intellectual and moral footing with men; a lack of sympathy; . . . and absolutism. It is paradoxical that, with all its individualism, the West is, nevertheless, more sympathetic than the East. This sympathy is largely a result of the Christian religion; for before the growth of Christianity the Roman world was dominated by the Stoic spirit, to which pity for the sufferings of fellow-beings was entirely foreign. Throughout the Orient, man is singularly apathetic and untouched by the woes of his fellows. It may be said, indeed, by apologists of Eastern thought, that sympathy merely increases human suffering a thousand-fold by making every individual carry the burdens of thousands of fellow-sufferers, and that it leads to a perpetuation of deformities and disease by protecting from extirpation the victims of these evils. Even so, it cannot be doubted that, when we come to consider the feelings and ideals which make our life endurable, the bond of sympathy with fellow-beings is to be counted among the first of these, and that the introduction of Oriental apathy regarding the well-being of others would impoverish our civilization. . . .

Some favorable influences that may be exercised by the meeting of the older and younger civilizations are the gaining by the latter of a deeper insight into the mystic elements of life, more serenity, and greater quiet and self-possession. Our civilization is too materialistic, and lays too much emphasis on mere machinery. The Oriental may well ask, Why do you hurry and struggle and make inventions and reduce life to an endless scramble, when you have not time left to think about the deepest questions of the human soul?

If Chinese partition should be made the stepping-stone to world control, Western nations would be forced to fight for their civilization, and a century of terrible conflicts would be imminent. Such a struggle could only end in the final preponderance of one power in a world absolutism more deadly than that of Rome, in that there would be left no vigorous elements to revive a dying civilization. It is not strange, then, that many should be looking forward to a time which will try men's souls, and insisting that we make sure of rallying about only the best in our civilization and of struggling, not for material gain and the vulgar glory of the hour, but for the permanence of our highest ideals, in order that the world may retain an abiding-place for truthfulness and honesty in life and thought. No one who sees the seriousness of the present situation will rashly cry for war and headlong national aggrandizement.

—Paul S. Reinsch, "World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as influenced by the Oriental Situation," pp. 243-245.

It is no wiser to speculate upon the great powers around the Pacific Basin a hundred years hence and leave China out of the reckoning than to write a treatise on oceans and leave the Pacific Ocean out of the account. If the Chinese and the Americans preserve their moral soundness, we venture the prophecy that in the twenty-first century the two peoples which will loom largest on the globe will be the Chinese and the Americans—or, perhaps better, the Chinese and the Anglo-Saxons. Whatever course human history takes, therefore, China will bulk large in the coming centuries. If the United States follows a statesmanlike, just, and Christian policy, she, too, will bulk large in the coming centuries, and despite her lesser numbers she may possibly bulk even larger than China in the moral leadership of the race. Moreover, if Russia fills up her large areas of tillable land, and if the Russians make the advance in political institutions and Christian civilization which we all hope and pray for, then, with Canada and the United States and such white populations as may be in South America on the east, and with the Russians upon the west, and with such moral influence as Great Britain and the Netherlands and France may exercise in Malaysia, the influence of the white race and of Christian civilization around the Pacific Basin may be maintained. On the other hand, with the rapid advance which the Japanese, the Chinese, and the people of India are now making, the influence of the yellow races in the Pacific Basin is certain to increase. In a word, the influence of each race and each civilization will last so long as it deserves to last. The influence of the white races will pale before the influence of the yellow races if the latter surpass us in intellectual and moral power. If we read aright the principles of evolution or the unfolding moral and spiritual history of the race or the teachings of the New Testament, Christ is set for the rise and fall of nations. If the Christian forces of the world respond to the divine summons, and Christianity takes deep root and spreads widely and rapidly around the Pacific, we may be sure that all will recognize that each race and nation has its providential work.—James W. Bashford, "China: An Interpretation," pp. 443-445.

### Forces That Make for Unity

In the last century and a half the United States has made three great contributions to the political advancement of the world. The first was the adoption of the constitution, an experiment in federalism on a scale larger than ever before known in history. The second was the adoption of a policy by which the vast territories of all the states were held in common, and these new territories admitted to statehood upon exactly the same terms as the original commonwealths which formed the Union. Our third contribution was the Monroe Doctrine, which removed two

continents from the field of foreign conquest and guaranteed to each American nation the freedom to determine its own form of government and its own sovereignty.

Today the nation is again in a position to contribute to the political progress of the world. It stands before a fourth decision. Either it can cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation, or it can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can promote, as can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind together the nations in a union of mutual interest and will hasten the peaceful progress of the economic and political integration of the world.—Walter E. Weyl, "American World Policies," p. 295.

If national ambitions and economic rivalries are often dividing forces, there are also in the modern world a great number of unifying forces more and more coming into play. There is law. Three great systems of law cover together half of the human race. A great French jurist has declared that by the end of this century there will inevitably be one joint code of law for all Europe. There is science. . . . How much has steam done to bring about similarity in the social problems of all nations? How much electricity is doing to put a girdle about the earth. It would need all the genius of Mr. H. G. Wells . . . to portray the future of these and other unifying tendencies. Then there is aviation. Already the estranging sea has become the all-uniting; what then may we not expect from the air? International law sprang out of the absolute need to have some rules for the sea; but the air is to the sea what three dimensions are to two. The air knows no frontiers; it must be international.

Democracy, too, must help. . . . Democracy has a strongly idealist quality. A mass of men always respond best to an appeal to their sense of justice and moral right, for two simple reasons: One is, that appeals to their interests tend to divide them just as their interests are divergent. The other reason is that broad and simple moral issues are the questions they can understand better than matters of intricate policy or technical detail. Democracy in the modern world had a religious origin. It sprang up in that wonderful army of Cromwell, an army of "godly" men, where an oath was punished by a fine and where the watchword was "tender consciences." It was this spiritual quality which was the underlying inspiration both of the French Revolution and the American Revolution. Without this spiritual quality Democracy will be a failure, but with it we can look with some hope to Democracy to be a potent spirit in the future consensus of nations on such a great moral question as war.

But the greatest and at the same time the most feasible of the reconciling influences is and will be Christianity. . . . It has now become manifest that Christian principles have to be applied to the industrial relations between individuals, to the life of corporate bodies, and to the

relations between states. This alone can set our social life, our commercial life, our international life on a firm basis, the basis which corresponds to the deepest relations, i. e., moral relations. This is no longer to be called Utopian, now that the alternative is seen to be war, war between individuals, between classes, between nations. Utopian it is, in the sense that it must be a long process, one to which each generation of men, each individual must consciously and patiently contribute. Already there are signs among the working classes, in the student world, even in the world of business and commerce, that such a spirit is springing up.—A. L. Smith, "International Relationships," pp. 134-136.

### **The Naturalization of Christianity among All Races**

The period of this third and greatest expansion of Christendom has . . . been a little less than four hundred years. The area of expansion is not now the basin of the Mediterranean. It is not the northern and western part of the little continent of Europe. In this epoch the area has been literally the whole of the habitable earth. The effort for the spread of Christianity has been . . . but an episode in a far larger world-movement, a movement which has resulted in bringing the whole earth under the influence of Europe. . . . In the sense merely of the proclaiming of the Gospel in all lands the work is entering upon its later stages. An arrest of this mere evangelizing process parallel to that which we have already twice observed in Christian history seems near. There will soon be comparatively few men anywhere who have not had a chance of listening to the word of the grace of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. How much that avails is another question. How far we still are from the real Christianizing of the world is brought home to us with terrific force in these days of war. It sometimes seems as if we were so far from that goal within Christendom itself that we have little to say to the rest of the world. Yet even that dissemination of the word of Christianity of which we spoke and the beginning made of the transformation of men by its spirit have put practically all the nations of mankind in a position to judge between Christianity and Christendom. How vast is the task of this naturalization and nationalization of Christianity among all the races of the earth, including our own, must be obvious to anyone who thinks.—Edward C. Moore, "The Spread of Christianity in the Modern World," pp. 14, 15.

### **Christianity's Opportunity in the Orient**

Throughout Asia there is in process a complete transformation of social institutions, habits, standards, and beliefs. The movement is unceasing; it will as little wait on our convenience as the tides of the sea. The moral and spiritual forces at work are as inexorable in their operation as the movements and energies of war. The new institutions

and habits which are being formed will bear the impress of the spiritual conceptions of life held by those who consciously or unconsciously are shaping them. If in a spiritual crisis so great and so real we know of a Gospel that floods life with meaning, strengthens and ennobles character, and makes men free sons of God to serve Him in His world, we cannot keep it to ourselves.

That we of the West should give to the peoples of Asia in this day of their awakening the best that we have—the knowledge that has been slowly accumulated by the labor of generations, the conceptions of liberty and the free institutions which we have won through long struggles, and above all the Gospel of Christ, which first came to us from the East—and that we in our turn should receive from them the gifts and treasures of their ancient civilizations, and the fruits of their distinctive powers of spiritual insight and apprehension, vitalized by the touch of Christ, so that we and they together may understand more deeply and truly what He is and what He would have us do—this surely is a dream that may make the blood run quicker in our veins, and an object of endeavor that may claim our utmost devotion.—J. H. Oldham, M.A., "The World and the Gospel," pp. 106, 107.

### At the Turning Point of History

The situation is grave in the Far East and not only in the Far East but throughout Asia. A little careful and patient labor in the work of mutual understanding may help to avoid a great conflagration. . . . We are faced by a great problem. To try to minimize the gravity of the problem is vain, for the facts lie before the eyes of every investigator. We are at a great turning point in the history of the world. At such a juncture it is not always easy to see our full duty. But a few things are plain, and one of them is that, in the present state of the relations between East and West, no labor can be spared from the task of bringing about a better understanding. Workers in many spheres will be rewarded by saving the world from an interracial conflict, a war of continents, by which the bloodshed, suffering, and waste of the past five terrible years would be overshadowed. . . .

There must be no question of struggling with a resentful and bristling Asia or of "licking the Japanese." There have been wars in the history of the world, there have been fights in America in which civilization has seemed to "Git forrard, sometimes upon a powder cart." But civilization will go down for centuries if half the world flies at the other half's throat. It will not be the fighting of men but of machinery. It will be crime on the earth, in the air, and on the sea. It will be annihilation by starvation and poison, by unimaginable cruelties. Unless progress is a dream and civilization an illusion we must be finished with war.—J. W. Robertson Scott, *Japan Society Bulletin*, January 31, 1920.

## **CHAPTER XIV**

### **WHAT IS THE SOLUTION OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM?**

#### **I. What is the Far Eastern question?**

1. From the study thus far, what would you say are the main issues in the Far Eastern problem?
2. What is America's relation to this problem?

#### **II. What is the solution of the Far Eastern question?**

1. As a result of these studies do you believe the Far Eastern problem is soluble? Why? Why not?
2. If it is soluble, what solution seems to you to be most promising?
3. How will America be affected by the solution or non-solution of the problem?
4. What part ought America to take in the effort to solve the problem?
5. Which of the following would you consider essential if the Far Eastern problem is to be solved?
  - a. Just and equitable immigration and naturalization laws, impartially enforced.
  - b. A wise, vigorous, and sustained Far Eastern policy on the part of the State Department at Washington.
  - c. An able diplomatic and consular personnel.
  - d. An intelligent public opinion supporting the State Department in its diplomacy and Congress in its legislation.
  - e. A capable and trustworthy personnel representing American commercial interests in the Far East.
  - f. A navy fully able to protect all legitimate American interests in the Pacific.
  - g. Courtesies and hospitality shown to students, business men, diplomatic and other leaders coming to America for longer or shorter stay from the nations of the Far East.

- h. The multiplication of personal friendships between Americans and representatives of the races of the Far East.
  - i. The opening up of cultural privileges in the United States, such as normal and technical schools, colleges and universities, in the largest possible measure to Far Eastern students.
  - j. The mutual interpretation of racial and national values and progress by exchange professorships and lectureships.
  - k. The encouragement of trans-Pacific tourist travel, so that the visits by intelligent nationals from one to the other side of the Pacific—East or West—may be multiplied.
  - l. A great enlargement of foreign mission work on those lines of development which have most approved themselves to both Occidental and Oriental enlightened judgment.
  - m. The American agencies of public information and guidance such as the news bureaus, the daily press, the weekly and monthly periodicals, fully related to the various aspects of the problem, and providing publicity on sound informative and interpretative lines.
  - n. The achievement of a more truly Christian private and public life in America, so that the commending of Christian ideals to the people of the Far East by our missionaries may be better understood and appreciated.
  - o. The development among Christians and others of a clearer sense of world brotherhood, of the essential unity of the human race, and of the inescapable and multiplying contacts of its various peoples as they sojourn on the earth, and, therefore, of the urgent duty to find ways whereby the nations may live together in peace and amity.
  - p. A full participation in the League of Nations.
  - q. A hearty sharing by great American financial interests in the development of natural resources and of systems of transportation in the Far East, especially in China, in order to hasten the enlargement of industrial processes and the raising of the standards of living, and so to increase the ability of the yellow peoples to provide for their own economic needs.
- III. What further responsibility, if any, should America assume in the Far East?**
- i. Are we, as Americans, to rest our cases as to our own ideals for the treatment and guidance of the less favored or backward peoples and races on our record with respect to the Filipinos, the Porto Ricans, and the Cubans?



2. Have we further and possibly still greater responsibilities in the Far East? If so, just what are those responsibilities?

**IV. What can be done to ease the international and interracial strain and tension in the world growing out of economic need?**

1. The white races now control vast areas of potentially food-producing land which is not used by any means up to capacity and these races purpose to monopolize those areas, by way of protecting their own standards of living and their racial integrity and for the use of the oncoming generations of white descendants. The yellow races, hard pressed for life's necessities, with multiplied millions living below the scale of efficiency, and with rapidly increasing populations, have awakened late to world conditions and find the areas of possible spill-over for their peoples already largely preempted by the white race. What, if anything, should be done about it?
2. Is the principle of loving our neighbor as ourselves a valid principle in the matter of relationships between the larger social units, such as nations and races? Why? Why not?
3. If we are to love our neighbors as ourselves, nationally and racially speaking, just what is involved in this for America?
4. If we are not to love our neighbors as ourselves, nationally and racially speaking, what would seem to you to be the probable outcome of the competitive, and perhaps increasingly bitter, international and interracial struggle for control of the sustentation resources, developed and undeveloped, of the earth?
5. Jesus laid down the principle, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things [needful for physical maintenance] shall be added unto you." To what extent is this principle valid in national and racial affairs?
  - a. Is character or upkeep more important for humanity?
  - b. In the larger economic order of the world will individual, national, and racial righteousness so react upon human life, and through it upon nature, that the human family may eat, drink, and be clothed as a byproduct of the search for God and His Kingdom? If so, in what ways? If not, does the principle have any validity whatsoever and just where does the validity end?
6. If the principle just enunciated is valid in the widest sense, of what importance is it that it should become effective in all nations and among all peoples?

- a. What effect will areas of non-acceptance have upon social and economic conditions and practices elsewhere?
- b. What is essential if this teaching of Jesus is to be accepted as basal for all of life everywhere?

#### REFERENCE MATERIAL

##### Aspects of the Far Eastern Problem

Fifty years of contact with the West have taught Japan that she can secure her rights, and even her political sovereignty, only as she is prepared to argue with the white man with bayonets and battle-ships.

Can we doubt that China will follow the same course of development as Japan has taken? China has definitely abandoned her ancient systems of education, government, and communication, and is acquiring as rapidly as possible the practices and the instruments of Occidental countries. This enormous change has been entered upon in consequence of European military aggression, and as a means whereby to oppose it ultimately and maintain independence.

Can we doubt the development in China, as in Japan, of deep moral indignation and resentment at the arrogance of other races in their assumption of inherent superiority and right to own the earth and to exploit all races, keeping them in economic and political inferiority and subjection?

Would not the above described anti-Asiatic policy produce such a feeling of pride, of rivalry, of ambition and indignation as would ultimately render inevitable a world-war of the races, in comparison with which, as many believe, the . . . tragedy in Europe would pale into insignificance?—Sidney L. Gulick, "America and the Orient," pp. 18, 19.

On the rim of the Pacific an issue has appeared which opens up difficulties far greater than those which have hitherto troubled diplomacy. The imperial clashes of today, the intrigues and competitions and wars that harass our world, revolve about the spread of Western commerce among backward peoples. But a new problem has arisen in California, Canada, Australia, infinitely more painful than the struggle of empires. It is a real friction of peoples who do not know how to live together and are forced therefore to compete for territory. The Hindus who cannot settle in Canada, the Japanese and Chinese excluded from the United States, are the first symptoms of a world problem to which no man has proposed a satisfactory answer.—Walter Lippman, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 175, 176.

Those who imagine . . . that the whole question of Asiatic emigration to North America and Australia has been more than temporarily settled are, in my judgment, deceiving themselves altogether. It is pos-

sible, of course, that the internal development of Japan, and behind her of China, may afford a full outlet for the ill-paid labor of the industrious millions in Japan and the tens of millions of China. But this does not seem in the least likely for many a long year to come. When, consequently, the vast populations of eastern Asia move in earnest towards a peaceful colonization of the European settlements bordering on the Pacific Ocean, and when they do this with the support and under the leadership of the Governments of Japan and China, it is difficult to see how their demand for free access to such sparsely-peopled territories as southern California, British Columbia, and western Australia can be effectively resisted.—H. M. Hyndman, "The Awakening of Asia," p. 175.

China . . . contains as yet no extraordinary difficulties, as the case of Russia does; no conglomeration of national and racial problems, as middle Europe does; no such festering caldron of jealousies and hatreds, as the Balkan question does. Yet in the last twenty years China has been developing into a combined Russia, middle Europe, and Balkans, with the antagonistic ambitions of several powerful nations concentrated on a struggle to control her or to possess the lion's share of her remains. What this situation leads to in international affairs has been sufficiently demonstrated by recent events. If China's case does not get sympathetic attention and just treatment by the world, it will not be possible for any one who knows the realities of international politics hereafter to hear their altruistic professions with any confidence or respect.—Thomas F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," pp. 357, 358.

Japan is a mighty potential force in the world. When every qualification has been stated, she is today the outstanding native power in Asia. She is the one determined and intelligently constructive force in all the lands that border the western Pacific. Her shadow is, indeed, over all Asia. . . . The lines of her policy are clear and far-reaching. Her prevision is astute; her will determined. She will be the shaping power of the East and the question which remains is simply this: Shall that power be Christian or pagan, theistic or agnostic, egoistic or altruistic, autocratic or popular? It is not conceivable that civilization anywhere in the world can placidly accept this uncertainty as a matter of insignificant concern.

But even this is a mere fragment of the story. Eastern Asia is the unexplored El Dorado of potential trade for all the nations of the world. There are not a few who believe that the real cause of the present European war is to be found in the exhaustless prizes of commerce which are offered in the western Pacific littoral. Indeed in some large sense this must be true, for back of all strivings of a thousand years has been the desire to reach the coveted riches which are concealed beyond these mysterious curtains. In any case, the opportunity to appropriate the mineral and agricultural riches of China and vicinity and the trade of

unnumbered millions will be the irresistible magnet which shall draw all the great races of the world into competition such as the world has never seen before. Here there is certain to come the gathering ambition of the world's dominating nations. Here will be another melting pot of international eagerness and struggle. To exaggerate is not necessary; but there are many who, knowing the East, look out upon the coming impact of the races in Eastern Asia with most solemn concern. And in all this Japan, as a nation, will be the sponsor. Her faith and her ideals will be influential beyond our power to anticipate. With what faith and what ideals shall she exercise her efficient sway in this hour, when, lifted so suddenly out of the isolation of the past, she becomes the arbiter of such world destinies?—American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Deputation to Japan, "The Kingdom of God in Japan," pp. 71, 72.

### **America's Relation to the Far Eastern Problem**

The United States has a unique role to play in this realignment of world politics and in the remaking of China. The Pacific Ocean is fast becoming the basin of political and commercial activities, and what affects one side of it is bound to affect the other. The United States cannot afford, for the safety of its own interests, to have China dominated by an aggressive and militaristic nation, European or Asiatic. The effete notion of splendid isolation is out of date, and America can no longer hold herself aloof and keep away from the entangling alliances of the old world. The world is being too closely unified for two incompatible political ideals to exist together—imperialistic autocracy based upon militarism, and representative democracy founded on political liberty. . . .

The United States fought for her own freedom in the Declaration of Independence. She was willing to fight for the freedom of the peoples of the Western hemisphere in declaring the Monroe Doctrine. In the European War she fought for the freedom and democracy of the whole world. China, if unselfishly aided and wisely guided, can revive her ancient genius and develop her vast potential resources, and will eventually take her place among the powers of the world as a strong, democratic nation. Will the United States of America, true to the new principles of her political conviction, perform her mission toward China in the consummation of this noble task?—Henry Chung, "The Oriental Policy of the United States," pp. 108-110.

If we are to grapple with the issues which distract the world, we have got to enter the theaters of trouble. If the United States is to be a leader, or even an important factor, in the stabilizing of mankind, it must create interests which will justify its participation in world politics. It must invest and trade in the backward countries. This will give our diplomacy a leverage on events. And to be effective that diplomacy will have to be weighted with armaments of sufficient power to make it heard

by the great powers. Moreover, we shall have to abandon our traditional dislike of European alliances. If we enter the arena of the world, we cannot stand entirely alone; we shall have to work in coalition with the powers whose policy is most nearly like our own.

That is, I realize, a terrifying program to most Americans. It terrifies me, and disturbs every prejudice of my training. We have all of us been educated to isolation, and we love the irresponsibility of it. But that isolation must be abandoned if we are to do anything effective for internationalism. Of course, if we wish to let the world go hang, we may be able to defend our coasts against attack and establish a kind of hermit security for ourselves. But even that security will be precarious in such a world arranged as this one has come to be. Less and less is it possible to remain neutral, to stay out of the conflicts.—Walter Lippman, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 226, 227.

### The Work of the Missionaries

The world is now *one* in fact. Untold miseries, and cataclysms worse far than that from which we are emerging, lie in store for us unless the world becomes one also in heart. . . .

The hope of the world lies, in sober truth, with those who preach peace to them that are afar off as well as to them that are nigh. Those shuddering possibilities of wreckage and horror can be averted by the breaking down of spiritual barriers, and by religious union among nations and races, for the silly nineteenth-century habit of ignoring the religious factor is contrary to all the record of history: religion is the ultimate motive of mankind, in all its forms; it is the great fundamental power that frames civilization and that moves men in their masses to great decisions and abiding achievements.

No doubt much of the surviving prejudice against foreign missions is due to actions which reflected the utmost possible credit upon them. But the missionaries have succeeded. . . . In every part of the world they are leavening society. They have a power beyond that of even the European official, who is just, able, hard-working, and very honorable, but a little cold and aloof. They are building everywhere the spiritual bridges, and bridges are what are needed everywhere; they are showing everywhere the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. They are making men of all, or almost all, nations and races see a glimpse of a better ideal than preying upon one another and fighting against one another. They are bringing us to realize that the better the ideals of each race the more those ideals coincide . . . ; because the nearer we are to God the nearer we are to one another. In a quite definite way they are becoming the inner statesmen of the new world; and the wisest rulers and administrators nowadays take ample counsel of them.—Percy Dearmer, "The Call of the Far," *East and West*, July, 1919, 207-209.

### The Spirit of Greed and Conquest

The ultimate fact behind the recent world-conflict is that the work life of the world is organized around the spirit of greed and conquest. No stable and enduring peace can be created without reckoning with this fact. If mankind would save itself from wasting death by a continued series of conflicts, it must find a new manner of living in times of peace. It is a choice not simply between two principles of government, but between two philosophies of life. The world must choose between life organized around the principle of strife, and life organized around the principle of good will. The way out of war and its horrors is not by paper pacts merely, but by the creation of a new world. It is not merely a question of new political constitutions or of new forms of social organizations; it is also a question of motives and organizing principle. Shall civilization seek property or life, the creation of goods or the development of humanity? Shall its organizing principle be strife or love, service or exploitation, the right of the strong, as individuals and a class, to rule, or the duty of the strong to serve?—Harry F. Ward, "The Opportunity for Religion," pp. 14, 15.

You cannot have a social Christianity in China and an individualistic Christianity at home—not permanently, that is. You cannot say Japan ought to treat China unselfishly, care for the welfare of the young girls in its cotton factories, and make place for the teaching of religion in its schools, and yet allow America to make national selfishness the controlling principle of its foreign policy, treat disputes between capital and labor as private quarrels between individual groups, and divorce the teaching of the churches on Sunday from the practice of their members on the other six days of the week. . . .

This missionary consciousness, then, that we wish to develop is something much bigger than a belief in foreign missions. It is the belief that Christian principles ought to be consistently applied in all human relations beginning with those which lie nearest ourselves. The man who believes this and acts accordingly has the missionary consciousness. The man who does not, has not.—William Adams Brown, *International Review of Missions*, October, 1917, pp. 501, 502.

Brotherhood in international economic relations is still in the clouds. No systematic attempt has as yet been made to apply the principle of the Golden Rule to the economic relations between peoples. . . . Every country, like every merchant and manufacturer, has certain material possessions or resources which the world needs, and which it has a duty to make available to the world on fair and honorable terms. . . . The last half-century has taught us that the ordinary "commercial inducements" which actuate individual traders do not promote a fair division of the world's resources; and also that the adoption by governments,

socialistic or otherwise, of the same commercial standard leads to no better result. Two self-interests cannot between them create a common interest: a self-interested seller in Britain and a self-interested buyer in Germany or Canada do not between them add to the total of human good will. This simple truth . . . spells the doom of all attempts to improve international economic relations whilst leaving the *motives* by which it is ordinarily guided unchecked and uncriticized. It is as true of nations as of individuals that they cannot serve both God and Mammon. Till this is realized in all its implications . . . economic policy is likely to remain, what it is at this moment, the storm center of international politics.—Professor Alfred E. Zimmern, *Student Movement*, February, 1920, pp. 66, 67.

We are standing today on the greatest watershed of human history. We look around and we see the wreckage wrought by selfishness. A distracted and stricken world is thundering in our ears its need of Christ. Selfishness at last stands unmasked, and we see the end of it. Of course it is the enemy in politics. Twenty years ago we proved it when a statesman said: "I guide my country's policy by my country's interests." Today we are witnessing something which might almost be called a nationalist mania, of new boundaries drawn by nationalist lines. Are they going to give us a united world or a fresh crop of selfish patriotism? Unless and until the Lord Jesus Christ fills the hearts of men with the love of the great human brotherhood we can have no vision of world citizenship. Look at industry. There is no escape from the selfish strife of competition—man against man and class against class—except by a Christian motive of love, service, and cooperation. Industry has got to remain competitive and selfish until it becomes Christian. Today we are witnessing a new danger. The old perpendicular lines of cleavage between race and race are being supplanted by horizontal lines of cleavage between class and class and only one thing can save us from a class war, and that is a community of mutual service—fellow-members with different functions, fellow-members of the same body, organizing for the good of all. But, if we witness the exposure of selfishness in its horror, we have also seen it in its weakness. Do you see how selfishness is revealed by this world war as essentially self-destructive? It has raised man against man and nation against nation in mutual destruction. We have seen the doom of selfishness. It is written there. Selfishness cannot be the basis of society. Life is this—it means a world of mutual service.—Rev. W. E. S. Holland, Address at Sheffield, England, November, 1919.

There can be no question which is the Christian way, the way of ruthless competition, or the way of generous cooperation; the way of the jungle, or the way of humanity. When God said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," He meant it to govern not individuals and families

only, but nations. He meant it to apply to Germany in her relations with Belgium, to Austria in her relations with Serbia, to the United States in her relations with Mexico and China. When the apostle gave as the law of Christ the great principle that "We that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak," he set forth a principle which must be in eternal conflict with the law of self-advantage and exploitation, till it drive it out of the social life of mankind.—William P. Merrill, "Christian Internationalism," pp. 135, 136.

### **Organizing the Will of God in the Life of All Peoples**

The appraising eyes that look out on the affairs of the earth today, however, will find that a . . . dominant characteristic of the world situation is interdependence. It is, indeed, a curious paradox that a world of such unparalleled disquiet should, at the same time, be a world of universal interdependence. Yet a survey of the life of all four continents reveals the fact that, not only are all peoples now inescapably "bound up in the bundle of life" together, but the uniting bonds are being woven in swiftly increasing closeness and complexity. . . .

The world today is one body, in which the cable, wireless telegraphy, and telephone are the nerves carrying the messages that are the impulses to action; and the steamship lines, the intercontinental railways, and the air routes are the arteries carrying to and fro the pulsating blood of humanity. . . .

We are interdependent also in all the raw material of our civilization; we starve, our mills and factories close, our whole industrial, political, social life is paralyzed, if there is cessation of the flow of our products from one to the other. The common things that we handle or wear every day—the soap, the tea, the cocoa, the rice, the coffee, the cotton or wool clothing, the gold, come out of everywhere to us. Indeed the very fabric of our ordered life reposes on world-wide intercommunication. There is today a world-interdependence.

All this has its bearing on moral interdependence. If the cotton factories of Japan are run—as they are—on cheap female labor which lives under such atrocious conditions that every bale of cotton that comes thence to us is—morally speaking—saturated with the blood of Japanese womanhood, we are involved in blood-guiltiness. If cocoa or rubber or gold are procured for us anywhere under conditions where men die like flies, and as they die are replaced from supposedly inexhaustible reservoirs of cheap labor, the brand of Cain is ultimately upon us all.

Distance does not break the chain of moral responsibility. Ignorance of the facts cannot be put forward today as a valid defence at the judgment bar of a Christian conscience. The world is one. And we, while we are in it, are inextricably involved in its collective sins of oppression, tyranny, commercial extortion, and the rest.

There is no way out. The only open way is through the wrong



to the right. The bad old order of life must be changed into the good new order of life. And it cannot be changed anywhere without changing it everywhere. As a body can suffer no disease in any limb save at the expense of the whole, so a world bound up as one can afford no slum or tyranny anywhere. . . .

In the lives of this generation there lies dormant the power to lay the foundations of a transformed world. That world will come, if it does come, through the rebuilding and renewal of human life in a civilization where order will reign without tyranny and freedom be exercised without anarchy, a world-commonwealth of good will. Such a commonwealth can come, as Lord Bryce has declared, only through "a change of heart in the peoples of the world." And such a change of heart can emerge only through the sustained labor of a manifold moral leadership rooted in spiritual reality.

We must have the will of God organized in the common life of all peoples, if we are not ultimately to have the will of Mammon driving all races over the precipice of greater wars into the abyss of barbarism. There is, indeed, only one standard so universal in its range, so complete as a solution of the evils that have oppressed man, that all races and every civilization can find in it a final and unifying aim that at once creates personal character, develops national strength, and gives power for united progress. That standard is expressed in the program of the world Kingdom of God.

To state that issue thus is to divide all who face it into those who on the one hand believe that the Christian program has been tried and found wanting and those who on the other hand hold, as G. K. Chesterton has said, that it "has been found difficult and not tried." These latter, who, with Matthew Arnold's Scholar-Gypsy, are "Still nursing the unconquerable hope," are then inevitably led to the decision that if we are to witness a world Kingdom of God, men everywhere must take the whole message of that Kingdom to the whole world, and incorporate its fundamental verities of spiritual reality and moral principle in the individual, social, national, commercial, international, and indeed interracial life of all humanity. The horizon, as President Wilson has said, is now "ultimate." That Kingdom can admit no frontiers, because it cannot cease its campaigns till it has brought into its dominion the whole life of all men everywhere.

As a war is carried to its victorious end by the cooperation of all arms—on sea and land and in the air—so this new world order will be triumphantly achieved only through the free enlistment of this generation of young men and women for the common service of the civil servant, the teacher, and the missionary; the artist, the doctor, and the nurse; the soldier and sailor, the social worker, the lawyer, the engineer, the planter, the priest and the prophet, the member of Parliament, the parent, and the merchant.

In the sustained labor of such a manifold moral leadership, rooted in spiritual reality and issuing in the service of humanity, lies the authentic hope of a human scene in which the confused and bitter rivalries of nations will be changed to an enduring world-fraternity. And ultimately such a leadership reposes on the will-to-service of the individual men and women who can say now in their young strength—

“I can devote myself;  
I have a life to give.”

—Basil Mathews, in “Essays on Vocation,” pp. 10-14.



## MOST USEFUL BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

BASHFORD, JAMES WHITFORD

China; an Interpretation. Rev. and Enlarged Ed. \$2.50. New York, Abingdon Press, 1919. 668p.

\*BROWN, ARTHUR JUDSON

The Mastery of the Far East; the story of Korea's transformation and Japan's rise to supremacy in the Orient. \$6.00. New York, Scribner, 1919. 671p.

CHUNG, HENRY

The Oriental Policy of the United States; with introductory note by Jeremiah W. Jenks. \$2.00. New York, Revell, 1919. 306p.

GULICK, SIDNEY L.

America and the Orient: outline of a constructive policy. 25c. New York, Missionary Education Movement, 1916. 100p.

\*HORNBECK, STANLEY KUHLE

Contemporary Politics in the Far East. \$3.00. New York, Appleton, 1916. 466p.

\*KAWAKAMI, KIYOSHI KARL

Japan and World Peace. \$1.50. New York, Macmillan, 1919. 196p.

KAWAKAMI, KIYOSHI KARL

Japan in World Politics. \$1.50. New York, Macmillan, 1917. 230p.

McKENZIE, FREDERICK ARTHUR

Korea's Fight for Freedom. \$2.00. New York, Revell, 1920. 320p.

\*MILLARD, THOMAS FRANKLIN FAIRFAX

Democracy and the Eastern Question; the Problem of the Far East as Demonstrated by the Great War, and Its Relation to the United States of America. \$3.00. New York, Century, 1919. 446p.

\*POWERS, HARRY HUNTINGTON

America among the Nations, \$1.50. New York, Macmillan, 1917. 373p.

SPEER, ROBERT ELLIOTT

The Gospel and the New World. \$2.00. New York, Revell, 1919. 313p.

The current periodicals carry much material on the Far East. The more important of these magazines are indexed in the Readers' Guide

\*The five books starred are perhaps most useful, if the inclusive list cannot be made available.



to Periodical Literature and the Readers' Guide Supplement, appearing monthly. These can be consulted in almost any library of size. See under headings China, Chinese, Japan, Japanese, Korea, Korean, Far East, etc. The most useful single magazine is doubtless *Asia*, "the American magazine on the Orient," 627 Lexington Avenue, New York City, \$3.00 a year. The magazine is prevailingly sympathetic with China, but gives from time to time a vigorous presentation of Japan's point of view by Japanese writers. The magazine deals, of course, with all of Asia. *Millard's Review* and the *Far Eastern Review*, both published at Shanghai, and the *Trans-Pacific*, published at Tokyo, are also useful.

For the pro-Japanese point of view, secure the *East and West News*, issued weekly by the East and West News Bureau, Woolworth Building, New York City. For the pro-Chinese point of view, secure the weekly *Bulletin* from the Far Eastern Bureau, 13 Astor Place, New York City. For the point of view of the American Protestant Churches, write for the publications of the Committee on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 105 East 22d Street, New York City. For articles on Christian progress in the nations of the Orient see the monthly numbers of the *Missionary Review of the World*, and of *World Outlook*, New York City. The outstanding Christian periodicals published in the Far East are the *Chinese Recorder*, Shanghai, and the *Japan Evangelist*, Tokyo.



